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ABSTRACT 
Although public health services have been responding to emergencies for a long time, 
public health emergency preparedness is an evolving field. Improvements in public 
health preparedness often make little progress, as a result of a lack of a shared 
understanding of the topic and agreed criteria for emergency response and 
preparedness. It may be concluded from the existing literature that it is difficult to 
make such improvements because of a lack of a capacity to measure objectively 
public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) and that this is caused principally by a 
lack of consensus on the definition of public health emergency preparedness and its 
key elements. 
Purpose 
This research is directed towards the development of a means of measuring public 
health preparedness and to thus provide a method for driving improvement. To 
develop reliable and valid preparedness metrics, this research sought to identify and 
validate a comprehensive evaluation framework and to develop and test a 
standardized index to measure hospital PHEP. 
Design and methods  
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was used in this study. The 
qualitative study includes a comprehensive literature review, intensive interviews with 
key experts and transitions to an agreed framework through a modified Delphi 
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approach. The quantitative study involved a cross-sectional survey of hospitals in 
Sichuan province of China using the assessment tool (questionnaire) which was 
developed as a result of the qualitative studies.  
The research was undertaken in three sub studies: 
Study 1sought to identify the concepts and findings about hospital public health 
emergency preparedness from the literature (Chapter 2), and this was complemented 
by intensive interviews with key expert informants. A meta-ethnographic approach 
was used to review and synthesize the findings of the literature. This led to an 
understanding of what hospital PHEP is and to the development of a conceptual 
model together with a set of elements. 
Study 2 sought to further develop a framework for evaluating hospital PHEP. This 
was undertaken by using a modified Delphi approach supported by a panel of experts 
assembled from three areas (administering organizations, technological and academic 
institutions). It was further evaluated by analysis of qualitative data gathered by 
applying questionnaires to hospitals in the Sichuan province. Convergence of expert 
opinion was measured by using Kendall’s coefficient of convergence W, mean value. 
Internal and external reliability of indicator system were assessed by Cronbach’s αand test-retest. 
The content validity and construct validity were proved by Kendall’s W and the 
Spearman’s correlation respectively.  
Study 3 aimed to estimate the level of preparedness for PHEP by applying the survey 
to hospitals in the rural areas of Sichuan province. There were 46 hospitals surveyed 
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and SPSS 19.0 were used for data analysis. Procedures and tests used in this study to 
analyse the quantitative data included descriptive statistics, t-test, and Factor Analysis. 
Findings 
A conceptual model for hospital PHEP with a set of initial elements was developed. 
The model proposed in this research includes five basic metrics which were identified 
as key components of maintaining a high level of PHEP, namely, “staff, stuff, service, 
space and system.” They were constructed around the stages of disaster management 
(pre-, during incident, and post-). The model ties together the core emergency 
preparedness competencies for hospitals, and the elements identified were intricately 
linked and describes PHEP activities for hospitals to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from public health emergencies. 
In the two-round Delphi study, Kendall’s coefficient of convergence W of the whole 
evaluation indicator system was 0.610, and mean value of all indicators were nearly 
3.0, indicating the consensus was achieved after two rounds. The reliability and 
validity were verified by using Crohbach’s Alpha and Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient respectively, and have been demonstrated as ‘good’.  
The final validated evaluation framework comprised of nine key elements: emergency 
plan, PHE detection and identification, laboratory diagnosis capacity, training and 
drills, communication and cooperation, medical treatment capacity, command system, 
and fully staffed workforce. 
The survey of hospitals in rural Sichuan was then undertaken to test the framework 
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and examine the current status of hospital PHEP in rural areas of Sichuan province 
(China). Through using Factor Analysis method and establishing a statistical model 
(F=0.518F1+0.173F2+0.160F3+0.150F4), there were four major contributing factors 
identified which mainly affect hospital PHEP, namely, hospital service capacity factor, 
human resource factor, stockpiles and facilities factor, management, direction and 
coordination (MDC) factor.  
The results of this study indicate that the majority of hospitals in the rural area of 
Sichuan province had a capacity to respond to public health emergencies, but still face 
some challenges and shortcomings. Additionally, comparison of hospital’s 
preparedness capacity using these four factors, revealed that tertiary-grade, teaching 
and general hospitals performed better than secondary-grade, non-teaching and 
non-general hospitals with statically significant. 
Discussion 
This research provides a comprehensive review and description of hospital PHEP, and 
confirms the key dimensions of hospital PHEP which could be used to develop new 
research surveys or improve the current tools. The proposed new and validated 
framework provides hospitals with a practical tool that facilitates the understanding of 
PHEP activities and decision-making for hospital PHEP investment with a view to 
building sustainability targets. It will also support critical developmental activities of 
hospitals: pre-planning, coordination, quality improvement; health service 
improvement; effectiveness of training and drills; resources prioritization. The 
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framework may also be helpful in constructing plans and strategies to enhance 
hospital preparedness and performance. 
This study does have limitations. The sample size of 46 hospitals is relatively limited 
and selection bias also may have occurred. There may also be respondent reporting 
bias as a self-report method was used. Additionally, the research was conducted over 
almost 12 months, during which time there may be some changes in PHEP of the 
surveyed hospitals.  
Further research is necessary to build on the findings of this study. The framework 
should be further validated across various provinces and in other jurisdictions outside 
of China. It should also be tested against more long term objective measures of 
hospital performance in public health emergencies. As the aim of research is to guide 
preparedness and response, focus should also be placed on practical guidelines and 
tools that may facilitate improvement. 
In future, hospital PHEP research in China should make efforts to (1) establish a 
universally accepted standard of prepared PHEP which is accepted by policy makers 
and stakeholders, particularly those charged with evaluating the capacity of the public 
health and safety systems (Zhao Qi, 2009; Fan Liping, 2012;), (2) create a theoretical 
structure for further studies, and (3) integrate research of different disciplines. 
Therefore, researchers should give more attention to basic concepts, principles and 
methods, their application to public health incidents and disasters, and the key 
functional systems required to develop emergency resilience of hospitals. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Public health emergencies directly affect people’s health, economic development and 
social stability. In the past decade, a succession of public health emergencies has 
challenged preparedness and response capacities of government agencies, hospitals 
and clinics, public health agencies and academic researchers around the world. Figure 
one displays a number of previous examples, and highlights the diversity and 
frequency of events that can be expected to occur in the foreseeable future. 
 
Figure 1 A timeline of major public health emergencies worldwide 
Each of these events has significantly challenged the public health systems and 
impacted on the health and wellbeing of affected people. For example, the epidemic 
of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) not only challenged the health 
systems capacity to respond but also directly affected health workers with 
consequential effects on the capacity of the health services to function. Similarly 
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H5N1 influenza (Bird Flu) while currently affecting a relatively small number of 
people has the potential to become human to human transmissible and with it high 
mortality rate could result in catastrophic rates of mortality and morbidity. In addition 
natural disasters such as the 2010 earthquakes in Haiti, China and Pakistan illustrate 
the potential diverse and complex forms that the threat to public health may take. 
Destruction of public health protections such as sewerage systems, clean water 
supplies and safe food can cause very significant mortality and morbidity. 
Health systems need to be resilient which may be defined as the capacity of the 
system to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the impacts of 
PHEPs. Maintaining emergency preparedness of hospitals is not a static effort, but is a 
dynamic process. Because emergencies happen suddenly and often unpredictably, 
preparedness for major emergencies is different from the routine functions of 
hospitals. However, measuring the capability of hospitals to respond to major 
disasters is undertaken under normal stress and not in the environment of non-routine 
stress.  
It is difficult to predict the performance of hospitals under such major pressures; 
therefore any evaluation must be constructed around the stages of disaster 
management. A dynamic framework necessitates developing an organizational system 
and structure, reviewing resources, training staff, testing and improving service 
capability. In response to such threats to human health, many nations, led by the 
World Health Organization (WHO), have put in place systems and structures that seek 
to ensure the protection of the health and wellbeing of people. Further, there has been 
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a heightened interest in using surveys to assess preparedness for various disasters. The 
knowledge generated through well-designed, effectively executed research in 
anticipation of, in the midst of, and after an emergency, is critical to better achieve the 
overarching goals of preparedness, namely: preventing injury, illness, disability, and 
death, and supporting recovery (Lurie N, et al. 2013). 
During and after incidents hospitals play the main role of providing health services to 
people, on time and without any interruption (Barbara I. Braun, et al. 2006). 
Additionally, hospitals are also crucial for those who are charged with planning how 
to prevent and treat large outbreaks of infectious disease and other mass casualty 
events (Niska, Shimizu. 2011). In response to this concern, China, the focus of the 
current study, has invested heavily in the state and local public health infrastructure, 
and has provided funds to survey hospitals about their preparedness of response to 
public health emergencies (Qi Zhao, 2009; LQ Liuet al., 2006).  
However, the existing research has centred on areas which are relatively rich in 
human and material resources, or in the provincial and municipal health care 
institutions. According to the characteristics of emergency events in China, public 
health emergencies frequently occur in remote and rural areas. Therefore, the rural 
hospitals may be the first major response capability for public health emergency 
responses and management (Hu GQ 2006). Moreover, the rural areas have 60% of the 
nation’s population, but only 20% of its health resources (Qi Zhao, 2009). Thus, rural 
health care institutions may face some unprecedented challenges, such as proximity to 
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potential terror targets, and to international borders, as well as the availability of food 
and water supplies.  
Since 2009, the Chinese government has invested more than 57 billion RMB in the 
renovation and expansion of county level hospitals (FL Lin, 2010). Despite the 
magnitude of this investment, it is difficult to measure, objectively, the progress that 
has been made, and the preparedness gaps that remain (Institute of Medicine 2008). 
Moreover, it is also difficult to measure hospital preparedness for some challenges 
arising from public health emergencies. For example: 
(1) There are no national standards of “ideal preparedness”. Many experts posit 
that, to be realistic, jurisdictions of different sizes and characteristics may require 
different objectives. However, no consensus has been reached about the minimum 
functions that could be expected to see implemented at various levels (Pezzino et 
al. 2006). 
(2) There are no standardized and validated instruments to assess and measure 
hospital preparedness for public health emergencies. Further, no consensus exists 
about any given tool, and no tool has been adopted broadly (Jenkins, et al 2013）. 
The research attempts to fill the identified gaps. It also seeks to identify the key 
functions or activities for hospital preparedness, which would enable the reliable and 
valid assessment of the status of hospital preparedness. 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
China has made significant progress in their preparedness system in recent years. For 
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example, it has already established a standardized monitoring, early warning and 
reporting system for public health emergencies, using the principles of hierarchical 
management and graded response. Currently, the country’s public health emergency 
response system, at the national level, is based mainly on the CDC (Centers for 
Disease Control) and medical assistance units. At the township level the system tends 
to rely on the local county hospitals. Further, these hospitals play a leading role in the 
three-level medical network in rural areas. 
However, evidence from the literature suggests that, within China, the rural health 
care infrastructure is ill-prepared for a large-scale public health emergency event 
when compared to the urban areas’ capabilities, mostly because of the limited 
capabilities and constrained health resources in the rural areas. Rural hospitals tend to 
have less capacity and resources than their urban and suburban counterparts (Zhao Qi, 
2009; Ji Xing, 2011; Cheng Qinglin, 2010). 
Sichuan, a mountainous province, located in the southwest of China, has high 
population mobility, a poor economy, and low health standards. Nevertheless, the 
public health emergency system has developed and improved over recent years; 
however, it still lacks appropriate resources for public health emergencies, particularly 
in the rural areas (YZ Chen, et al., 2009). 
Definition of rural area: In China, agriculture area, has town and village, mainly 
depends on agriculture and husbandry, including different kinds of farms (raise 
livestock and aquafarm), tree farm, gardening etc. The region mainly lived 
agricultural population who engaged in agricultural production. 
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Thus, there is an urgent need to strengthen and improve rural hospital’s capability in 
order to effectively control or manage public health emergencies, and to improve 
people’s health and wellbeing.  
1.3 Research Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to develop an evaluation framework including a set of 
key indicators related to public health emergency preparedness for hospitals, and to 
examine the current status of disaster preparedness in rural hospitals by using the 
framework in Sichuan province. 
In order to achieve the research aim, there are four main research objectives: 
1. To understand the concept of hospital public health emergency preparedness and 
identify its key elements 
2. To design a framework for assessment of hospital public health emergency 
preparedness. 
3. To utilize the framework to test its validity and utility. 
4. To evaluate the current status of hospital preparedness in rural areas and identify 
the contributing factors which may derive possible improvements. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This research will address the following questions: 
1. What is hospital public health emergency preparedness? 
2. How could hospital preparedness be assessed? 
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3. What is the current status of hospital public health emergency preparedness in 
rural areas of China (Sichuan)? 
1.5 Significance of Research 
It is difficult to measure a hospital’s preparedness ability to respond to a bioterrorist 
attack, pandemic influenza, or any other large-scale public health emergency (Nelson 
C, Lurie N, Wasswman J., 2007). This situation has not developed because of a 
shortage of measures of preparedness, but because of uncertain goals, a lack of 
agreement about what the measures should aim at and how they should be interpreted, 
and a weak system of accountability for producing results (Lurie N, Wasserman J, 
2006). 
Currently, public health emergency preparedness is not well defined compared with 
more traditional public health activities, such as food safety inspections, outbreak 
investigations, community health assessments, immunization clinics, and 
environmental monitoring (Asch SM, Stoto M, Menders M, et al.,2005). 
Given this situation, the concept of hospital public health emergency preparedness 
was proposed by reviewing a meta-analysis of the peer-reviewed literature, as 
published over the last ten years, and the elements for a high level of preparedness 
were identified. The results are expected to help provide a set of shared terms for 
discussion among various actors, especially in relation to what exactly is involved in 
enhanced hospital preparedness. 
Secondly, through an intensive review of the literature and the conduct of a modified 
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Delphi study using key experts, a comprehensive assessment tool for hospitals was 
developed, based on agreed-upon elements. This tool may be used to help hospitals 
recognize how their daily work fits within emergency preparedness, as well as 
identify the gaps and areas for improvement. 
Thirdly, the current state of county hospitals in Sichuan province was examined. By 
measuring preparedness, standard public health emergency preparedness is identified 
and, thus, there can be a reduction in the impact that the public health emergencies 
have on the health and well-being of the people. 
This is one of the first studies in china to examine the preparedness of the Chinese 
hospital system in rural areas for public health emergencies. This research adds to the 
evidence available to guide improvement in preparedness and thus contributes to a 
reduction in risk.  
1.6 Research Scope 
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Figure 2 Map of Research Scope 
As shown in Figure two, the research began with an extensive literature review to 
probe the depth and width of existing knowledge on public health emergency 
preparedness. For the purpose of the current research, the literature review was 
viewed as a preliminary step in understanding the concept of public health 
preparedness, and to validate the establishment of a theoretical framework.  
The objective of developing an evaluation tool and identifying the relevant elements 
centered on the need for a quantitative method which could be used to provide action 
guidelines to the framework. A body of knowledge can be established and advanced 
with confidence only when appropriate methodologies and methods are applied with 
rigor (Fellow & Liu, 1997). In the light of that outlook, in the current study, intensive 
interviews, a Delphi study and a survey were chosen as the methods by which to 
collect the data. The qualitative and quantitative data was processed and analysed with 
computer-assisted tools to derive meaningful results.  
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The dissertation comprises eight chapters. A brief summary of each is outlined as 
follows: 
Chapter One comprises the introduction section which outlines the direction of this 
investigation. It also states the research background, questions and objectives, and 
provides a brief discussion on research methodology and thesis organisation. The 
research scope and significance are also described. 
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Chapter Two summarizes the current state of knowledge via examining the relevant 
papers and publications. Areas include: the concept of public health preparedness; the 
current status of hospital preparedness in China, and the relevant problems of hospital 
preparedness. Accordingly, the research gap is identified from a wide range of 
literature which justifies the need for this research. 
Chapter Three describes the research methodology in detail including: the research 
design, data collection methods (namely intensive interviews, Delphi study, and 
survey); research process; selection of participants and research instrumentation; data 
analysis (quantitative and qualitative) and framework formulation. 
Chapter Four describes the data analysis and presents the results of literature review 
and intensive interviews. The findings are tabulated to illustrate the concept of 
hospital public health emergency preparedness, and consistent elements for a high 
level of preparedness to further the development of a universal self-assessment tool. 
This chapter also discusses the outcomes of the Delphi study and presents the results 
of data analysis. The critical indicators for assessing hospital public health emergency 
preparedness are compiled. 
Chapter Five assesses the current state of hospital preparedness in county and urban 
areas of Sichuan province, and identifies the relevant contributing factors. 
Chapter Six discusses the key findings of the intensive interview, Delphi study, and 
the results of survey in the context of the literature. 
Chapter Seven summarizes the key findings from the previous chapters, and discusses 
11 
 
the overall significance, strengths, limitations and implications of the present study. In 
addition, at the end of the chapter, recommendations for future research are proposed. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this review was to understand the concept of hospital public health 
emergency preparedness, and to examine the current research regarding preparedness 
and response, and to summarize the problems of public health emergency 
preparedness in China. 
This chapter includes three parts. In the first part of the review, the definition and key 
elements of public health emergency preparedness (PHEP) are examined, and the 
instruments for assessing public health response system are presented and evaluated.  
In the second section, a brief description of the public health emergency preparedness 
and response system in China is introduced, followed by an analysis of current 
hospital capacity of PHEP in China according to the previous studies, and 
identification of the deficiencies and relevant factors.  
Finally, building upon the two previous sections, the review of literature narrowed to 
the subject of the measurement of public health preparedness program effectiveness, 
and how a supported measurement methodology was applied in China. 
This literature includes both peer- and non-peer-reviewed sources to ensure wide 
coverage of less accessible materials such as government reports.
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Part 1  
2.1 Concept of Hospital Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
2.1.1 Background 
Public health threats are always present. Whether caused by natural, accidental, or 
intentional means, these threats can lead to the onset of public health incidents. 
During and after incidents hospitals play the main role of providing health services to 
the people, on time and without any interruption. Being prepared to prevent, respond 
to, and rapidly recover from, public health threats is critical for protecting and 
securing a nation’s public health; thus, the importance of hospital preparedness has 
been highlighted. 
All hospitals should have emergency plans, have prepared beds, drugs, and equipment, 
and have educated and trained staff in advance to respond to any public health 
emergency (Loutfy MR, Wallington T, Mederski B, et al. 2004). 
The research on hospital public health emergency preparedness in China is still at an 
early stage. For example, there are no uniformly accepted, standardised definitions 
and no conceptual framework to provide a structure for the research (XiaoPingGao 
2010).  
This part of the thesis first proposes a definition of hospital public health emergency 
preparedness, and identifies the common themes relating to the concept of hospital’s 
preparedness for public health emergencies. Consequently, it is the basis for the 
development of an agreed framework for evaluation. 
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2.1.2 Methods 
Having explored the definitions of a hospital’s preparedness the literature review 
focuses on the following four research questions: (1) What is public health emergency 
preparedness? (2)What available, existing instruments are closely related to hospital 
preparedness? (3) What key components of commonality, with the identified 
instruments, can be used to evaluate hospital preparedness? And (4) What is an 
appropriate conceptual framework to synthesise these key components into the 
concept of hospital preparedness? 
To address these questions, this section followed a meta-ethnographic approach to 
synthesise findings across included studies. This meta-analysis translates ideas, 
concepts, and metaphors across different studies and is increasingly seen as the 
well-developed approach for synthesising qualitative health research.  
Further, this part comprises of four distinct phases: (1) a rigorous search of the 
literature to identify relevant articles; (2) a critical appraisal of the identified 
articles;(3) the development of a comprehensive definition of a hospital’s public 
health emergency preparedness, and (4) a subsequent meta-analysis to identify 
consensus elements for high levels of preparedness to further the development for a 
universal self-assessment tool. 
The literature analysed in this section was identified through a comprehensive search 
strategy and analytical process. Figure three maps the process and outcomes of the 
review. Six electronic databases were used for the years 2002 to early 2014 (ProQuest, 
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EBSCO, Web of Science, Pubmed, Scopus, and Science Direct). The combined 
groups of terms were used during the search of the databases: disaster/emergencies, 
preparedness, hospital, assess/measure/evaluate, and instruments/tool/indications.  
Additionally, snowballing strategies were used once specific key studies were 
retrieved. The related key references, citations, instrument names, and author names 
of the identified articles were inspected to ensure that all relevant articles were 
included. The focus identified peer reviewed journal articles close to the evaluation 
instrument of the hospital PHEP. 
Studies were included that used qualitative methods focusing on instruments for 
measuring or evaluating the concept of hospital preparedness or the related concepts 
in the face of public emergencies. Papers were included that reported qualitative 
research only, as well a research using both qualitative and quantitative methods 
(mixed method) that reported the qualitative findings. The search was limited to 
journal articles published in English and Chinese. We used four inclusion and 
exclusion criteria to select articles. (1) We included studies that used qualitative 
methods focusing on instruments for measuring or evaluating the concept of hospital 
preparedness or the related concepts in the face of public emergencies. (2) We 
included papers that reported qualitative research only, as well as research using 
qualitative and quantitative methods (mixed method) that reported qualitative findings. 
(3) In order to obtain authoritative information, this review included only peer 
reviewed journal articles; books, reports and conference abstracts were excluded. (4) 
The study only focuses on community preparedness, staff preparedness, individual 
preparedness which could not be adapted to hospital preparedness were excluded. 
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Figure 3 Search process and study selection 
2.1.3 Critical Appraisal of Articles 
The research assessed the quality of individual studies using a checklist based on an 
existing appraisal scoring system for quantitative study quality assessment (Critical 
Appraisal Skills Programme). Evaluating a study’s quality involves the reviewer 
depicting the range of quality across the included studies (Munroet al., 2007). Thus, 
the strengths and weaknesses of the research articles were identified using this 
approach. The findings of studies can be weighted by the quality grade of the studies 
included. Therefore, the poorer-quality studies tended to contribute less to the 
cumulative meta-analyses, and the synthesis, therefore, became “weighted” towards 
the findings of the better quality studies (Munro et al. 2007; Campbell et al., 2011). 
Study quality was assessed by two reviewers independently using a pretested form 
2162 papers potentially 
relevant records identified 
through 6 databases searching 
Titles and abstracts screened 
13 papers included in 
synthesis  
22 papers considered eligible 
for inclusion (n=22) 
Exclusion criteria: 
· focus on quantitative, 
empirical studies only 
· books, reports, and 
conference abstracts  
· cannot be adapted to 
hospital preparedness for 
public health emergencies 
5 duplicate papers 
excluded, and 4  
ineligible papers excluded  
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(Table 1). No studies were excluded on the basis of quality. 
Table 1 Methodological Quality of Included Studies (n=15) Adapted by author from Munro, 
2007 
 
Quality Criterion 
Agreed Assessment for Each Study 
Yes No 
Screening 
Questions 
1. Was there a clear statement of the aims of the 
research? 
2. Is a qualitative methodology appropriate? 
15 
 
14 
0 
 
1 
Aims 3. Is there a clear statement of the aims of the 
research? 
13 
 
0 
Appropriate 
research design 
4. Was the research design appropriate to address 
the aims of the research? 
11 4 
Sampling  5. Is the sampling method clearly described? 
6. Is the sampling strategy appropriate for the 
research question?  
9 
12 
 
9 
3 
 
Data collection 7. Is the method of data collection clearly described? 
8. Is the data collection appropriate to the research 
question? 
15 
14 
0 
1 
Data analysis 9. Was the data analysis sufficiently rigorous? 14 1 
Findings  10. Is there a clear statement of findings 15 0 
 
2.1.4 Results 
Related Concepts 
A number of related concepts are included within the results, namely: public health 
emergency, preparedness, public health emergency preparedness. 
Public health emergency 
The World Health Organisation defines a public health emergency as: 
"an occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition, caused by bio 
terrorism, epidemic or pandemic disease, or (a) novel and highly fatal infectious 
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agent or biological toxin, that poses a substantial risk of a significant number of 
human facilities or incidents or permanent or long-term disability (WHO/DCD, 
2001).” 
However, this definition is relatively restrictive, being limited to infective agents. 
The real threats to public health may be more broadly considered to include anything 
that has the potential to significantly and adversely impact on the health and 
wellbeing of the community. 
The National Disaster Medical System Federal Partners Memorandum of Agreement 
defines a public health emergency as “an emergency need for health care (medical) 
services to respond to a disaster, significant outbreak of an infectious disease, 
bioterrorist attack or other significant or catastrophic event”(NDMS,2005). 
According to the Secretary of the Ministry of Health (MOH, China), public health 
emergencies refer to events that occur unexpectedly and can cause, or potentially 
cause, mass destructions to public health.  
The Public Health Emergency Response Regulations define four categories of such 
events: (1) serious epidemics; (2) mass diseases with unknown causes; (3) large scope 
food poisoning; and (4) other events that can severely affect public health, for 
example, the leaking of infectious bacteria from laboratories (State Department of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2003).  
The Health Emergency Response Handbook classifies PHEP into eight categories: (1) 
serious epidemics and mass diseases with unknown causes; (2) large scope food and 
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professional poisoning; (3) events that leak infectious bacteria from laboratories; (4) 
hazards caused by natural disasters; (5) hazards caused by farm chemicals, ratsbane 
and other toxic chemicals; (6) preventive inoculation accidents; (7) hospital and 
laboratory infections; and (8) other events that can severely affect public health.(Liu 
Q, 2010) 
Chen et al. (2006) divided public health emergencies into six categories according to 
the following characteristics: (1) natural disasters; (2) infectious disease events; (3) 
poisonings; (4) terrorist incidents; (5) nuclear and radioactive accidents; and (6) other 
mass disturbancesthat can severely affect public health.  
Preparedness 
Preparedness is commonly viewed as consisting of activities aimed at improving 
response activities and coping capabilities (Melinda Moore, 2012). Further, the term 
preparedness is typically understood as consisting of measures that enable different 
units of analysis—individuals, households, organizations, communities, and 
societies—to respond effectively and to recover more quickly when disasters strike 
(Sutton&Tierney. 2006). 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) defines preparedness as: activities, 
programs, and systems developed and implemented prior to a disaster/emergency that 
are used to support and enhance the mitigation of, the response to, and the recovery 
from disaster/emergencies.  
The FEMA (the Federal Emergency Management Agency, USA, 2012) defines 
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preparedness as: the leadership, training, readiness and exercise support, and technical 
and financial assistance to strengthen citizens, communities, state, local, and tribal 
governments, and professional emergency workers as they prepare for disasters, 
mitigate the effects of disasters, respond to community needs after a disaster, and 
launch effective recovery efforts. 
The National Research Council (NRC, USA, 2005) reported preparedness efforts as 
aiming to ensure that the resources, necessary for responding effectively in the event 
of a disaster, are in place, and that those faced with having to respond know how to 
use those resources. The activities that are commonly associated with disaster 
preparedness include planning processes to ensure readiness; formulating disaster 
plans; stocking resources necessary for effective response; and developing skills and 
competencies to ensure effective performance of disaster-related tasks. 
Slepski defined emergency preparedness as being based on the term “emergency 
preparedness”, namely, “the comprehensive knowledge, skills, abilities and actions 
needed to prepare for and respond to threatened, actual or suspected chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive incidents, man-made incidents, natural 
disaster or other related events” (Slepski LA, 2005). 
The concept of emergency preparedness also encompasses measures aimed at 
enhancing life safety when a disaster occurs, such as protective actions during an 
earthquake, hazardous materials spill, or terrorist attack. Further, it includes actions 
designed to enhance the ability to undertake emergency actions in order to protect 
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property and contain disaster damage and disruption, as well as the ability to engage 
in post-disaster restoration and early recovery activities. (Jeannette& Sutton, Kathleen 
Tierney, 2006) 
Emergency preparedness activities differ according to which social unit (households, 
business, communications, and public or government entities) is involved. For local 
emergency management agencies, disaster preparedness focuses on establishing 
authorities and responsibilities for emergency actions and resources to support those 
actions (Haddow and Bullock, 2006). 
There are different definitions for preparedness, and the activities and elements of 
preparedness often vary considerably across agencies, and shift dramatically from 
year to year. There are also consistent problems, confused and perplexed state and 
local health officials, businesses, non-profit organisations, and citizens. These 
problems include: What should preparedness aim at? (Jeannette &Sutton, Kathleen 
Tierney, 2008; Nelson C, 2007; Melinda Moore, 2012; Lurie N, Wasserman J, 2006); 
What constitutes preparedness? (Asch SM, Stoto M, Menders M, et al.,2005; Nelson 
C, 2007;Haddow and Bullock 2006); and who should be involved in 
preparedness?(Fraser M, 2007. Asch SM, Stoto M, Mendes M, et al., 2005; Jeannette 
&Sutton, Kathleen Tierney, 2008). 
These questions are considered within the definition of hospital public health 
emergency preparedness. 
Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) 
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Currently, public health emergency preparedness is not well defined. (Asch SM, Stoto 
M, Menders M, et al. 2005). To develop a definition, and identify the activities, three 
aspects must be considered, namely: “what public health emergency preparedness 
should aim at, what public health emergency preparedness activities include, and who 
is involved in it”. 
“What should public health emergency preparedness aim at?” 
Public health emergencies are defined by their health consequences, their causes and 
the precipitating events (Auf der Heide E.1989). A situation becomes emergent when 
its health consequences have the potential to overwhelm routine community 
capabilities.  
Thus, the proposed definition will focus on situations “whose scale, timing, or 
unpredictability threatens to overwhelming routine capabilities” (Nelson C., et al., 
2007). Additionally, the definition should be aligned with the all-hazards approach to 
preparedness instead of focusing on a “disaster du jour” (Keim M, Giannone P.2006), 
and should allow for the optimal development of capabilities across scenarios, and the 
better preparation of communities for the broad spectrum of potential risks (Lindell 
MK, Perry RW., 1993). 
“What do public health emergency preparedness activities include?” 
Preparedness intersects pre-disaster and post-disaster, serving as a temporal connector 
between the pre-impact and post-impact phases of a disaster event (Gordon, Paula. 
2004). Emergency preparedness refers to four processes involved in ensuring an 
23 
 
institution: (1) complying with the preventive measures; (2) having a state of 
readiness to contain the effects of a forecasted disastrous event in order to minimize 
loss of life, injury, and damage to property; (3) providing rescue, relief, rehabilitation, 
and other services in the aftermath of the disaster; and (4) holding the capability and 
resources to continue to sustain its essential functions during a PHE (Thomas J. 
2004). 
Further, PHEP is a process as much as an outcome. It requires continuous 
improvement, including the frequent testing of plans through drills and exercises, and 
the formulation and execution of corrective action plans (Christopher Nelson, Nicole 
Lurie, 2007). It also includes the practice of developing plans and procedures, training 
staff, improving the health and resiliency of communities, and the acquisition of 
facilities, equipment, and materials needed to provide active protection during 
emergency response (Aledort J, Lurie N, Ricci K, Dausey D, Stern S, 2006).Thus, 
PHEP should include a full range of prevention and protection, response, and 
recovery activities, such as developing planning processes to ensure readiness; 
formulating disaster plans, and stockpiling resources necessary for effective response; 
and developing skills and competencies to ensure effective performance of 
disaster-related tasks.  
“Who is involved in public health emergency preparedness?” 
Preparedness is typically understood as consisting of measures that enable different 
units of analysis—individuals, households, organizations, communities, and 
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societies—to respond effectively and recover more quickly when disasters strike 
(Jeannette Sutton, Kathleen Tierney. 2006). 
Responsibility for the preparedness of the nation’s community lies not only with 
governmental agencies, but also with active, engaged, and mobilized community 
residents, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations (Nelson C, et al., 2007). A 
large share of first aid, search-and-rescue, and other initial response activities are 
provided by on-site civilians prior to the arrival of response personnel (KerbyDM, 
Brand M, Johnson D, et al. 2007). This fact indicates that the individuals, households, 
organizations, communities, and societies are involved in the full range of activities. 
Accordingly, involving a broad range of actors in PHEP requires coordination.  
To sum up, the thesis proposes a definition for hospital public health emergency 
preparedness including: the planning and actions that enable hospitals to prevent, 
protect against, quickly respond to, and recover from public health emergencies in a 
timely, coordinated and effective way. These activities may involve different 
units—individuals, households, organizations, communities, and societies. 
Measurements and Themes of Hospital PHEP 
Meta-analysis 
Based on the meta-ethnography approach, this research followed a 7-step process 
(Noblit GW, Hare RD. 1988), using reciprocal translations, and analogous to constant 
comparisons in primary qualitative research, to compare the themes identified in each 
study. A “line-of-argument synthesis” was conducted, an approach similar to 
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grounded theory in primary research(Munro, et al. 2007), to determine an evaluation 
instrument for hospital public health emergency preparedness.  
(1) Identifying themes and concepts 
Concepts, themes, and subthemes were identified by reading and rereading the 
included studies. Initially, the author manually summarized the existing studies’ 
original findings by using original terms and key concepts from the articles. In this 
process, primary themes and sub-themes were found in the results section of an article, 
and secondary themes (translation)were extracted in the discussion and conclusion 
section of these studies, plus the definition of public health emergency preparedness 
(Nelson, Nicole, et al. 2007). Although the foci of these studies were different, and 
not all their components were directly comparable, a number of recurring themes and 
sub-themes were identified; they were then added to the initial themes.  
(2) Determining how the studies are related 
Thematic analysis was used to develop categories from the identified primary themes 
in the included studies. Thematic analysis was conducted in three main stages: (1) 
Identify themes or code findings; (2) Determine how studies are related; (3) 
Synthesise themes. Some primary themes were extracted from the stage 1 (Table 1). 
Stage 2 required that the relationships between the concepts (primary themes) arising 
from the different papers were considered. The author looked across the different 
papers for common concepts. These concepts represent related themes and concepts 
and, initially, included: prevent, protect and response ability; surveillance; training 
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and drills; stockpiles; emergency management; staff; on-site rescue and medical 
treatment; evaluation, and emergency funding. These categories were revised and 
merged through discussions with the research team. A similar process was followed 
for the sub-themes from the included studies. Stage 3 was conducted by following the 
steps: 
(3) Reciprocal translation of studies 
According to the meta-ethnographic method, categories were identified across each 
article, while the primary themes were translated from each study to determine the 
sub-themes. The translation involved a comparison of themes across papers and an 
attempt to “match” themes from one paper with themes from another, ensuring that a 
key theme captured similar themes from different papers (Britten et al., 2005; Munro 
et al., 2007). 
(4) Synthesizing translation 
To develop an overarching framework, the translated themes and subthemes were 
listed and juxtaposed with parameters derived from the articles (see Table 2). Then, 
after discussions with the research team, consideration was given to if and how the 
translations and the author’s interoperations were linked together. This method, the 
“line-of-argument” synthesis, is a method used to create a theoretical framework 
representing a further level of conceptual development incorporating all the included 
studies, rather than a description of the synthesized papers (Jenkins, Kelen, et al. 
2009). 
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Measurements of preparedness 
Preparedness has a variety of elements that are in turn supported by a number of 
activities. Elements of public health emergency preparedness consist of the various 
goals or end-states that public health emergency preparedness seeks to achieve. This 
research reviewed articles which used assessment tools that require jurisdictions and 
officials to complete written assessments of public health emergency preparedness 
activities. These assessments typically rate readiness on a list of key elements of 
preparedness. These articles are detailed in Table 2. 
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Table 2 An overview of related instruments 
Author Disaster  type Purpose/Application Scale Scoring procedure Key elements  
The Healthcare Association 
of Hawaii 2001 
Emergencies 
Evaluate hospital readiness capacity at 
state and local level 
N/A N/A 
12(Number of key elements):Leadership and Authorities; Hazard 
Identification and Risk Assessment; Planning; Direction, Control and 
Coordination; Communications and Warning; Operations and 
Procedures; Resource Management; Logistics and Facilities; 
Training ; Exercises; Performance improvement; Information 
Michael I. Greenberg, et al. 
2002 
Bioterrorism and 
mass casualty 
Evaluate the preparedness of hospital 
EDs to treat victims of a terrorist 
biological or chemical agent release 
Yes/No/ 
don’t know 
N/A 6: Training; ability of Decontaminate; Cooperation; Evaluation and 
Treatment of Biological and Chemical Casualties; Exercises; 
Logistics, like antidotes. 
Barbara I. Braun 2004 Bioterrorism  Assess linkages between hospitals and 
key community entities related to 
preparedness for bioterrorism 
Yes/No 
and 
open-ende
d items 
N/A 4: Hospital-specific emergency management plans; Hospital 
perception of community-wide emergency management plans; 
Hospital perception of community coordination; Hospital 
demographic information 
Knudsen 2005 Chemical, 
biological, nuclear 
and explosive 
threats 
Assess the level of preparedness of a 
community 
Yes/No/ 
don’t know 
N/A 6:Risk assessment; Screening and identification; Prevention, 
Deterrence and Planning; Training, Awareness and Application; 
Leadership, Authority and Communication; Activation and Response 
Hu GQ, et al. 2006 Public health 
emergencies 
Assess the current preparedness 
capacity to public health emergencies 
in China 
yes/ no/ 
partially 
The response categories 
were “yes, no, partially”, and 
responses to measures 
were given values (yes=1; 
partially=0.5; no=0). These 
scores were used to 
10: Laws and relevant regulations; Incident Command system; Risk 
Identification and Assessment; Emergency Plan; Expert Database; 
Emergency Response team; Medical treatment system for public 
health emergency; Recourse management; Emergency funding; 
Monitoring and Warning 
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calculate summary 
performance scores for each 
of dimensions. 
Kaji, and Lewis 2006 All hazards Measures of hospital disaster 
preparedness or hospital ‘‘surge 
capacity 
yes/ no Overall score was calculated 
by summing indicators 
6: Disaster Plan; Modes of intrahospital and interhospital 
communication; Decontamination capability and training; 
characteristics of Drills; Pharmaceutical stockpiles; Facility’s surge 
capacity 
Braun et al. 2006 All-hazards Evaluate hospital-community services 
linkages that facilitated the response to 
local emergencies 
yes/ no the accuracy of data entry 
was assessed by calculating 
agreement from duplicate 
entry of 12 randomly 
selected questionnaires 
4: Collaborative planning process; Community emergency 
operations plan; Established response capability; ongoing 
surveillance, reporting and laboratory identification 
Zhang H, et al 2007 Infectious 
diseases 
Measure the current status of hospitals 
preparedness for infectious disease in 
Beijing 
yes/ no N/A 6: Emergency Plan; Laboratory Diagnosis Capacity; Medical 
Treatment Procedures; Specific Drug Stockpile; Personal Protective 
equipment stockpile; Staff Training 
Xingming Li, et al. 2008 Public health 
emergencies 
Assess the current status of hospital 
PHE preparedness in China 
yes/ 
no/unknow
n 
Each answered item was 
scored 1 for “yes” and o for 
“no” or “unknown”. Item 
scores were calculated by 
adding together “yes” 
answers. 
8: Hospital’s demographic data; Hospital PHE preparation; 
Response ability to a community PHE; Stockpiles of drugs and 
materials; PHE detection and identification; Procedures for medical 
treatment; Laboratory diagnosis and management; Staff training; 
Risk communication 
Cliff B.J., et al 2009 Chemical, 
biological, nuclear 
and events 
Quantify the levels of preparedness for 
rural hospitals 
yes/ no 
 
Overall preparedness score 
was the mean score of 
categories 
8: Administration and planning; Surge capacity; Education and 
training; Communication and notification; Supplies, 
Pharmaceuticals, and Laboratory support; Staffing and Support; 
Isolation and Decontamination; Surveillance 
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Zhu, ea al. 2009 
 
Public health 
emergencies 
Evaluate the hospitals’ capacity in the 
public health emergency preparedness 
 
yes/ no 
Each “no” response was 
coded as a “0” and each 
“yes” response was codes 
as a “1”.Item scores were 
calculated by adding 
together “yes” answers 
8: Emergency system; Emergency organization; Monitoring and 
Warning; Procedures for medical treatment; Logistics; Training and 
Exercises; Publicity and Education 
Zhao Q. 2009 Public health 
emergencies 
Evaluate rural medical institutions 
preparedness and response capacity 
for public health emergencies 
yes/ 
no/unknow
n 
Each answered item was 
scored 1 for “yes” and 0 for 
“no” or “unknown”. Item 
scores were calculated by 
adding together “yes” 
answers. 
8: Planning; Monitoring and Warning; Laboratory diagnosis; 
Emergency response team and expert database; Communication, 
Coordination; Training and Exercises;  
Kollek, and Cwinn 2011 Chemical, 
biological, nuclear 
events 
Assess the readiness of emergency 
departments at the organizational and 
administrative levels 
Yes/No/ 
don’t know  
N/A 5: Risk assessment; General Disaster Preparedness; 
Bio-preparedness; Decontamination; Availability of Equipment 
Niska, and Shimizu 2011 Mass casualty 
and influenza 
Evaluate hospital preparedness for 
emergency response 
Yes/No N/A 6: Emergency response plans; Components of hospital 
preparedness; Internal and External mass casualty drills, 
simulations, or exercises; Hospital preparedness funding 
Davis, Christine, etc. 2014 Public health 
emergencies 
Examine local health department 
preparedness capacities 
N/A N/A 8: Surveillance and investigation; Plans; Workforce; Communication 
and information dissemination; Incident command; Legal 
infrastructure and preparedness; Exercises. 
Johnson LA, Rafael.2014 Infectious disease Measure CDC’s capacity for infectious 
disease surveillance and preparedness 
N/A Overall score was calculated 
by summing indicators 
10: Planning; Research; Communications; Epidemiology; 
Laboratory; Surveillance; Containment; Intervention; Infection 
Control; Health Sector Response 
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15 studies published during 2002 between 2014 were included in this review. These 
studies were mainly conducted in US, UK, and China. All studies focused on 
evaluation instruments for hospital preparedness in different types of disasters. Most 
studies concerned with the preparedness or readiness of hospitals (including ED) to 
disasters (n=11). The other articles examined linkages between hospitals and key 
community entities related to preparedness during disasters (n=2). All reviewed 
instruments can likely contribute to the new instrument of evaluating hospital 
preparedness directly or indirectly. It is noteworthy that most of the studies are based 
on U.S. samples, post 9.11. 
In 2002, the CDC (Centres for Disease Control, USA) created a voluntary 
self-assessment instrument “Public Health Preparedness and Response Capacity 
Inventory” (PHPRCI). The content was linked to the CDC’s 2002 Cooperative 
Agreement on Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism. This is the 
main funding vehicle for the Federal government’s post-9/11 infusion of funds for 
public health preparedness. Items in the instrument seek information on a full range of 
preparedness structures, including planning, surveillance, laboratory capacity, 
communication, and training. Data from the assessment are intended to support both 
process improvement and accountability efforts. The reliability and validity of the 
instruments are context-specific, which need to be retested if with a different hospital 
sample or a different context, other than functional, are to be used.  
To measure preparedness outcomes, the Montana Department of Public Health and 
Human Services established a partnership with Montana State University-Bozeman to 
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develop a tool to gauge baseline preparedness, as well as the progress made during the 
first two years of the Cooperative Agreement funding (Kuntz, Smilie, Wang, 2005). 
The tool, the Emergency Preparedness Scoring Matrix (EPSM), extrapolated a 
point-in-time measure (a single numerical score) and gave health departments a 
baseline/starting point preparedness score for 2002. The initial data were collected 
through the PHPRCI, with modifications specific for Montana. However, a challenge 
remains in identifying external parameters to test the construct validity. 
Michael I. and Greenberg, in 2002, assessed the level of preparedness of hospital EDs 
(Emergency Departments) in a large metropolitan area to evaluate and treat victims of 
a terrorist biological or chemical agent release. The survey instrument, consisting of 
38 questions, was mailed to the physician directors of each ED. The survey contained 
six key measures: training, cooperation, ability to decontaminate, evaluate and treat 
biological and chemical casualties, exercises, and logistics. The results of the research 
presented criteria for minimum preparedness for hospital EDs (Michael I., Greenberg 
2002). 
To assess the linkages between hospitals and key community entities related to 
preparedness for bioterrorism, Barbara I., et al. carried out a pilot study, before and 
after the terrorist events of September of 2001, in two independent samples of 
hospitals scheduled for the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) accreditation survey. Information was obtained using a 
self-administered questionnaire, with on-site verification of selected items, by 
JCAHO surveyors. The questionnaire contained 51 items, both open and close-ended, 
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in four sections: (1) hospital-specific emergency management plans; (2) hospital 
perception of community-wide emergency management plans; (3) hospital perception 
of community coordination; and (4) hospital demographic information. However, the 
questionnaire was not able to evaluate the completeness or accuracy of the linkages 
(Barbara I., et al. 2004). 
To characterize disaster preparedness among a cohort of hospitals in Los Angeles 
County, US, Amy H. Kaji, et al., in 2006, carried out a cross-sectional survey study 
focusing on practice variation, plan characteristics, and surge capacity. Evaluations of 
hospital disaster plan structures, vendor agreements, modes of communication, 
medical and surgical supplies, involvement of law enforcements, mutual aid 
agreements with other facilities, drills and training, surge capacity (assessed by 
monthly emergency department diversion status, available beds, ventilators, and 
isolation rooms), decontamination capability, and pharmaceutical stockpiles were 
assessed by the survey. However, this instrument needs revision or substantial user 
training, as well as verification of the reliability in a particular setting before use. 
Hu GQ., et al., in 2006, assessed the current preparedness capacity to public health 
emergencies in four Chinese provinces. The study was based on a capacity framework 
developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The instrument has 
10dimensions, including 204 indicators. The response categories were “yes, no, 
partially”, and the responses to measure were given values (yes=1; 
no=0partially=0.5 ;). These scores were used to calculate summary performance 
scores for each dimension. The UNDP framework assesses capacity from three levels: 
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the individual level, the level of the organization or entity, and the level of the system. 
However, this study evaluated PHEP capacity only, at the level of the system (Hu GQ, 
2006). 
In 2006, Braun I, et al. assessed community emergency preparedness linkages among 
hospitals, public health officials, and the first responders. A mailed questionnaire was 
used to assess the linkage issues related to training and drills, equipment, surveillance, 
laboratory testing, surge capacity, incident management, and communication. The 
internal consistency and validity of the instrument was tested. The responses 
categories were “yes, no, don’t know”; the accuracy of data entry was assessed by 
calculating the agreement from duplicate entries of 12 randomly selected 
questionnaires. The responses reflected the hospitals’ self-perception of the linkages. 
The quality of the linkages and the extent of the possible biases favouring positive 
responses were not assessed. 
Xingming Li, Jianshi Huang and Hui Zhang(2008) surveyed four hundred hospitals in 
four cities and provinces of China using a standardized questionnaire to assess the 
current hospital PHEP. The data were collected and analysed as they related to: the 
hospital demographic data; PHE preparation; response to PHE in the community; the 
stockpiles of drugs and materials; the detection and identification of PHE; the 
procedures for medical treatment; laboratory diagnosis and management; staff 
training and risk communication. The questionnaire consisted of 17 sections and 192 
items. Each answered item was scored 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no” or “unknown”. The 
item scores were calculated by adding together the “yes” answers. The higher the total 
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item score, the better the hospital PHE preparedness capacity. However, the 
instrument may underestimate the evaluation of the reliability and validity by only 
using the Cronbach’s coefficient without any other correlation analysis (Xingming 
Li, et al. 2008). 
Cliff BJ, et al. (2009) examined disaster preparedness, risk perception and association 
in rural hospitals in the United States. The study described the perceived risk of 
disaster events and the status of disaster preparedness in rural hospitals. It was based 
on a regionally stratified, random sample of rural hospitals, consisting of a mailed 
questionnaire and a follow-up telephone interview. The study examined seven 
elements of preparedness: administration and planning; surge capacity; education and 
training; communication and notification; supplies, pharmaceuticals and laboratory 
support; staffing and support. There were 37 indicators within the seven subcategories 
of preparedness. Each indicator had nominal variable with a yes/no scale based on the 
self-reported responses. Each “no” response was coded as a “0” and each “yes” 
response was coded as a “1”. The responses to each indicator were added to establish 
a total sub-score for each subcategory. However, the validity and reliability was not 
tested. 
Zhao Qi, et al. (2009) evaluated rural medical institutions’ preparedness and response 
capacity for PHE in China. The survey was carried out in six provinces. The content 
contained eight elements of preparedness: planning; surveillance; laboratory diagnosis; 
emergency response team and expert database; communication and coordination; 
training and exercises. Both the validity and reliability were tested, while the 
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correlation was also evaluated. Each answered item was scored 1 for “yes” and 0 for 
“no” or “unknown”. The item scores were calculated by adding together the “yes” 
answers. Few studies about disaster preparedness concentrated on rural areas; this 
research was the first to put county CDC and hospitals together as an entity to 
response PHE, and developed an assessment framework and instrument based on 
UNDP theory. However, the six provinces did not fully represent all rural medical 
institutions of China. 
Dexiang Zhu and some researchers evaluated the PHEP capacity of hospitals in 
Guangzhou by using a questionnaire. The instrument had seven indicators and 
twenty-one sub-indicators, and tested the correlation by the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process. The content validity of the questionnaire was evaluated. Each indicator was a 
nominal variable with a yes/no scale based on the self-reported responses. Each “no” 
response was coded as a “0” and each “yes” response was coded as a “1”. The 
questionnaire used, in the main, categorical variables, like “yes/ no”, which may cause 
a loss of some information compared with the measurement data. 
Kollek D. and Cwinn, in 2011, assessed the readiness of emergency departments at 
the organizational and administrative levels. The questionnaire was emailed to 
hospitals. The questionnaire consisted of multiple-choice questions divided into 
sections by demographics of the department, risk assessment, general disaster 
readiness, readiness for bio-events, ability to decontaminate, radiation readiness, and 
the availability of antidotes. The response was defined to “yes, no, don’t know, null”. 
The limitation of this study is the low response rate caused loss of information. 
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Besides, it wasn’t impossible to provide a before and after comparison of specific 
centres that responded in the first study to those that responded in the second study, 
because the results in each study were pooled to maintain the confidentiality of data 
from individual institutions (Kollek D., Cwinn, 2011). 
Themes of Hospital PHEP 
Despite different instruments having different assessing objectives, and because there 
are many differences in the preparedness elements, a number of common themes 
appear both in the research on preparedness and in the guidance documents. Further, 
almost every instrument covered the functional requirements of disaster management 
at all stages of a crisis (pre-incident, incident, post-incident). Ten primary themes and 
23 subthemes were identified from the synthesis of the related studies. The following 
table (Table 3) outlines these three categories and the relevant elements.  
Table 3 Themes and sub-themes emerging from the included studies 
Themes Sub-themes 
Emergency Plan  Type of emergency plan: e.g. bioterrorism and chemical events; communicable disease, 
etc. 
 The accessible of plan: whether is accessible to all medical staff; promote the emergency 
plan 
 Details of the plan: e.g.: a protocol to initiate the emergency plan, a classification of the 
role in community wide planning. 
 The period of evaluating and revising the plan 
Surveillance  Disease surveillance: e.g. surveillance policy and system; surveillance systems for 
different types of diseases, etc. 
Training and drills  Type of training/ drills: e.g. bioterrorism and chemical events; communicable disease 
 Evaluation for effectives of training/drills: whether assess effectives of training/drills at 
fixed period. 
 Drills cooperation with multiple agencies 
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Stockpiles  Emergency supplies: e.g. drugs, food, water, protection facilities, emergency beds, 
 Emergency stockpiles management: e.g. whether establish system and plan of stockpiles, 
whether have a person responsible for stockpiles management 
Emergency command system  Emergency command centre 
 Emergency relevant system: e.g. whether establish emergency report system, medical 
treatment system, emergency watch system, etc. 
 Emergency committee or group 
Fully staffed workforce  The staff structure of critical department 
 Capacity of critical staff 
On-site rescue and medical 
treatment 
 On-site rescue: e.g. capacity of emergency rescue, equipment for on-site rescue (for 
example, ambulance, communication equipment.) 
 Medical treatment: e.g. expert group for emergency medical treatment; treatment 
strategies for different diseases; equipment for medical treatment, etc. 
Crisis communication and 
cooperation 
 Communication and cooperation with hospitals: e.g. within department within hospitals; 
within key staff within hospitals 
 Communication and cooperation with other facilities: e.g. with other health facilities; 
with government offices for emergency; with media and pubic 
Evaluation and adaption  Experience learning: e.g. lessons learned; experience summary 
 Evaluation of hospital capacity: e.g. hospital vulnerability analysis 
 Adaption of hospital: e.g. adaption of the emergency plans, etc. 
Emergency funding  Emergency funding collection: e.g. the means of collecting funding;  
 Emergency funding management: e.g. emergency funding planning; management system, 
etc. 
 
The emergency plan element consists of activities related to developing, evaluating, 
and revising emergency plans and other agreements; such plans can be either informal 
or formal, with different plans for different types of emergencies. For example, 
organizations, multi-organizational response networks, and preparedness activities 
centre on the development and the adoption of the formal disaster plans (Jeannette 
Sutton, Kathleen Tierney. 2006). Additionally, the emergency plans should be 
accessible to all hospital staff. These plans are outlined below. 
The element of surveillance involves the ability to maintain and improve the systems 
and network to monitor, detect and investigate the potential hazard. And laboratory 
39 
 
functions are mainly identify, test, and isolate variety of etiology. 
Training and Exercises is focus on developing and maintaining a public health and 
health care workforce through training, exercises and drills and real events or other 
educational activities. 
The stockpiles are related to activities for building infrastructure, such as original 
critical facilities to meet the building codes for high risks, e.g. floods and earthquakes. 
Included in the concept of stockpiles are emergency supplies, e.g. water and food, and 
a certain number of ambulances, beds, as well as protection for inventories and drugs. 
The activities of a command system include the identification of responsibility in all 
sectors, the specification of how resources will be managed, how preparedness 
networks are to be formed, and the management procedures adopted. The goal of the 
command system is to develop, test, and improve decision-making, as well as the 
response capability using an integrated incident command system in the hospital. 
The element of communication and cooperation involves activities to provide accurate 
and credible messages to, and cooperate with, the public, organizations and 
community institutions. The types of information focus on health and safety, the 
continuity of operations and government, the critical facilities and infrastructure, the 
delivery of services, the environment, and economic and financial conditions. 
The elements of on-site rescue and medical treatment involve the ability to implement 
public health functions, including capabilities to detect, investigate, and identify 
health hazards, as well as to rapidly provide medical services to the public and 
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casualties during crisis.  
The element of evaluation and adaption contains the use of hazard and hospital 
vulnerability analyses to determine what should be done in the future, and to ensure 
that mitigation issues are addressed during the adaption process. The emergency plan 
needs to be revised or a new plan developed, based on the evaluation results, as well 
as the experiences summary.  
The final element, funding management, involves the means for the collection and 
analysis of funding for emergency responses, the tracking of resources, and ensuring 
adequate and timely reimbursement. 
Therefore, part 2 proposes what hospital PHE preparedness is, reviews the 
measurements for public health emergency preparedness, and describes the current 
capability of a hospital’s public health emergency preparedness in China, as well as 
the factors which affect preparedness capacity.  
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Part 2  
2.2The Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response System 
in China 
2.2.1Introduction 
Public health emergency preparedness and response（PHEPR）involves activities 
directed at preventing possible emergencies and planning to ensure an adequate 
response and recovery if an emergency occurs. The purpose of the PHEPR is to 
provide a process to quickly identify, notify, assemble and deploy public health 
personnel, partners from the private health sector and private hospitals, and 
appropriate medical equipment and supplies (Debra Revere, Kailey Nelson, et al. 
2011). 
Since the outbreak of SARS in 2003, the Chinese government has paid more attention 
to the development of the public health emergency preparedness and response. At 
present, China has developed the standardized public health emergency preparedness 
and response system. (Figure four) 
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Figure 4 Public Health Emergency Response System in China (GQ Hu, 2006) 
 
According to National Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Figure four depicts 
the public health emergency preparedness and response model. Public health 
emergencies (PHE) in China are divided into 4 levels, namely Special major PHE, 
Major PHE, Large PHE and General PHE. For example, if the public health 
emergency is confined within a certain region of a province, the provincial emergency 
plan will be appropriate. If the public health emergency is diffused across provinces 
and endangers the national public health, the national plan will be needed.  
In China, the PHEPR system consists of PHE headquarters, administrative 
Department of Public Health, CDC (Centres for Disease Control), and medical 
treatment institutions. The relevant departments and organizations are divided into 
two categorical types: the technical institutions, including medical institutions, CDC, 
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health monitoring institutions, and entry and exit inspection and quarantine bureau; as 
well as relevant departments and organizations, including government branches and 
non-governmental organizations (NGO). 
2.2.2 Methods 
This section utilised a standard comprehensive literature search method. Electronic 
data bases, including PubMed, Web of Science, CNKI, and Wang Fang Med Online, 
were searched. The algorithm and terms in PubMed and Web of Science were [China 
AND hospital management AND (emergency OR crisis OR disaster)] OR [China 
AND hospital AND (emergency response OR emergency preparedness)]. The terms in 
the Wang Fang Med Online searches and the CNKI were [hospital management AND 
(emergency OR incident OR crisis OR disaster)] OR [hospital AND (emergency 
response OR emergency preparedness)]. The time period was limited between 2001 
through to 2014. In addition, the reference lists of most recent relevant articles were 
examined (known as the snowball technique) to identify any missing articles. 
The articles were reviewed by the principal researcher, with the duplicate articles 
being excluded. The list was narrowed by reviewing the titles and abstracts, while the 
list was further narrowed by a reading of the texts. A total of 135 full-text articles 
were reviewed for the detailed analysis. 
2.2.3 Results 
Progress in the PHEPR system in China 
By 2010, 27 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in China had set up 
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offices of PHE. The national and some provincial CDCs established Departments of 
Emergency Response, along with the development of an emergency plan (FL Lin, 
2010). In January, 2004, the national PHE information system was launched and 31 
provinces began network reporting (GQ Hu, 2006; Hui Zhang, 2006). The MOH, 
National Development and Reform Committee developed a Construction Plan for 
CDC in China, and invested 114 billion RMB in the medical rescue system. Ten 
national disaster relief and disease prevention leading groups were organized for 
directing and supporting local government to deal with PHE (Hong Chen, 2010); 
Multiagency coordination system has been formed, such as the National Development 
and Reform Committee which developed emergency material production and reserve 
system; civil aviation, railways department, traffic department and others established 
epidemic monitoring reporting systems. (Liu XH 2008). 
Previous studies on preparedness and readiness in China 
Up until 2007, there is no national data on China’s hospital preparedness or readiness 
capacity (Zhang Hui, Huang Jian-Shi, et al. 2007). Therefore, to understand the 
current capacity of hospitals in China, a summary was made of the research surveying 
hospitals in China, as well as those related to medical institutions’ PHEP. Eighty-nine 
(89) articles were related to medical institutions’ PHEP capacity in China from 
2001-2014 (Table 4). 
Table 4 Summary of topics in articles included in the review 
Topics Numbers of 
Articles 
Topics Numbers of 
Articles 
Topics Numbers of 
Articles 
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Laws and Policy 5 Surveillance 37 Training  60 
Emergency 
management: 
model, stages, etc. 
17 Communication 
system 
25 Exercises  36 
Emergency plan 48 Logistics  69 Advantages and 
disadvantages of 
military hospitals 
14 
Command and 
Direction 
36 Funding  55 Hospital safety in 
disaster 
10 
Communication 
and Cooperation 
39 Medical treatment 66 Evaluation 25 
 Some articles cover more than one aspect of hospital PHEP capacity 
Table 4 shows the topics included in the reviewed articles. These topics were quite 
broad, and covered almost all aspects of medical institutions’ PHEP capacity. The 
current research lists the current status of PHEP in China, from the frequent and major 
topics in the articles, namely, emergency plan, command and direction system, 
communication and cooperation system, surveillance, logistics (stockpiles), funding, 
medical treatment, training and drills (exercises), and evaluation. 
PHE Plan 
During a sudden, large-scale infectious disease outbreak, hospitals need to quickly 
convert their current care capacity to surge capacity (XD Tan 2003). An emergency 
preparedness system is primarily composed of emergency plans and organizational 
structures which lay the foundation for dealing with PHE. 
Therefore, the infectious disease emergency plan is needed before, during, and 
immediately after the infectious disease outbreak. Most studies showed that most 
hospitals had emergency plans and these plans focused on infectious diseases control, 
but less attention were paid to preparedness for biological, nuclear radiation and other 
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terrorist attacks (XH Liu 2009; JX Fu, et al. 2005; J Wen, et al. 2006). 
Some researchers recommended that emergency response plans should focus on 
particular types of incidents to which a hospital might have to respond (JX Fu, et al. 
2005). They further suggested that hospitals establish a database of incidents: 
analysing the factors that have an influence on incidents in China (JX Fu, et al. 2005) 
and develop guidelines for classification of those incidents (J Wen, et al. 2006).  
In addition, reviewing and updating the emergency plan is important to enhance 
response capability. For example, Zhang (2006) showed that little more than half of 
the 152 hospitals surveyed reviewed and updated their emergency response plan at 
least once; while less than half had participated in a disaster exercise for a large-scale 
infectious disease outbreak within the past 12 months. In 2011,Chen investigated 80 
hospitals in seven big cities (Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, Lanzhou, Chengdu, Nanjing 
and Guangzhou), and found that 12.3% updated their plans once a year. 
Surveillance  
The objective of real-time surveillance is to replace the periodic manual reporting 
with online reporting to meet the requirement of emergency alert and response 
(Huigang Liang, Yajiong Xue, 2004). In order to facilitate public health surveillance, 
hospitals at the city and county levels are required to develop infectious disease 
databases of public health risks. H. Chen in 2011 showed that all responding hospitals 
had professional staff for routine monitoring, nearly 100% of hospitals had a 
surveillance plan, and most hospitals established comprehensive monitoring and 
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surveillance networks. More than half of hospitals provided training and exercises to 
monitoring staff (H. Chen 2011). 
Hospital laboratories play an important role in detection of the PHE (Gu CHY, Chang 
GWJ, et al. 2004; Xu JG 2005). Xingming Li, et al selected 15 kinds of infectious 
diseases on which to assess laboratory diagnosis. The results showed that the majority 
of responding hospitals could isolate and identify class A infectious diseases 
(according to the Law on Communicable Disease Prevention and Control of China). 
However less than 10% of surveyed hospitals reported that they could isolate and 
identify infectious diseases caused by pathogens that can potentially be used as a 
bioterrorist weapon. Most hospitals had strict laboratory operational regulations and 
personnel specially assigned to laboratory management (Xingming Li, et al. 2008). 
Stockpile 
So far, China has not enacted quantifiable standards for various emergency materials 
stockpile. The hospitals store up emergency materials according to their own 
assessment and financial capacity (FL. Lin, et al., 2010). Most hospitals have different 
levels for ambulances, beds, protective equipment, and drugs. They have stored up 
emergency drugs for treating infectious diarrheal, influenza, and botulism toxin. 
When the hospital levels were compared with each other, the tertiary hospitals 
generally had a higher score than the secondary ones. Further, most hospitals had 
protective equipment stockpiles, biohazard protective suits, safety glasses and 
ventilators (LP Fan, et al. 2012; XH Liu, 2008; Xingming Li, et al 2008).  
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Training and drills 
Almost all the investigated hospitals had a staff training program, with varied contents 
that include awareness of emergency plan, medical treatment procedures, infectious 
disease prevention and control, routes of transmission of infectious diseases, 
disinfection and sterilization, and principles of quarantine and isolation (H. Chen, 
2009; LM Sun, et al. 2006; LM Yu, et al. 2005; XH Liu 2008).  
Emergency command system 
More and more hospitals have emergency command institution arrangements and 
most CDCs above county level had PHE office (DX Zhu, 2009; QL Chen 2009; DP 
WU, et al. 2009). While, only some hospitals had specific emergency command 
mechanism and division of functions for different types of emergencies. And most 
hospitals above second-class had experts database from various fields, e.g., 
epidemiology, clinical medicine, and public health, etc. to provide technical support in 
the event of a PHE. 
Crisis Communication and cooperation 
Crisis communication is an important part of a PHE response and the key to ensuring 
complete, transparent and prompt information exchange, to help hospitals make 
timely responses and reduce the serious consequences (Zheng L. 2003). No hospital 
or medical system can manage a public health emergency alone. Therefore, hospitals 
need to communicate and cooperate with other local health agencies, functioning as a 
networked public health service. (H. Zhang, et al. 2005).  
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One study indicated that medical staff in 12.1% of the hospitals underwent training 
for evaluation of PHE-related stress and only one-third of respondents had specific 
programs and spokespersons for communicating critical messages and information to 
the media, public, governments and stakeholders (XM Li, et al. 2008).  
The lack of emergency communication, the absence of central direction, and 
insufficient exchange information, led to a failure of comprehensive and accurate 
statistical data in the SARS epidemic situation (Jingqiang Shen, et al. 2007).  
On-site rescue and medical treatment 
One survey (i.e. Q. Zhao 2009) showed that large a proportion of hospitals in Jiangxi, 
Jiangsu, Fujian, Yunnan, Gansu, and Ningxia had specific drugs and medical 
treatment procedures for SARS and influenza, with22.4% of the respondents having 
medical treatment procedures for 8 selected kinds of infectious diseases. More than 
half the hospitals had special medical treatment procedures for treating class A 
infectious diseases. 
Another study revealed that physicians in 80.2% of the responding institutions 
reported being familiar with the latest treatment protocol for a PHE; nearly 95% could 
transfer PHE victims to corresponding medical agencies for appropriate treatment; 
and 100% could provide training on the protocol system. However, more than half the 
hospitals had specific procedures for patient transfers in a PHE. Furthermore, the 
tertiary grade hospitals and the teaching hospitals had a greater capacity than 
secondary grade B and non-teaching institutions, respectively. 
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Funding 
The approach of collecting emergency funding is singular: most hospitals get 
emergency financial support from nation and local government. (FL. Lin, et al. 2010). 
One study revealed that only 44.6% of hospitals had a funding allocation system for 
emergencies and only 23.1% of hospitals established special emergency fund 
management departments (Q. Zhao, et al 2009).  
Evaluation  
Hui Zhang and Chuanmei You’s survey respectively reported that most hospitals 
re-evaluated the effectiveness of staff training, and analysed vulnerability of hospital 
after crisis, and summarized the experiences which will be for amending emergency 
plan and staff training (Chuanmei You, et al. 2009; Hui Zhang, et al. 2008 ). 
Recent studies on preparedness in other countries 
Recent studies (e.g. Fockler, 2010; Kollek, 2011; Klitzman, Freudenburg, 2003) 
reported that public health infrastructure was “structurally weak in nearly every area”. 
They expressed concern that the hospitals were not adequately prepared. To 
understand the extent to which hospitals were prepared for PHE in developed 
countries, this part of the research examined a number of studies about emergency 
preparedness, and summarized the deficiencies in hospital preparedness in other 
countries. This information served as important data for hospital preparedness 
development in China. 
Canadian hospital emergency preparedness was assessed using a survey that analysed 
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deficiencies in readiness—most notably in the availability of the appropriate 
equipment, medical treatment, and the disinfection and decontamination 
capacity(Kollek, Cwinn, 2011). There were also deficiencies in hospital capability to 
respond to major biological, chemical or nuclear events. such findings were consistent 
with studies performed in other countries (Davis, Bevc, et al., 2014; Anathallee M, 
Curphey A, et al, 2007; Johnson L, et al. 2014;). 
In subsequent years, the focus on hospital preparedness shifted from bioterrorism 
attacks to natural disasters and major infectious disease. The published literature 
demonstrated that U.S. hospitals had response plans for chemical releases, natural 
disasters, epidemics, and biological incidents; they had staged drills, mass 
vaccinations or medication distributions (Niska, Shimizu, 2011), as well as improved 
surge capacity (Cliff, Morlock, et al. 2009). However, as recently as 2012, local health 
department preparedness capacities were identified, with reduction in surveillance, 
investigations, plans, communication, and incident command over three years (from 
2010 to2012) (Davis, Bevc, et al., 2014). Such activities are critical for preparedness 
responsibilities, as well as for the basic functions of a public health organization. 
Decreases in the preparedness capacities in the U.S. may be caused by multiple years 
of funding cuts and job losses (Bhandari MW, Scutchfield FD, 2010). 
The preparedness of emergency departments (EDs) in the United Kingdom (UK) was 
assessed in 2006 for the management of potential biological incidents (Anathallee, et 
al. 2008).It was found that the UK was not prepared well for emerging biological 
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events and bioterrorism. The majority of EDs did not have isolation facilities 
available for the management of patients with potential infectious diseases.  
Between2011 and 2013 the level of preparedness of health facilities in the European 
Region were assessed. The participating countries (Balkans, the UK, Caucus and 
Ukraine) were generally prepared for major infectious disease outbreaks; however, the 
level of preparedness needed improvement. For example, there was a need to 
strengthen national preparedness plans, the initial response, the plans for securing 
vaccine supplies, and improving communications. Similarly, in Italy, hospitals’ 
preparedness capacity was not high enough to cope with surge demands, particularly 
in terms of medical and allied health personnel, and adequate supplies (Djalali, et al. 
2014; Giacomet V, et al. 2007; Fusco FM, et al. 2012). 
Summary of deficiencies of medical institution preparedness capacity 
According to the findings from the literature review there are no national standards 
for disaster preparedness, and no validated tool to assess overall hospital disaster 
preparedness. The most frequent identified problems or factors in the articles and the 
relevant suggestions by the researchers were summarized for the current study (Table 
5). Importantly, they could be considered in the development of an evaluation tool for 
hospital preparedness; they are evidence or standards for future hospital response 
capability improvement 
Table 5 Problems faced by hospitals preparedness and suggestions for improvement 
Problems
1-6
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Emergency response plan were not integrated, appropriate or able to be implemented 
There were insufficient communication and coordination among hospitals, between hospitals and local health 
agencies 
Information systems were unable to provide sufficient data to enable appropriate decision-making 
Physicians, nurses, and equipment were inadequate, and storage of emergency drugs needed to be sure sufficient 
and various 
Budgets were insufficient for maintenance of facilities and equipment and storage of supplies 
Medical staff were inexperienced and unprepared 
There was inadequate experience and capability for nuclear, biological and chemical incidents 
Suggestions
5 7-10
 
Developing, implementing and maintaining response plans on the basis of vulnerability analysis 
Strengthening communication and coordination between hospitals and community agencies  
Establishing mechanisms for coordinating the response of different hospitals to disasters 
Establishing or improving mechanism for information collection, issuing of early warning, resource support, 
managing response, coordination, training and research 
Establishing an emergency-drug-supply system for most of the infectious diseases 
Strengthening different hospitals capacity to provide different numbers of extra beds 
The form of training and exercise should be diversified, activities should include case analysis, role plays and 
testing of skills 
1. The main problems and their reasons of emergency public health incident response. J Kong, 2009 
2. Development of response and control system for public health emergencies. Wu WB, 2011 
3. Problems and countermeasures of hospital infection control in public health incident response. Ding Y,2005 
4. Hospital emergency medical treatment system for public health crisis response. Meng J, 2009 
5. Establishment of Chinese public health incident command system. Duan YR,2004 
6. Hospital crisis management and intervention. Dong Q, 2006 
7. Rethink the Chinese emergency incident medical rescue system after Wenchuan earthquake. Huang XK,      
2009 
8. The general scheme design of public health emergency medical treatment. Wu XK,2004 
9. Considerations for public health incident research system. Cao J, 2006 
10. Research on the hospital function of response to public health emergency. LX Luo, 2004 
Most studies showed that medical institutions had emergency plans (XH Liu 2009; JX 
Fu, et al. 2005; J Wen, et al. 2006). However, not all hospitals with emergency plans 
reported that they had evaluated and revised their public health emergency systems (J 
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Kong 2009; LX Luo, et al. 2004;H. Zhang 2006; C Hong, 2011).  
Besides, all kinds of medical institutions need to communicate and cooperate with 
other local health agencies, functioning as a networked public health provider. 
Problems such as lack of communication and coordination between hospital 
departments and inter-agency networks hinder the availability of resources in a 
community and limit timely forecasting, public communication and effective 
regulation of a PHE(Wu WB, 2011; Deng Y, 2004; LX Luo, 2004). These studies 
show that if a PHE occurred, most of hospitals reported that they could take 
responsibility for PHE rescue service, transport the medical staff in a timely manner, 
and provide priority health services to vulnerable populations. Yet, not every hospital 
attended regulation and revision workshops for emergency plans for infectious 
epidemic control held by local agencies. This lack of cross-institutional interaction 
indicated that the ability of hospitals to coordinate with community agencies in 
preparation for, or response to a PHE was generally poor. Communication and 
coordination between hospitals and community agencies should be strengthened, and 
mechanisms established for coordinating the responses of different hospitals to 
disasters. 
Characteristics of a PHE include suddenness and unpredictability (Tan XD 2003). For 
most hospitals, medicine supplies maybe in great demand when faced with a sudden 
increase in patients. Therefore, hospitals must have programs to ensure appropriate 
levels of emergency supplies including drugs, medical equipment, electricity, water 
and oxygen, disinfectant, etc.  
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Most hospitals possessed emergency resource reserves, but few had corresponding 
drug distribution programs (Meng J, 2009; Duan YR, 2004). In addition, hospital 
capacity was affected by economic level and classification of the hospital, suggesting 
that the importance of local economic development strengthens hospital ability to 
provide PHE (Huang XK, 2009).  
Sufficient emergency response personnel and equipment are necessary to respond 
effectively to a large-scale infectious disease incident. Some studies indicate that, 
during the SARS epidemic, hospitals were short of infectious disease physicians, 
nurses, and equipment in some cities (Cao J, 2006). Loutfy et al reported that different 
hospitals could provide different numbers of extra beds (Loutfy MR, Wallington T., et 
al. 2004). All the articles we reviewed indicated that most hospitals admitted that their 
extra beds were not enough to meet the demands (LP Fan, et al. 2012; XH Liu, 2008).  
Currently most hospitals had transfer and treating procedures for infectious diseases, 
including SARS, influenza, and infectious diarrheal, and their physicians were aware 
of current PHE protocols, but less held these procedures for biochemical incidents, 
leakage of nuclear and terrorist attacks. Therefore there are two issues with respect to 
training and exercises were mainly discussed, namely, the content, and the methods of 
training and exercises (Dong Q, 2006; J Kong, 2009).  
Storage of emergency drugs, equipment and facilities largely depended on emergency 
funding. Thus, funds are the one of key factors affecting PHE. In China, the way of 
collecting funding is relatively singular and lacks regulation and supervision for fund 
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distribution (FL Lin 2011). H. Chen, et al. suggested the establishment of financial 
tracking systems which could analyse and collect charges for medical care, track 
resources (H. Chen, et al. 2012). 
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Part 3  
2.3 Gaps in Knowledge and Research Questions 
This review of the literature and context demonstrates that there is no agreed 
framework for understanding the components either of health system resilience or for 
its measurement.  
Attempts to date have focused on urban areas, but less attention has been given to 
rural areas. For instance, Xu feng, et al. in 2010 developed a capacity assessment 
framework for community hospitals and; Shen jinyu (2011) developed a ‘capability 
index’ for CDCs based on expert consultation and literature review. Shen jinqiang 
(2011) produced an assessment for urban PHE preparedness capacity. Other 
researches has focused on military hospitals and analysed the current status of special 
hospital preparedness capacity (Qiu XY 2007; Lv HY 2005; Lin YF 2007; Yang XY 
2008; Wang ZH 2008).  
This is partly related to the perception that more concentrated areas have an increased 
risk of disastrous events (Barbara J. 2010).  
Public health emergencies frequently occur in rural areas, and county hospitals are the 
most important units for initial response to PHE (Hu GQ 2006). Therefore, it is 
necessary to investigate and assess the preparedness and responsiveness of county 
level in high risk areas of rural China. It is also necessary to develop and evaluate 
measures for health system resilience. Most Assessment instruments were developed 
by scholars themselves, were not comprehensive and rigorous, and the validity and 
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reliability of some questionnaires were not tested (Zhu, et al. 2006).  
Although Zhao Qi, et al. assessed the county-level public health emergency response 
system in 6 provinces of China (2009), and identified some organizational factors 
which influence the organizational response to PHE, he still suggested that a system 
of assessment indicators need further improvement. Particularly, the data was 
collected during 2005-2006 when the construction of PHE system was at an 
elementary stage. Therefore, it is necessary to know the current status of 
preparedness. 
In order to rectify these problems, this research aims to evaluate hospital PHE 
preparedness capacity in rural areas of Sichuan Province using an assessment 
instrument that is derived from those previously used and further improved by experts’ 
opinion. The research will analyse the level of preparedness and identify the factors 
and impediments that appear most relevant to their level of preparedness. 
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CHAPTER 3 STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the study design and methods used in this PhD research program; 
it includes the study design and sampling, the data collection, and management and 
analysis. The materials and methods used are detailed and specified in each 
corresponding results chapter. Some overlaps between this chapter and the other three 
results chapters were inevitable; even though efforts have been made to minimize 
such repetition. 
3.2 Study design and sampling 
3.2.1 Study design 
As the nature of the current study was exploratory, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods was used to address the research questions. According to Fellow 
and Liu (2008), explanatory research answers a particular question/s or explains a 
specific issue/s or phenomenon/a. In contrast, exploratory research investigates a 
phenomenon, identifies the variables, and generates hypotheses for further study. The 
present research explores the evaluation framework and identifies the key indicators; 
it also explains the contributing factors necessary for hospital preparedness. 
Qualitative research is able to uncover and help us understand what lies behind any 
phenomenon about which little is known, as well as identifying the intricate details 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The quantitative paradigm tends to provide more generalised 
findings, with more demonstrable rigor of larger sample sizes from broader sets of 
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subjects (Clark, 2009). In contrast, quantitative research is “[tests] a theory composed 
of variables, [is] measured with numbers, and [is] analysed with statistical procedures 
in order to determine whether the predictive generalisations of the theory hold true” 
(Creswell, 1994).  
The benefits of combining qualitative and quantitative techniques within a research 
method help to develop or extend theory and test its application. Additionally, it 
enhances between-method triangulation through augmenting the quantitative output 
with rich qualitative data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Triangulation can capture a more 
complete, holistic and contextual portrayal of the study because the weakness in each 
single method is compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of another(Jick, 
1983).  
Pragmatically, concerns about combining and balancing qualitative and quantitative 
methods in health services research depend on the aims of the study (J.P. Clark, 2000). 
The purpose of this research is to define public health emergency preparedness and 
develop an appropriate assessment framework to evaluate hospital public health 
emergency preparedness by using both qualitative and quantities research approaches. 
The marriage of these two methods in this research was based on the model provided 
by Morgan (1998) for multi-method research designs. The model is summarized as：
QUALQUAN (Morgan, 1998). 
It involves a quantitative follow-up study to help evaluate or interpret results from a 
qualitative study. Qualitative data can generate hypotheses or develop content for a 
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survey. Quantitative data collection may help to generalize results to different samples 
or to test emergent theories. Quantitative research is used to quantify the problem by 
way of generating numerical data or data that can be transformed into useable 
statistics. It allows researchers assume sample is representative of the population, and 
use statistics to generalize results form a sample to a wider or entire population. 
Quantitative research usually builds on and/or test hypotheses which are based on 
prior research and theories on the topic. By collecting and analysing quantitative data, 
findings of research can be reported in terms of statements, data, tables and graphs to 
address each research questions or hypothesis. 
In this research, qualitative research involves literature review, intensive interview, 
Modified Delphi method. The quantitative approach, in the main, includes a survey 
questionnaire of hospital capability to test the reliability of the instrument and its 
utility. The study was undertaken in three sub studies, as outlined below: 
Study 1 
Propose a definition for hospital PHEP and its elements based on the literature, and 
further informed by intensive interview with experts. 
Study 2 
A modified Delphi Method was used to develop and validate an evaluation framework 
and identify key indicators for evaluation. 
Study 3 
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An instrument (questionnaire) for assessment was designed based on the validated 
framework. The instrument was tested and revised via pilot study prior to 
administration to a stratified sample of hospitals in Sichuan province.  
The detailed process and method are illustrated in Figure five. 
 
Figure 5 Overall research process and methods 
 
3.2.2 Sample 
Intensive Interview 
Choosing the appropriate sample is an important step in qualitative research as the 
most suitable answers are embedded in the samples. Morse (1991) suggested that 
Morse (1991) suggested that four types of samples are commonly used for qualitative research: the 
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purposeful sample, the nominated sample, the volunteer sample, and the sample that consists of 
the total population. For the interview method in the current research, purposive 
sampling and the snowball technique were used to contact key informants and 
participants.  
Purposive sampling is when a researcher chooses specific people within the 
population to use for a particular study or research project. Unlike random studies, 
which deliberately include a diverse cross section of ages, backgrounds and cultures, 
the idea behind purposive sampling is to concentrate on people with particular 
characteristics who will better be able to provide data that are detailed and relevant to 
the research question (Morse, J. M. 1991). 
The purposive sampling technique was used to identify the experts to review the 
dimensions for hospital PHEP assessment. These constituted a Reference Group for 
the research. The purposive sampling technique is an appropriate sampling strategy 
for the purpose of selecting participants who can provide broadly based feedback on 
the content of PHEP.  
The sample size is important for a research design. When determining sample size for 
qualitative studies, “What sample size will reach saturation or redundancy?” “How 
large a sample is needed to represent the variation within target population?” should 
be considered. As there is no exact way of determining sample size in qualitative 
research (Mark Mason, 2010), Strauss and Corbin (1998) provided guideline for 
actual sample size: “The number of participants and key informants in such research 
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may be as few as 10 people or as many as 40 people.” This may help researchers 
estimate sample size when conduct interview. In this range, the sample should be 
large enough to leave researcher with “nothing left to learn” or beyond this range, the 
concepts, themes, etc. begin to be redundant. 
If a potential participant was unable to participate, then the researcher approached the 
next available participant. Additional (candidate) experts were identified through 
“snowballing” technique in which participants identified additional experts for 
possible involvement. A snowball sampling technique is well-suited to study of social 
networks, subcultures, or dispersed groups who share certain practices or attributes 
(Lindlof, Taylor, 2001).It is recognized that expert’s self-selection may potentially 
bias the sample as those who choose to participate may be more interested or 
experienced in the study area than the non-participants. However, in this field, such 
interest implied genuine knowledge and expertise and, thus, an ability to contribute to 
the objectives of the research. 
Participation in the Reference Group was guided by four “expertise” requirements: (1) 
knowledge and experience with the issues under investigation; (2) capacity and 
willingness to participate; (3) sufficient time to participate in the following Delphi 
survey; (4) effective communication skills. 
The next important step is to choose the way the researcher gets access to the targeted 
respondents. Before the real action of research, targeted individuals were contacted by 
an email or phone call. In principle, researchers and their study participants must 
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agree on the expectations during the study process, particularly the expectations each 
party has of the other (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The participants were informed that 
the participation is voluntary, and that they can withdraw at any point during the 
process. In order to develop a trustful relationship between the participants and 
researcher, a full explanation about the confidentiality and anonymity was provided. A 
covering letter which includes all these key points was sent to potential participants to 
gain their agreement to participate in this study. The consent form for the interviews 
stated that every interviewee has read the purpose of the study and accepted the 
requirements and agreed to participate in the interview process. 
Modified Delphi Method 
Contrary to a traditional survey, which would use a random sample to estimate the 
views held by separate individuals in a target population, the Delphi method uses 
interactions by a panel with relevant expertise to arrive at a consensus. A general 
population, or even a narrow subset of a general population, might not be sufficiently 
knowledgeable to answer the questions accurately (Okoli & Powlowski, 2004). 
Unlike a typical user survey, the validity of a Delphi study depends not on the number 
of participants polled, but rather on the expertise of the panel members who 
participate (Armstrong, 1985). The Delphi group size does not depend on statistical 
power, but rather on group dynamics for arriving at consensus among experts (Okoli 
& Pawlowski, 2004). The number of experts is determined by the criteria: “the 
number is required to constitute a representative pooling of judgements and the 
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information processing capability of the research team” (Ludwig, 1994). Generally, 
the approximate size of a Delphi panel is under 50 (Witkin & Altschuld, 1995). 
According to Delbecq, Van de Ven and Gustafson (1975), ten to fifteen could be a 
sufficient number if these participants are homogeneous. Ludwig (1997) pointed out 
that “the majority of Delphi studies have used between 15 and 20 respondents”.  
In this study, the same reference group used for interviews was used in the Modified 
Delphi. The survey also requested some personnel information on the experts for the 
purpose of assessment of the final results. It included highest qualification, working 
department, working position, working role, experience in this area, and key 
personnel evaluation criteria. 
Survey 
Sichuan province located in the southwest of China, has 17 prefecture-level cities, 3 
autonomous prefecture, and 183 counties. Excluding traditional Chinese medical 
hospitals, and military hospitals, there are 122 hospitals above the secondary level in 
county-level cities of Sichuan province. 
According to "the hospital classification system" of the Ministry of Health of People's 
Republic of China, all hospitals in China are classified into primary, secondary, and 
tertiary hospitals based on their functions in providing medical care, medical 
education, and conducting medical research. A secondary hospital is defined as a 
regional hospital that provides comprehensive medical care, medical education, and 
medical research for the region. A tertiary hospital is defined as cross-regional, 
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providing comprehensive and specialized medical care with a high level of medical 
education and research functions. Secondary and tertiary hospitals are further 
classified into subgroups: Grade A, Grade B, and Grade C according to their service 
levels, size, medical technology, medical equipment, and management and medical 
quality. 
In this research, hospitals above the secondary level were selected for investigation 
for the following reasons: (1) the human resources, facilities and instruments for 
public health emergencies are mainly in the secondary and tertiary hospitals, and they 
play a main role in response to incidents; and (2) hospitals above the secondary level 
are usually designated to be responsible for public health emergency tasks (Zhang hui, 
2005). 
Generally, if the population size is less than 1000, for simple random sampling, the 
sample ratio must not be lower than 30% to ensure high accuracy. In the current 
research, the sample of surveyed hospitals was estimated, preliminarily at around 80, 
the ratio reached 50% and, thus, the sample size was considered appropriate for this 
research. 
Next, the Finite Population Correction (FPC) factor was calculated to adjust the 
sample size when the sample rate was more than 20% (Xiangxue Cui, 2009). The FPC 
factor was a modulating factor which optimizes the sample size to ensure the 
credibility or accuracy of the investigation. It is calculated using the following 
formulation (XJ Xu, 2009): 
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FPC=√
N−n
N−1
 (N: population; n: sample), 
And adjusted sample = n*√
N−n
N−1
 
Eq.1 Formulation of calculating FPC 
Using this calculation, the final number of the surveyed hospitals equalled 
80*√
122−80
122−1
 =47.  
The principle of the research design was based on the limited existing resources. It 
used a relatively small sample size within the allowed sample error range (≤5%) to 
achieve a high rigorous result (Xiangxue Cui, 2009). 
In this research, the average sample error was calculated by the 
formulation=√
p(1−p)
n
(
N−n
N−1
)=1.5% (P: 95%) (Xiangxue Cui, 2009), the result indicated 
that the sample size of 47 hospitals was appropriate for the research. 
3.3 Data Collection 
Intensive interview 
The interviewees were contacted by phone or email; they all signed the consent 
information sheet. Due to the constraints of time and financial resources, face-to-face 
interviews were conducted when the participants were in Chengdu city; the other 
interviews were conducted by phone or webcam.  
Each interview lasted from45 minutes to1 hour, depending on the specific situation, 
and was tape-recorded with the permission of the interviewees. The digital voices 
were captured by a combination of note taking, and recording; the transcripts were 
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converted into a word document. The accuracy of the transcription was checked by 
reading the transcription whilst listening to the audio record. If the interviews were 
recorded in Chinese, the researcher transcribed those results into English. The 
transcription from each interview was read and re-read.  
A number of common themes emerged from the categorization process. The data is 
broken down, conceptualized and categorized, and similar incidences, claims and 
discursive practices are grouped together (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The information 
derived from these interviews was used in the next stage, namely, the Delphi study. 
Modified Delphi study 
Delphi process begins with a well-structured questionnaire which is based upon an 
extensive review of literature and intensive interviews outcomes. Using a structured 
questionnaire is an acceptable and common modification of the Delphi process format, 
if basic information concerning the target issue is available and usable (Kerlinger, 
1973).  
These questionnaires were distributed by email to participants, with an advanced 
introduction to the research. All the participants were asked to rate each potential item 
of the framework to establish the preliminary priority of the items. The results of the 
first-round questionnaires were reviewed by the researcher for the design of the 
second questionnaire, and to summarize the items based on the investigation.  
In Round 2, each Delphi panel member received the second questionnaire with 
summarised items. In this round, consensus begins forming and the actual outcomes 
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were presented among the participants’ response, as shifts in rating items is allowed. 
Basically, consensus on a topic can be decided if there is a two-thirds majority 
(Behrens et al., 2006) to 83% agreement (Armon et al., 2001).  
Pilot study 
A survey questionnaire was designed based on the results of Delphi study. Then the 
questionnaires were emailed to the hospital’s Emergency Department Director. When 
completed, they were returned by email. Follow up phone calls were made to seek to 
improve response rates. 
The data from the returned questionnaire was then transferred into a database for 
analysis using SPSS 19.0. The reliability was tested using Cronbach’s α and test-retest 
method. The face validity and content validity of the questionnaire was assessed and 
was approved by the experts during the intensive interviews, that is, the Modified 
Delphi Method. The importance and consistency of the indicators was evaluated by 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient.  
Survey 
The self-administered survey was emailed to the targeted hospitals. It was 
accompanied by an official letter stating the importance of the survey. Each hospital 
was required to designate a department director who would be responsible for 
coordinating the completion of the questionnaire. The questionnaire took 
approximately 30 – 60 minutes; each section needed to be filled out by different key 
staff members who were familiar with the various hospital data. Each returned 
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questionnaire was carefully reviewed for its completeness and consistency. 
As with the pilot study, the data from the returned questionnaire were checked, 
cleaned, and transferred into a database for analysis by using SPSS 19.0 
3.4 Data Analysis 
Meta-ethnographic approach 
A meta-ethnographic approach was used to synthesize the findings from literature 
review. 
Meta-ethnography is a qualitative research methodology developed by Noblit and 
Hare (1988) to provide a similar function to meta-analysis. It is a method for 
combining data from qualitative evaluation and research. 
The meta-analysis translates ideas, concepts, and metaphors across different studies 
and is increasingly seen as the most well-developed approach for synthesising 
qualitative health research, and one that clearly has origins in the interpretive 
paradigm from which most methods of primary qualitative research evolved, it was 
the method selected (Britten, Campbell, et al. 2002) (Also see the chapter of literature 
review). 
Mean value and Kendall’s coefficient 
The mean value is the arithmetic average of a set of values which points to the central 
location of the data. In this study, mean value was chosen to present the rating factors 
to the panel members (Delphi study). The larger the mean value is, the more 
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important the indicator is.  
Accordingly, Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was applied to measure the 
agreement in the ratings. A strong consensus exists for W >=0.7; a moderate 
consensus exists for W=0.5; and a weak consensus exists for W<0.3 (Schmidt, 1997). 
The consensus then demonstrates the trend towards group consensus (Chapter of 
Results in detail). 
Factor analysis 
For the survey results, each answered qualitative question was scored 1 for “yes” and 
0 for “no” or “unknown”. Item scores were calculated by adding together “yes” 
answers; each item of quantitative questions was calculated using Quartiles: 25% 
(P25), 50% or mean (P50), 75% (P75) to describe the properties of a group scores or 
data.  
After all the data were transferred into a database, a Factor Analysis was applied to 
identify the main factors which affect the overall hospital preparedness capacity. 
Factor Analysis is a statistical approach that can be used to analyse inter relationships 
among a large number of observed variables and to explain these variables in terms of 
their common underlying dimensions (factors). (See the Chapter of Results). 
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS: QUALITATIVE STUDIES 
The second objective of this research was to design and validate a framework for 
assessment of hospital public health emergency preparedness. This was undertaken by 
critical analysis of the concepts identified in the literature and the development of a 
draft framework based on those concepts. This draft framework was then further 
developed and validated by intensive interview with key experts in the field and by a 
modified Delphi approach using those experts to achieve agreement on the 
framework. 
This chapter is therefore divided into two parts which report the outcomes of those 
two steps in the validation process. Study one describes the outcomes of key expert 
interviews and study two the process and outcome of the Delphi study. 
4.1 Developing a theoretical framework for hospital preparedness 
The increase in frequency, scale and severity of impact of contemporary crises in their 
many forms-from terrorist threat to climate change, earthquakes to rail crashes- has 
resulted in an increased focus on prevention and preparedness rather than just 
response to events after they happen. This shift in thinking has been marked by a shift 
from ad hoc response arrangements, towards being better prepared and this is best 
illustrated by the concept of resilience.  
Resilience is defined the quality of being able to resume its original shape, or the 
ability to recover quickly (Norris et al. 2008). Disaster resilience is the capacity to 
prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the impacts of disasters 
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(Council of Australian Governments, 2009). 
Preparedness and resilience are critical features of modern risk and crisis management, 
and understanding the risk in detail is vital to ensuring appropriate measures are in 
place. Preparedness is based less on responding to an emergency and more about a 
strategy of “building resilience”. The strategy of building resilience is contributing to 
a sustainable reduction in vulnerability through increased absorptive, adaptive and 
transformative of an organization; improve ability to identify, address and reduce risks. 
A comprehensive approach to disaster management (PPRR disaster management 
cycle) ensures an emphasis on the reduction of risks and the building and 
enhancement of resilience (Council of Australian Governments, 2009). 
Human vulnerability to disasters has two sides: the degree of exposure to dangerous 
hazards (susceptibility) and the capacity to cope with or recover from the 
consequences of disasters (resilience). Vulnerability reduction programs reduce 
susceptibility and increase resilience. Susceptibility to the impact of disasters 
decreases through activities that seek to prevent the risk, or through preparedness 
measures that limit the impact on the population. Thus, preparedness activities 
enhance resilience. 
When emergency events occur, hospitals will be on the front line, playing an active 
part in reducing human vulnerability to disasters. However it is unclear exactly what 
hospitals can do to improve their resilience and how this could be measured so as to 
foster improvements. In this research, we aimed to develop a comprehensive 
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evaluation framework for hospital preparedness. Such a framework would serve to 
reveal and improve the preparedness of hospitals and thus contribute to a more 
resilient health system. 
The relationship between preparedness and resilience could be demonstrated in the 
following Figure six. 
 
Figure 6 Components of Emergency Management. (Adapted from Ministry of Community Safety 
and Correctional Services, 2012, Emergency Management Ontario) 
While there have been around the world considerable investments in improving public 
health preparedness, a general conceptual framework would be an important step 
toward understand the nature of PHEP to enhance the development of evidence and to 
inform policy and practice. 
The purpose of Study 1 is to develop a framework for hospital resilience which is 
derived from the literature but modified as a result of the input from key experts. It 
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also seeks to identify consistent elements for a high level of preparedness and to 
further the development of a universal self-assessment tool that hospitals can use to 
guide their emergency preparedness efforts. 
4.1.1 Methods 
In Study 1, key elements of hospital preparedness which had previously been 
identified by a comprehensive literature review and reported in Chapter 2 were used 
to develop a draft framework which was the basis for structured interviews with key 
experts. Intensive interviews were conducted to complement and validate the potential 
elements of hospital preparedness identified in the literature review. 
Sample of Interview respondents 
A purposive sampling technique was used to identify the experts to review the 
dimensions for hospital public health emergency preparedness assessment (Chapter 3 
of Methods in detail).  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the number of participants and key informants in 
structured interviews can be from 10 to 40. In this study, the number of participants 
was 15 in total from three different categories; academic institutions, administering 
organizations and technical institutions (Figure seven).  
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Figure 7 Reference group 
 
A list of possible participants was provided by key academics at Sichuan University 
(the selection process see as Figure eight). 
 
 
Figure 8 The Selection Process of Panel Members (Okoli&Powlowski, 2004) 
The purpose of step 1 was to help categorise the experts before identifying them. In 
this research, there were three major categories – namely, academic institutions, 
administering organizations and technical institutions – that are familiar with issues 
concerning disaster management. After the step 1 was completed, the actual names of 
Step 1: 
 Prepare  
• Identify relevant disciplines and skills 
• Identify relevant categories: academics,practitioners and government  policy makers 
• Identify relevant organizations 
Step 2 
Populate 
with 
Names 
• Write in names of individuals in relevant disciplines  or skills 
• Write in names of individuals in relevant organizations 
Step 3:  
Nominat
e 
Additiona
l Experts  
• Contact experts listed  
• Ask contacts to nominate other experts 
Step 4: 
Rank 
Experts 
•Create lists of experts fitting for each category 
•Rank experts within each list based on their qualifications 
Step 5: 
Invite 
Experts 
• Invite experts for the panel according to the ranked order 
•Target size is 10-18 
Reference group 
Administrative institutions 
Academic institutions 
Technical institutions 
Supervisors team (both in Australia and China) 
Key officers from the Health Bureau of Sichuan 
Key staff from CDC and hospitals 
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potential experts were placed into the appropriate categories. In the next step, the 
researcher contacted all the potential experts and asked them to recommend additional 
experts. At step 4, the qualifications of those experts in each category were compared 
and ranked in priority for invitation. Based on the rankings, the panel list was created 
at the final stage. 
4.1.2 Results 
The comprehensive review of the literature described in Chapter two, identified ten 
primary themes and twenty three subthemes (Table 3) and these themes are structured 
throughout the cycle of pre-incident preparedness, incident management and post 
incident recovery or adaptation. These themes and subthemes formed the basis of a 
draft framework which was validated through a process of intensive interviews with 
experts in disaster management. 
The respondents to this element of the research comprised a balance of expertise. The 
fifteen experts selected as above comprised four professors in the area of disaster 
management at universities (including the Queensland University of Technology, 
Sichuan University, and Chengdu University of Traditional Chinese Medicine), two 
consultants from the Health Bureau of Sichuan, directors or managers from CDC (3) 
and hospitals (6). They all occupied significant positions in their own organizations 
and had more than 5 years of experience in their professional area (Figure nine and 
ten). 
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Figure 9 Demonstration of expert participants’ working experience 
 
 
Figure 10 Demonstration of participants’ academic qualification 
The interview was conducted in Sichuan province of China, interviewees were 
contacted by phone or email and they all signed the consent information sheet. 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted when participants were in Sichuan; other 
interviews were conducted by phone or webcam.  
After interview, the records were manually transcribed and arranged into key themes 
and issues. Within this process, the data was broken down, conceptualized and 
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categorized, and similar incidences, claims and discursive practices are grouped 
together.  
There were two main questions for the intensive interview:  
(1) What are the ingredients or constituents or elements of hospital public health 
emergency response preparedness?  
(2)What were the expert’s opinions about challenges of major hospitals in rural areas 
of China regarding to the hospital preparedness for public health emergency? (e.g., 
hospital culture and social beliefs, policy and plans for disaster management, 
management mechanism, management procedures, costs of preparation, governance 
frameworks, socio-economic frameworks)  
Examples of responses and the themes extracted from the interviewees’ responses are 
presented in the following table (Table 6). 
Table 6 Examples of interviewees’ response 
Interviewees’ Responses Extracts (elements for PHEP) 
Q 1: What are the ingredients or 
constituents or elements of hospital public 
health emergency response preparedness? 
Examples of statements: 
● To respond to PHE events effectively, 
hospital should be prepared from three aspects, 
namely preparedness before incident, response 
during incident, and evaluation and adaption 
after incident. Emergency plan is important, 
which defines the responsibilities of different 
departments and their interactions, and it also 
makes different specific procedures for 
different types of PHE.  
Emergency plan (guide, document), rescue, 
on-site rescue and medical treatment, training 
and drill, supportability (stockpiles of drugs, 
facilities, structure of staff), early detection 
and disease surveillance, emergency command 
system, evaluation and adaption. 
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● I think, in order to assess an organization’s 
preparedness capacity of PHE, we should focus 
on its rescue and independent response ability 
in 24 and 72 hours. 
● Hospitals should have plans, guide for rescue, 
and documents for disease diagnostic criteria. 
● Plus, I think hospital should provide training 
and drills for emergency plan to raise staff’s 
awareness and understanding for emergency 
plan. 
● Hospitals should have a certain amount of 
stockpiles to ensure hospital respond to PHE 
● The selection of evaluation indicators should 
be considered from hospital’s capacity of 
supportability, such as management of drugs 
and medical facilities, structure of staff, etc., 
early detection and warning, emergency 
disposal (on-site rescue and treatment, 
emergency command system), and evaluation. 
Supportability is foundation for hospital 
preparedness capability, disease surveillance 
and emergency disposal is core function, and 
evaluation can promote hospital preparedness 
capacity development and progress. 
Please give us your opinions about 
challenges of major hospitals in rural areas 
of China regarding to the hospital 
preparedness for public health emergency? 
Examples of statements: 
● I think the limited resources in rural areas is a 
common problem for health organizations, 
therefore, in the future, rural hospital should 
strengthened allocation and complement of 
emergency resources (not only material but also 
human resources) among different level of 
hospitals.  
● Only we know what we have could know 
what lack for, so it is necessary to evaluate 
hospital preparedness capacity regularly.  
Emergency resources, evaluation, emergency 
funding, disease reporting system, information 
communication, cooperation. 
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● Rural hospitals in China may well be the first 
and important response organization when 
emergency occurs, however, they are not 
competent to respond to PHE, so there is a need 
for technical and finical support (such as 
emergency funding )from local government and 
higher authorities.  
● The main responsibility of hospital is to 
provide medical care and medical treatment, 
and for rural hospital in China, they also play 
important role in early detection and warning. 
However, the disease reporting system hasn’t 
been set up in some areas, and among hospitals 
and other health organizations, information 
communication and cooperation should be 
strengthened.   
The transcription of the interviews was imported and analysed by SPSS 19.0 software. 
To analyse the relative importance of issues identified in the structured interviews, we 
used a statistical method known as the Saliency index. Saliency index is defined：The 
average percentile rank of an item across all lists is the item’s gross mean percentile 
rank—its salience index. This measure takes into account the open-ended nature of 
free listing, and it incorporates both how often and how early items occur in 
informants’ lists.  What this method does is to takes into account the open-ended 
nature of free listing, and it incorporates both how often and how early items occur in 
informants’ lists, and quantify the importance of an item in relation to the number of 
uses mentioned by informants (Cotton, 1996). The preference ranking index estimates 
the preference or importance of a plant in relation to a particular criterion. Indexes of 
agreement compare the level of agreement between informants with respect to the 
components and/or structure of a domain. 
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The Saliency index of each code was calculated for assessing its importance for 
hospital preparedness. The larger the Saliency index, the more important the proposed 
element. The Saliency Index is calculated by the following Equation 2,  
Sj =
n − rj
n − 1
 
Eq. 2 Formulation of calculating Saliency index 
“Sj” indicates the Saliency index of element j; “rj” indicates the mean position of 
element j in code list. “n” indicates the total number of elements. Frequency (times 
mentioned by experts during interview) and Saliency index of each item was 
calculated as shown as Table 7. 
Table 7 Proposed potential elements of hospital public health emergency preparedness 
No. Proposed Elements Frequency 
Saliency 
Index 
 No. Proposed Elements Frequency 
Saliency 
Index 
1 Emergency plan 15 0.696  7 
On-site rescue and 
medical treatment 
15 0.609 
2 
Hospital incident 
command system 
13 0.644  8 
Communication 
cooperation with other 
facilities 
11 0.171 
3 Disease surveillance 15 0.409  10 
Expansion of workforce 
surge capacity 
10 0.117 
4 
Laboratory 
diagnosis capacity 
14 0.361  11 
The staff structure of 
critical department 
12 0.224 
5 Training and drills 11 0.327  12 Emergency Funding 7 0.095 
6 Stockpiles 14 0.350  13 Evaluation and adaption 5 0.090 
 
The indicators which were mentioned by experts less than 2 times were excluded: for 
example “income of hospital emergency department staff”, “Hospital management 
pattern”, “public education”, “media report”. 
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Therefore, a preliminary evaluation framework for hospital preparedness was 
developed from those extracted from literature but which demonstrate high saliency 
index following analysis of the outcomes of the interviews. 
This preliminary framework included the elements of emergency plan; surveillance; 
training and drills; stockpiles; emergency command system; on-site rescue and 
medical treatment; crisis communication and cooperation with other facilities; fully 
staffed workforce; evaluation and adaption. These “first level indicators” where able 
to be further explained and detailed through the second and third level indicators 
detailed in Table8. 
Table 8 Initial three-level indicator system 
First level indicator Second level indicator Third level indicator 
A Emergency Plan A1 Type of emergency plan ________ 
A2 The accessible of plan to all staff ________ 
A3 Details of the plan ________ 
A4 The period of evaluating revising plan ________ 
B Surveillance  B1 PHE detection and identification B11 Monitoring system 
B12 Type of surveillance event 
B13Analysis and management of information 
B2 Laboratory diagnosis capacity B21Working procedure and policy of laboratory 
B22Varieties of etiology can be isolated and identified  
B23 The structure of laboratory staff 
B24 Equipment 
C Training and Drills C1 Emergency training C11 Type of emergency training 
C12 Evaluation of the effectiveness of training 
C2 Drills C21 Type of drills 
C22 Back-up files of drills 
C23 Evaluation of the effectiveness of drills 
D Stockpiles D1 Emergency funds D11 Emergency funds budget 
D12 Emergency funds management 
D2 Emergency materials D21 Stockpiles of emergency materials 
D22 Management of emergency materials 
E Emergency command 
system 
E1 Emergency command center/office ________ 
E2 Emergency relevant system E21 Emergency report system 
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E22 Medical treatment system 
E3 Emergency committee or group E31 Type of emergency committee or group 
F On-site rescue and medical 
treatment 
F1 On-site rescue F11 Capacity of emergency rescue 
F12Equipments for on-site rescue 
F13 System of transferring patients 
F2 Medical treatment F21Treatment strategies for different disease 
F22 Treatment plans for different emergencies 
F23Equipments for medical treatment 
G Crisis communication and 
cooperation  
G1Communication and cooperation with inside 
/outside of hospitals  
G11 Communication and cooperation system 
G12 Means of communication and cooperation 
H Fully staffed workforce H1 The staff structure  ________ 
H2 Capacity of critical staff ________ 
H3 Expansion of workforce surge capacity H31 Plan for continuity of health care workforce 
I Evaluation and adaption I1 Evaluation of hospitals capacity ________ 
I2 Experience learning  and adaption of hospital ________ 
For example, the first level indicator (element) of ‘surveillance’, includes the capacity 
for detection and identification of public health emergencies which in turn rely on the  
presence of monitoring systems, capacity to identify types of events and the ability to 
analyse and manage the information resulting. 
Developing the Framework for Hospital Preparedness 
The indicators identified and evaluated through this analytical process form the 
elements of hospital resilience; organised on the basis of the logical association 
between first, second and third tier indicators. However to present these elements into 
a format that may be useable for hospital managers we have taken the further step of 
constructing a model which aligns these, to components identified in previous 
research and described in detail in Chapter 2.  
In addition, we also need to convert these elements into ‘measures’ in order for them 
to form a means of measuring resilience. The evaluation framework must be based on 
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valid criteria that are measureable, reliable, and enable conclusions to be drawn. 
Generally assessments measure performance against known standards for a list of 
critical elements. Measurement data can be generated using a variety of formats, 
including filling out written instruments (Sutton, et al. 2006; Nelson et al. 2007; 
Thomas Fockler, 2009). The logical process of assessment is described as Figure 11. 
 
 
Fig.11 The process of assessment (Adapted by the author, from Nelson et al., 2007) 
According to the process, critical elements or dimensions are needed to be proposed 
first, then organised into a meaningful association.  
Previous research has largely adopted a simple framework for the components of 
health system resilience as comprising staff, stuff, space, service and systems. These 
have been adopted and modified for the purposes of this research into the following 
diagram (Figure 12). 
Measures 
Assessment format 
Surveys / checklists 
Data 
Uses 
Improvement 
Evidence base 
Standards 
Critical elements or 
quality dimensions 
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Fig.12 Model of sustainable organization. (Adapted from Jesse Jacoby, 2012) 
 
For the purposes of this research the following descriptions apply to these 
components. 
“Staff”------ governs the human resources, and policies of recruiting, training, 
and development to produce talent workforce and leadership.  
“System”------ refers to a series of activities for command, control, 
communications, coordination, continuity of operations, stress management. 
“Stuff”------ typically denotes supplies and equipment, and contains a very 
wide range of items, including beds, ventilators, and other medical apparatus; 
pharmaceuticals; and a range of other essential resources.  
Staff 
System 
Stuff Service 
Space 
Sustainable 
Organization 
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“Service”-------or “operations”, refers to roles and responsibilities of hospitals, 
including epidemiology functions, laboratory functions, and capability of 
providing mass health care services. Health systems are only as effective as 
the service they provide (WHO, 2010). 
“Space”------or “structure” refers to both physical structure and facilities, such 
as laboratory, pharmacy, radiology, occupational health, medical supply, and 
so on. 
In addition, the literature also recognises the need to consider the resilience of 
organisations throughout the lifecycle of disaster management. Disaster risk 
management lifecycle includes pre-impact incident risk reduction—prevention and 
preparedness as well as response during incident, and recovery post-incident 
management activities (Keim, Giannone, 2006; Settle AK. 2011). Many major 
disaster assessment frameworks, such as the Common Ground Preparedness 
Framework (CGPF), the National Security Strategy (NHSS), Emergency Support 
Function8 (ESF#8) of National Response Framework (NRF) were developed based on 
the disaster management cycle (P. Joseph Gibson et al., 2012; US Dept of Health and 
Human Services, 2009; US Dept of Homeland Security, 2010), including pre-impact 
incident risk reduction—prevention and preparedness as well as response during 
incident, and recovery post-incident management activities (Settle AK 2011; Gibson 
et al., 2012; Keim 2006).  
In this review, public health emergency preparedness involves activities of prevention, 
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protection, response, and recovery from health emergencies. Thus, the process of 
hospital preparedness has three phases, each of these phases fall within one of three 
time periods: pre-incident, incident, and post-incident (Figure 13). 
 
Fig.13  Disaster management cycle. Adapted by author, from (O’Brien et al. 2010; Copolla 
2007; Twigg 2004). 
The framework and model we developed needs to provide performance criteria, and 
to influence the approach towards a higher-order interpretation. Therefore, a 
comprehensive model for hospital preparedness (resilience) links the elements 
identified and evaluated in this research to the life cycle of disaster management and 
to the domains of activity.  
The following diagram seeks to represent those associations (Figure 14). 
 
Disaster 
Response 
Recovery 
Prevention 
and Protection 
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Fig.14 Model of hospital preparedness 
 
According to this model, hospital preparedness must occur through the continuum of 
the disaster management life cycle (pre-event, during the event and post-event) and in 
each of the domains of staff, stuff, space, service and systems. Finally there are key 
elements that must also be addressed and these elements contribute both individually 
and collective to the domains and continuum of activities. 
Table 9further represents these associations and links them to possible means of 
measuring preparedness and resilience.  
Table 9 Metrics of hospital preparedness 
Key 
components 
Process of Hospital Preparedness 
Prevention and Protection Response Recovery 
Staff 
Develop operation-ready 
medical and nonmedical 
Medical and nonmedical 
workers’ surge capability to 
volunteer recruiting;  On-site 
training of volunteers and 
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workers and volunteers 
through training and drills; 
Staff disaster management 
respond to emergencies; 
feasibility of volunteer register 
workers ; staff capacity 
enhancement; The rapidity for 
adaptation of staff by training 
course; 
Stuff 
Critical infrastructure, 
equipment, medications and 
other supplies: e.g. beds, 
ventilators, and other medical 
apparatus. 
Surge capacity of equipment, 
medications and other supplies 
within hospital 
Proportion of equipment to 
return to pre-event functional 
levels in the first day; The 
adaptation of infrastructures 
and equipment 
Service 
Provision of a package of 
clinical and public health 
interventions; Daily medical 
care; Daily surge capacity 
On-site rescue (out-of-hospital 
care); Distribute vaccine or 
medication; Ancillary services: 
e.g. food, water, transport. 
Provide mental & behavioural 
health care to workers and 
volunteers and patients; 
Medical treatment; Develop, 
test and improve the 
capability of mass health 
services 
Space 
Hospital facilities and 
medical assets: e.g. 
laboratory, pharmacy, 
radiology, occupational 
health, medical supply;  
Surge capacity infrastructure: 
e.g. efficiently the use of 
nonmedical spaces such as 
unstaffed beds, corridors and 
restaurants as treatments spaces; 
Creating treatment areas beyond 
the hospital. Non-health assets: 
communication infrastructure 
Assessment and identification 
of feasible modification to 
medical facilities to increase 
surge capacity 
System 
Disaster plans; Warning and 
surveillance system; Incident 
command system; 
Information and 
communication. 
Emergency plans; cooperation 
with other health and non-health 
facilities; communication 
mechanism and protocols; 
specific procedures for 
vulnerable population;  
treatment strategies 
Optimizing recovery 
strategies; The rapidity for 
adaptation of plans and 
policies; Adaptation of 
communications; 
 
4.1.3 Discussion 
This study built upon the draft framework for hospital disaster preparedness derived 
from the rigorous literature search strategies, critical appraisal, and meta-ethnography 
described in Chapter 2. The elements of resilience identified by the process of 
structured interview with experts where incorporated into the domains identified in 
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the literature to form a new model of hospital preparedness. 
Maintaining emergency preparedness of hospitals is not a static effort, but is a 
dynamic process. Because emergencies happen suddenly and often unpredictably, 
preparedness for major emergencies is different from the routine functions of 
hospitals. However, measuring the capability of hospitals to respond to major 
disasters is undertaken under normal stress and not in the environment of non-routine 
stress. It is difficult to predict the performance of hospitals under such major pressures; 
therefore any evaluation must be constructed around the stages of disaster 
management. A dynamic framework necessitates developing an organizational system 
and structure, reviewing resources, training staff, testing and improving service 
capability. 
By breaking down the domains (staff, system, space, stuff, service) in the model of a 
sustainable (resilient) organization and putting them into context of hospitals, we built 
an evaluation framework for hospital preparedness. This evaluation framework 
comprehensively describes hospital preparedness activities by identifying and 
conceptualizing the essential components of hospital preparedness during the disaster 
lifecycle (and their interactions).  
The difficulty of translating the complex interdependencies inherent in the concept of 
hospital preparedness has meant that measures and metrics have tended to concentrate 
on one single component or didn’t assess components by putting them into each phase 
of disaster management. For example, some empirical studies focused on the 
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emergency plan in the response process(Hong Chen, 2011; WL He, 2004; Xiaomei 
Jiang, et al., 2005; DC Liu, et al., 2010) when the emergency occurs, however, an 
effective plan involves all the activities, practices, interactions, and relationships that 
are aimed at improving the ability of the system during pre-incident, incident and 
post-incident. 
Nevertheless, the basic components of a surge system are laid out in this Chapter. 
However further research was necessary to validate this conceptual framework of 
hospital preparedness and the indicators of performance within each of the themes and 
to identify explicit or minimum criteria for being a resilient hospital. 
 
4.2 Study 2 Finalized the Framework and Develop an Evaluation 
Tool 
Hospitals play a dominant role in managing health aspects of major emergency 
scenarios and are considered as safe havens where affected individuals go for shelter, 
food, water, and psychosocial assistance. Therefore, hospitals must maintain a high 
level of emergency preparedness. To address this continuous threat of disasters, a 
standardized and unified approach is required based on consistent benchmarks to 
assess hospital public health emergency preparedness (Markenson D, et al. 2005). 
Consensual benchmarks may improve capacity for an effective disaster response and 
provide a unified, comprehensive response framework (Cherry, Trainer, 2008).  
Study 1 explored a series of elements for developing an evaluation framework. Based 
on this, the research advanced in to the Delphi study to further identify and refine the 
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most critical indicators which are relevant to the study and which should be included 
in the instrument for evaluating hospital PHEP. This process enabled the distillation of 
the views of experts using a modified Delphi method, with the outcome of an agreed 
instrument for evaluation. 
Not only did the Delphi study supplement information to the preliminary findings 
from literature review and intensive interviews, but also it verified the preliminary 
findings in order to refine the initial framework. Compared to traditional 
questionnaire survey, the Delphi technique can provide more profound and reliable 
findings because of the following reasons: (1) the existing literature implied that there 
is limited consensus on benchmarks on the assessment of framework for public health 
emergency preparedness due to the breadth and complexity of its activities, so there is 
a driver for seeking agreement on this complicated matter, and Delphi study fits 
perfectly for this purpose rather than traditional questionnaire; (2) the merit of “trying 
to achieve consensus” embedded in Delphi technique inherently validate the data 
which will be converted into the strategic actions on a decision-support framework, as 
“two heads works better than one” through group opinions’ exchange the course of 
Delphi study involves consistent revision of participants’ responses.  
4.2.1 Methods 
The study methods comprised the following: (1) a modified Delphi method used to 
identify key indicators for measurement; and (2) Crohbach’s Alpha and Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient were used to verify the validity and reliability of the 
framework. 
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The Delphi process allows researchers to involve experts in a systematic method of 
consensus development and prioritization involving multiple rounds or review and 
synthesis (Dalkey, Helmer, 1963). This process is designed to ensure the 
representation of various experiences and areas of expertise; highlights points of 
convergence and divergence in the expert opinions; narrows the scope of agreed upon 
information; and refines or modifies the information to achieve consensus (Brennan, 
et al., 2006). A modified Delphi technique can be implemented using an initial event 
list rather than a blank piece of paper, while the panellists may be provided with a 
context within which to consider their response. Also the number of rounds in the 
modified technique may be decreased to as few as two if the panellists have been 
provided with an event list, and if early group consensus is achieved (Martino, 1993). 
A questionnaire for the Delphi survey emerged from the literature review and 
intensive interviews. In the questionnaire, each potential item was assessed by experts 
in the study area; they used a five-point scale to evaluate the importance to the 
research topic. Then an evaluation framework was developed with the identified key 
indicators.  
The questionnaire was emailed to experts, along with an introduction to the research, 
in advance. The experts gave importance weighting to each potential item of the 
framework, and provided comments for every level item. Also, the experts were 
invited to identify the illogical parts of the indicator system. They were asked to 
return the questionnaire within three weeks. 
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Some personal information on the experts (e.g. highest qualification, working 
department, working position, working role, and experience in this area)was requested 
during the survey, mainly for the purpose of assessment of the final results.  
Theoretically, the Delphi process can be continuously iterated until consensus is 
determined to have been achieved. In most cases, two to three rounds in the modified 
Delphi method are often sufficient to collect the needed information and to reach a 
consensus (Cyphert& Gant, 1971; Brooks, 1979; Ludwig, 1997). 
4.2.2 Data Analysis and Management 
The survey data was managed and analysed using SPSS 19.0. 
First, the authority of experts was assessed. The basic information of the experts was 
identified, and the authority of experts was evaluated, which was expressed by the 
authoritative coefficient Ca. Generally, when Ca is higher than 0.7 the result will be 
acceptable (Yanping Li, 2013). 
Two impact factors were used; one was the evaluation criteria for the indicator 
(expressed by Cd), and the other factor was the experience of the expert in this area 
(represented by Ce). 
Ce was divided into five levels, with each level given a score, namely “unfamiliar=0, 
less familiar=1, familiar=2, more familiar=3, very familiar=4”.  
Cd was decided against the evaluation criteria used by the experts. Each answer was 
given a score “never=0, little=1, somewhat=2, much=3, a great deal=4” (Table 10). 
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Table 10 The evaluation criteria of experts and corresponding score (Cd) 
Evaluation 
criteria 
To what extent do you rely on these criteria to give your evaluations 
Never  Little  Somewhat  Much  A great deal  
Experience (C1) 0 1 2 3 4 
Theory (C2) 0 1 2 3 4 
Literature (C3) 0 1 2 3 4 
Instinct (C4) 4 3 2 1 0 
Thus, the authority of experts was calculated by the following equations (Eq.3): 
 
 
 
Eq.3 Formulation of calculating authority of experts 
Secondly, the mean value (“Mj”) of each indicator was calculated to assess the 
‘intensity of importance’ weight for each item. In the questionnaire, each potential 
item was assessed by experts in the study area, using a five-point scale regarding their 
importance to the research topic.  A score according to the magnitude of importance 
was given as follows: Very important =4; Important =3; Moderately important=2; Of 
little importance=1; Of no importance=0. The larger the mean value, the greater 
indicator is.  
Thirdly, Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was applied to measure the experts’ 
agreement on the indicators. It is a measure of the agreement among several 
quantitative or semi-quantitative variables that are assessing a set of n objects of 
interest (Dawson B., 2014). Kendall’s W ranges from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete 
agreement). Intermediate values of W indicate a greater or less degree of unanimity 
Cd=(C1+C2+C3+C4)/4,  
Ca= (Cd+Ce)/2 
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among the various responses. 
Reliability and Validity of Indicator System 
Through the literature review, intensive interviews and modified Delphi, an evaluation 
framework with indicators were finalized. The framework includes nine themes, and 
24 sub-themes. 
(1) Reliability 
Internal reliability and external reliability were tested by Cronbach’s α and test-retest 
method, respectively. This involved testing the same participant twice, over a period 
of time, using the same test.  Similar scores suggest a test has external reliability. 
Generally, Cronbach’s α >=0.6 indicates that the internal consistency is acceptable; if 
the test-retest reliability is 0.7 or higher, then it has good external reliability (Joseph 
A., et al. 2003). 
(2) Validity 
In this study, content validity and construct validity were tested. Content validity 
required each question of the survey or test to be given to a panel of experts, who then 
rated it. The experts gave their opinion about whether the question was essential, 
useful or irrelevant. It was tested by Kendall’s W. Construct validity which defines 
how well a test or piece of experiment measures up to its claims. The evaluation of 
construct validity required the correlations of the measure to be examined in regard to 
the variables that are known to be related to its construct. This was demonstrated by 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient (rho), which was calculated by the strength and 
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direction of the relationship between the two continuous variables, where both 
variables were at least ordinal scales (Dawson B., 2014). 
4.2.3 Results 
Profiles and Expertise of the Panel Experts 
In this study, with reference to the selection process of panel members described in 
the study 1, 15 experts were invited to participate in the Modified Delphi study. The 
choosing of qualified experts for the purpose of high-performing group consensus 
achievement is a most important factor determining the Delphi study’s effectiveness. 
In contrast to traditional surveys, a Delphi study does not require a statistical sample 
that attempts to represent a population; instead it aims to approach high profile 
experts who have a profound understanding of the specific topic (Okoli C., et al., 
2004).  
Table 11 Profile of the panel experts 
 Number of panel experts CR*(%) 
   
Gender  
Male 
Female 
 
6 
9 
 
40 
60 
Working experience(years) 
< 10 
11-15 
15-20 
>20 
 
2 
6 
4 
3 
 
13.3 
40 
26.7 
20 
Position 
Professor 
Executive/Associate Director 
Consultant 
 
6 
7 
2 
 
40 
46.7 
13.3 
Organization 
University 
 
4 
 
26.7 
100 
 
CDC 
Health Bureau of Sichuan 
Hospital 
3 
2 
6 
20 
13.3 
40 
*CR: Constituent Ration 
They all occupied significant positions in their own organizations and had at least 
more than 5 years of experience in their professional area. The following table shows 
the familiarity of panel experts in public health emergency. 
Table 12 Familiarity of experts in public health emergency 
Familiarity Numbers of experts CR(%) 
Very familiar 6 40.0 
More familiar 7 46.7 
Familiar 2 13.3 
Less familiar 0 0.0 
Total 0 100 
The evaluation framework was finalized by identifying key evaluation indicators 
during the Delphi study. The validity of a Delphi study depends on the expertise of the 
panel members who participate (Armstrong J.S., 1985). Therefore, the authority of 
experts (Ca) was assessed. Among the reference group, there were six experts who 
were very familiar with public health emergency preparedness, and nine experts who 
were familiar in this area. The Ca of experts was 0.825, it is therefore concluded 
participants have good expertise. 
Finalized the evaluation framework 
To achieve a statistically rigorous consensus, this research looked at the degree of 
consensus. Accordingly, Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W) was applied to 
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measure the agreement in the ratings. A strong consensus exists for W >=0.7; a 
moderate consensus for W=0.5; and a weak consensus for W<0.3 (Schmidt, 1997). 
Kendall’s W was computed by SPSS software to illustrate the degree of consensus for 
the indicators (Table 13). 
In the first round, Kendall’s W for the first-level indicator ranged from 0.352 to 0.492, 
P＜0.05, and Kendall’s W for the whole indicator system was calculated to be 0.434. 
The results indicated a fairly close to moderate consensus level. This finding can be 
explained. The panellists had multiple professional backgrounds and dealt with 
disaster/emergency work at different levels (including project management, policy 
consultation, and technical support); all the indicators were broad and covered various 
aspects of hospital management, such as planning, a fully staffed workforce, stockpile 
management, etc. This result may reflect that people who work in different 
organizations have different knowledge, skill sets, and interests about hospital 
preparedness capacity. As such there were difficulties in achieving a relatively low 
degree of consensus.  
After the revision of the Delphi questionnaire, in the second round, Kendall’s W for 
the first-level indicator ranged from 0.522 to 0.685; P＜0.05 concluded that the level 
of agreement was higher than in the first round. Kendall’s W of the whole indicator 
system was 0.610, showing that there was a very strong consensus level. 
After two rounds Delphi, Kendall’s W of entire framework had great degree of 
unanimity among reference group.  
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Table 13 Kendall’s W for each indicator in two rounds of Delphi 
First-level Indicator 
First Round Second Round 
Mj
※
 Kendall’s W P Value Mj Kendall’s W P Value 
Emergency plan 3.486 0.442 0.015 3.667 0.685 0.016 
Surveillance 3.000 0.416 0.107 3.173 0.560 0.015 
Training and drills 3.233 0.436 0.009 3.621 0.601 0.028 
Stockpiles 2.967 0.492 0.002 3.074 0.534 0.026 
On-site rescue and medical treatment 3.244 0.412 0.002 3.147 0.541 0.004 
Fully staffed workforce 3.373 0.467 0.012 3.278 0.522 0.010 
Emergency command system 2.667 0.565 0.023 3.556 0.562 0.022 
Crisis communication and cooperation  3.140 0.483 0.043 3.474 0.526   0.041 
Evaluation and adaption 2.900 0.352 0.042 ------- -------- -------- 
Entire indicator system 3.223 0.434 0.000 3.373 0.610 0.000 
※ Mj =“mean value of indicator j”, indicating the importance of indicator j 
 
On the other side, the mean value (Mj) for a set of indicator also could reflect the 
consensus of a group of highly knowledgeable and experienced professionals on both 
the theory and practice aspects of disaster management. All indicators were filtered by 
the criteria of “extent of importance” (Mj).  
Importance (Mj) for each second and third level indicator was calculated in two 
rounds of Delphi (Table 14). 
Table 14 Mean value for each indicator in two rounds of Delphi 
Second level indicator 
Importance of indicator (Mj) 
Third level indicator 
Importance of indicator (Mj) 
First round Second round First round Second round 
A1 3.667 3.667 ________ ________ ________ 
A2 3.660 3.778 ________ ________ ________ 
A3 3.133 3.556 ________ ________ ________ 
B1 3.000 3.095 B11 3.000 2.889 
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B12 3.000 2.778 
B13 3.000 3.489 
B14 ________ 3.222 
B2 3.000 3.250 
B21 2.733 3.444 
B22 3.333 3.556 
B23 2.800 2.889 
B24 3.133 3.111 
C1 3.933 4.074 
C11 3.467 4.111 
C12 4.399 4.000 
C13 ________ 2.800 
C2 2.533 3.167 
C21 3.466 3.111 
C22 1.333 ________ 
C23 2.800 3.222 
D1 2.733 2.889 
D11 2.533 2.556 
D12 2.933 3.222 
D2 3.200 3.222 
D21 3.200 3.222 
D22 ________ 3.222 
D3 ________ 3.111 
D31 ________ 3.000 
D32 ________ 3.222 
E1 3.333 3.111 ________ ________ ________ 
E2 3.133 3.220 
E21 3.043 3.441 
E22 3.223 3.000 
E3 3.267 3.111 E31 3.267 3.111 
F1 3.589 3.397 
F11 3.733 3.667 
F12 3.445 3.589 
F13 ________ 3.222 
F14 ________ 3.111 
F2 3.156 3.158 
F21 3.067 3.556 
F22 3.133 3.444 
F23 3.267 3.111 
F24 ________ 3.222 
F25 ________ 3.000 
F26 ________ 2.889 
F27 ________ 2.889 
G1 2.667 3.556 
G11 2.533 2.667 
G12 2.800 3.465 
H1 2.889 3.667 ________ ________ ________ 
H2 3.000 3.222 ________ ________ ________ 
H3 3.533 3.533 H31 2.533 2.533 
I1 2.800 ________ ________ ________ ________ 
I2 3.000 ________ ________ ________ ________ 
According to the score given by experts, Mj of all indicators were nearly 3.0 
(important) in the second round, indicating the intensity of importance for each item 
of evaluation framework is high.  
There was little change in the experts’ opinions in the intensity of importance for each 
indicator in two consecutive rounds. Overall, along with the evaluation of Kendall’s 
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W, these results indicated that the round 2 can be considered to reach the stopping 
point. 
In the second round, based on the outcomes of first round and consequent 
modifications, there were some changes, such as, added secondary-level indicator 
“emergency drug”, and “evaluation and adaption” was excluded because there would 
be no valid records of hospital self-evaluation to review, etc. 
Based on the modified Delphi, an evaluation framework was finalized (Table 15)  
Table 15 An evaluation framework for hospital preparedness 
Themes Sub-themes 
Emergency Plan  Type of emergency plan: e.g. bioterrorism and chemical events; communicable disease, 
etc. 
 The accessible of plan: whether is accessible to all medical staff; promote the emergency 
plan 
 Details of the plan: e.g.: a protocol to initiate the emergency plan, a classification of the 
role in community wide planning. 
 The period of evaluating and revising the plan 
PHE detection and 
identification 
 Surveillance policy and system; 
 Surveillance systems for different types of diseases. 
Analysis, report and share of surveillance information 
Laboratory diagnosis capacity  working procedure and policy of laboratory 
 variety of etiology can be isolate and identified 
 equipment 
Training and drills  Type of training/ drills: e.g. bioterrorism and chemical events; communicable disease 
 Evaluation for effectives of training/drills: whether assess effectives of training/drills at 
fixed period. 
Stockpiles  Emergency materials and facilities: e.g. food, water, protection facilities, emergency 
beds, 
 Emergency funding: e.g. emergency funding collection and management 
 Emergency drugs 
Emergency command system  Emergency command centre 
 Emergency relevant system: e.g. whether establish emergency report system, medical 
treatment system, etc. 
 Emergency committee or group 
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Fully staffed workforce  The staff structure of critical department 
 Capacity of critical staff 
 Expansion of workforce surge capacity 
On-site rescue and medical 
treatment 
 On-site rescue: e.g. capacity of emergency rescue, equipment for on-site rescue (for 
example, ambulance, communication equipment.); Emergency beds and space: e.g. license 
beds, isolation beds, alternative medical space, ICU, ED, etc 
 Medical treatment: e.g. expert group for emergency medical treatment; treatment 
strategies for different diseases; equipment for medical treatment, etc. 
Crisis communication and 
cooperation 
 communication and cooperation within hospital: e.g. within department within hospitals; 
within key staff within hospitals 
 Communication and cooperation with other facilities: e.g. with other health facilities; 
with government offices for emergency; with media and pubic 
Test of validity and reliability of indicator system 
Reliability 
Cronbach’s α and test-retest reliability were calculated to assess internal and external 
reliability respectively (Table 16). 
Table 16 Analysis of reliability of the framework 
First-level Indicator Cronbach’s α Test-retest reliability 
Emergency plan 0.802 0.765 
PHE identification and detection 0.795 0.873 
Laboratory diagnosis capacity 0.736 0.794 
Training and drills 0.799 0.795 
Stockpiles 0.754 0.816 
On-site rescue and medical treatment 0.834 0.722 
Fully staffed workforce 0.816 0.766 
Emergency command system 0.778 0.722 
Crisis communication and cooperation 0.745 0.756 
Entire indicator system 0.949 0.806 
Cronbach’s Alpha of first-level indicator ranged between 0.736 and 0.834, P＜0.05. 
Test-retest reliability ranged from 0.722 to 0.873, P＜0.05. Thus, the indicator system 
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has a good internal and external reliability.  
Validity 
The content validity was proved by Kendall’s W. In the above section, the overall 
Kendall’s W was 0.610, which means that the content validity was good. 
The Spearman’s correlation coefficient (rho) was used to evaluate the construct 
validity, which was calculated to show the strength and direction of the relationship 
between the two independent indicators. All the statistical computation was executed 
by SPSS software. The coefficient of the internal indicators ranged from 0.112 to 
0.561, P＜0.05. The positively strong relationship indicated that the indicator system 
had a higher construct validity (Table 17). 
Table 17 Relationship between two items 
Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1.00         
2 0.346 1.00        
3 0.382 0.366 1.00       
4 0.561 0.254 0.246 1.00      
5 0.473 0.354 0.486 0.277 1.00     
6 0.356 0.355 0.146 0.286 0.302 1.00    
7 0.433 0.371 0.112 0.312 0.252 0.498 1.00   
8 0.500 0.356 0.152 0.351 0.233 0.416 0.458 1.00  
9 0.454 0.516 0.504 0.365 0.364 0.348 0341 0.527 1.00 
1 Emergency plan; 2 Disease surveillance; 3 Laboratory diagnosis capacity; 4 Training and drills; 5 Stockpiles; 6 
On-site rescue and medical treatment; 7 Fully staffed workforce; 8 Emergency command system; 9 Crisis 
communication and cooperation. 
 
4.2.4 Discussion 
An evaluation framework was finalized via two rounds Delphi method, consisting of 9 
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first-level indicators and 24 second-level indicators. The indicators system was developed 
around five key elements: Staff, Stuff, Space, Service and Space. Capacity of hospital 
preparedness not only refers to self-ability of response to PHE, but also about ability of 
cooperation and coordination with other organizations, community, and government which 
might be more important to cope with PHE effectively. This framework contains hospital’s 
main responsibilities in response to PHE, such as capacity of taking mass patients in a short 
time when PHE occurs, PHE surveillance and monitoring. Meanwhile, it also emphasizes 
cooperation, communication and coordination with different organizations, for example, 
whether hospital conduct drills with other hospitals or organizations; whether have 
communication system, etc. Therefore, the content of finalized indicators system is relatively 
comprehensive. 
Additionally, the reference group includes officials from academic institutions, the health 
bureau and technical institutions including the CDC in Sichuan. The aim was to collect 
individuals from a diverse background thus bringing together a range of perspectives which 
could make the indicator system with authoritative. 
The number of experts in each round of Delphi was 15, which met the requirements of 
the Delphi method. In addition, they are senior practitioners in the area of disaster 
management. The experts came from academia, technical institutions (hospitals and 
CDC), and the government, which enabled the Delphi study to obtain different 
perspectives, and to ensure the qualification of experts was suitable.  
Furthermore, the index for the authority of the experts was assessed; it indicated that 
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the study approached a high profile level for the experts who had a profound 
understanding of the research topic. Their qualification had a close link with the 
validity of the Delphi study. For example, the higher the expertise of the participants, 
the more reliable the outcomes are. The authority of experts here was 0.825, 
illustrating that the proposed indicator system was reasonable. Theoretically, the 
Delphi process can be continuously iterated until consensus is determined to have 
been achieved. The value of W was assessed at 0.610, indicating a greater degree of 
unanimity among the various responses; thus, a consensus on topics was deemed to be 
achieved. The Delphi process began with a well-structured questionnaire; the design 
was based upon the literature review and the intensive interview outcomes. Hence, 
face and content validity was demonstrated as good. 
Generally, Cronbach’s Alpha higher than 0.6 indicates the internal consistency is 
acceptable; the external reliability is good when the test-retest reliability is above 0.7 
(Joseph A., et al. 2003). In the current study, both Cronbach’s Alpha and test-retest 
reliability of each indicator were higher than 0.7, implying that the entire indicator 
system had good internal and external reliability.  
A scientific and reasonable measurement tool, such as Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient, can appropriately represent or measure the construct being investigated. 
Thus, the construct validity assessment illustrated that the framework had good 
construct validity. 
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4.2.5 Conclusion 
An evaluation framework was developed and validated during the current research. It 
concisely, and comprehensively, captured the emergency preparedness activities of 
hospitals, helping hospitals to recognize how their daily work fits within public health 
emergency preparedness. However, the evaluation framework needs further 
assessment and adaptation for operational usage in the context of China. 
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CHAPTER5 RESULTS OF QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
Testing the Utility of the Framework for describing the Current 
Status of Hospital PHEP 
 
5.1Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of quantitative research. First, the chapter 
summarises the methodology, including the sample profile, survey instrument, data 
collection and analysis procedures. Then, it describes the current capacity of hospital 
preparedness for emergencies, and compares those capacities among different grades 
and types of hospitals.  
The study used a cross-sectional method by applying a questionnaire to survey 
hospitals preparedness in different regions of Sichuan province. Respondents were all 
from secondary and tertiary hospitals in the province of Sichuan. Forty sixresponding 
hospitals in total responded to the survey. 
Instrument 
An evaluation indicator system framework was created and a questionnaire was 
developed based on the results of Delphi method (reported in Chapter 4). The 
questionnaire consisted of eight sections and 76 items. The questionnaire was tested 
by a pilot study.  
For the purpose of this study, we analyzed the data focused on the following nine 
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areas of interest: (1) hospital’s basic information (including hospital grade, SARS 
crisis experience, and number of medical staff in related departments); (2) hospital 
emergency plan (emergency type, accessibility, and revision and implementation of 
emergency plan); (3) surveillance capability: Public health emergencies detection and 
identification; laboratory diagnosis capacity: laboratory regulation and management, 
sample disposal and evaluation system, collection and disposal of suspected samples, 
etc.); (4)staff training (organization of public health emergencies training,  
curriculum development and training effectives assessment);(5)stockpiles (emergency 
supplies, stockpiles of drugs and materials management); (6) emergency command 
system (emergency command centre, the staff structure, capability of critical staff); 
(7)medical treatment capacity (protocol for diagnosis,  treatment, and transfer of 
patients);(8) risk communication; (9) maintaining fully staffed workforce. 
Data collection procedures 
A questionnaire was sent to the targeted hospitals via email accompanied by an 
official letter from the Sichuan Health Bureau stating the importance of the survey 
and the requirement that each hospital designate a department director to be 
responsible for coordinating the completion of the questionnaire. Each questionnaire 
was carefully reviewed for its completeness and consistency. For those questionnaires 
with incomplete and/or inconsistent responses, one or two follow-up telephone calls 
were made to ensure completeness and consistency. The data from returned 
questionnaires were then transferred into a database for analysis. 
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Statistical analysis 
Each returned questionnaire was reviewed for completeness and consistency. If no 
answer could be obtained, that questionnaire was considered as “no” response. For 
qualitative questions, each answered item was scored 1 for “yes” and 0 for “no” or 
“unknown”. Item scores were calculated by adding together “yes” answers. The 
higher the score, the better the hospital was considered to be prepared. For 
quantitative questions, the normality test of data was conducted by using SPSS 19.0.  
All data were transferred into a database and analyzed using software SPSS. 
Descriptive statistics were used to present the data. Comparisons of mean scores for 
each of 8 emergency preparedness aspects among different levels of hospitals were 
performed by independent sample t test (2-tailed), with P ≤ 0.05 as statistical 
significance.  
5.2Results 
Pilot study 
A pilot study was conducted to check that the design of the questionnaire and its 
comprehension. It also sought to identify potential problems with the methods and 
logistics and to avoid misleading inappropriate or redundant questions in the 
questionnaire. 
Two tertiary and three secondary hospitals were selected for the pilot study. Since the 
content of the questionnaire refers to different departments of hospitals, the director of 
the Medical Department or the Emergency Department was responsible for 
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coordinating the completion of the questionnaire; where necessary collecting 
information from other departments.  
As a result of the pilot study, improvements were made as following to the 
questionnaire: 
 In the section of “Laboratory diagnosis”, the questions “is there someone is on 
duty for 24 hours in the laboratory?” and “is there someone is on duty in 7 days a 
week?” are similar, and were changed into “is there someone is on duty in the 
laboratory every day (include weekends)?” 
 In the section of “On-site rescue and medical treatment”, the question “Does 
hospital have facilities for medical waste and rubbish, such as boxes for used 
injector or other edge tool, etc.” was deleted because of Sichuan province has 
established medical waste centre which is responsible for collection and uniform 
disposal of trash from hospitals. 
 In the section of “Stockpiles”, there were many indicators which were repetitive 
and so a new structure was applied to the question to read “does the hospital have 
the following protective equipment?” 
Survey 
Hospital information 
There were forty six hospitals in total that responded to the questionnaire from 47 
approached. Of all hospitals, 25 were secondary hospitals and 21 were tertiary 
hospitals. In terms of hospital type, 19 were teaching hospitals and 27 were 
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non-teaching; 38 were general hospitals (See Table 18 and Figure 15).  
Table 18 Hospital classification information 
Variables Tertiary grade A Tertiary grade B Secondary grade A Secondary grade B Total 
Fever clinics 
Yes, designated 
Yes, not designated 
 
14 
2 
 
4 
1 
 
14 
3 
 
4 
4 
 
36 
10 
No/ Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 
Teaching hospital 
Yes 
No 
 
11 
5 
 
3 
2 
 
4 
13 
 
1 
7 
 
19 
27 
Types of hospital
※ 
General hospital  
Specialized hospital 
 
12 
3 
 
5 
0 
 
14 
3 
 
6 
2 
 
38 
8 
Total 16 5 17 8 46 
※Types of hospital: General hospital: A hospital that can treat most people and that does not limit itself to one 
particular type of medical problem. Types of specialised hospitals include trauma centres, women’s hospitals, 
children’s hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, etc, and hospitals for dealing with specific medical needs.  
 
Table 19 shows the numbers of health care staff and beds in the surveyed hospitals. 
The average number of physicians per hospital was 444, nurses averaged 486and the 
average total staff per hospital was 1547. Average bed numbers were 414 (range 
Tertiary grade A 
35% 
Tertiary grade B 
10% 
Secondary grade A 
37% 
Secondary 
grade B 
18% 
Fig. 15 Distribution of different level of hospitals 
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40-1800). The proportion of specialty beds such as Emergency Department Beds, 
isolation beds and Intensive Care Unit Beds (ICU) was 2.2% (605/27879), 1.9% 
(529/27879) and 2.5% (692/27879) respectively. Although the mean number of the 
hospital licensed bed capacity is greater than 400, fewer than 40 extra beds can be 
added immediately during emergencies, accounting for 10% of licensed beds. 
Table 19 The numbers of health care staff and beds in the respondent hospitals 
 Mean±SD Minimum Maximum Total 
Staff (in total) 1547.9±2073.9 96 8900 36222 
Physicians 444.7±606.1 32 2400 10227 
Nurses 486.3±590.3 33 2280 11184 
Licensed beds 414.4±345.7 40 1800 27879 
ED beds 26.3±16.5 12 188 605 
Isolation beds 18.3±44.5 10 148 529 
Intensive care unit 
beds 
30.1±37.1 10 150 692 
Extra beds* 38.2±95.3 10 400 1064 
SD, Standard deviation 
*Extra beds: the numbers of extra beds can be provided when a emergency plan is initiated. 
 
Current status of hospital PHEP in Sichuan province 
The eight aspects of hospital preparedness capacity identified in the framework 
described in Chapter 4 which formed the basis of the survey are detailed below. 
Capacity1：Emergency Plan 
Emergency plans establish the protocols for operation during a public health 
emergency. For a hospital to mobilize all emergency resources in a short period of 
time, contingency plans must be decided in advance. This study showed that all the 
targeted hospitals at least had one emergency plan, while no hospitals had emergency 
plans for all listed emergencies. Of all 46 hospitals, 45 hospitals had emergency 
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response plans that specifically addressed infectious diseases, 42 hospitals had plans 
for natural disasters, foodborne disease (40), and mass unidentified disease (38). 
Fewer hospitals had plans for nosocomial infection (22) and occupational poisoning 
(20), and only 11 hospitals had developed emergency plans for biological, chemical, 
radiological, nuclear and explosive threats (See table 20).At the time of this survey, 
38 hospitals had a protocol for use of personal protective equipment, and 23 had a 
detailed plan for drug distribution. 
Table 20 Comparison of capacity 1 (Emergency Plan) among different hospitals. 
Type of emergency plan 
Yes No/Unknown 
Numbers of hospital Numbers of hospital 
Infectious disease 45 1 
Mass unidentified disease 38 8 
Foodborne disease 40 6 
Occupational poisoning 20 26 
Nosocomial infection 22 24 
Natural disaster 42 4 
Bio/Chemical/nuclear, etc. terror 11 35 
 
Periodic review and updating of emergency plans enhances an institution’s emergency 
response capacity. In this regard, the survey sought responses in regard to the recency 
of updating of the plan. 38 hospitals had evaluated and revised their emergency plan 
at least once in 12 months, and 44 respondents reported that their emergency plan 
were accessible to all medical staff.  
Capacity 2: Surveillance  
The surveillance capacity of hospitals was assessed via two aspects: early detection 
and identification, and laboratory diagnostic capability. Detection and identification 
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of a public health emergency are amongst the most important objectives for prompt 
and effective public health response. Hospital laboratories not only have the task of 
diagnosis, but are also responsible for the surveillance of disease and reporting of 
disease outbreaks. Therefore, laboratory information plays an important role in the 
early detection of public health emergencies. 
(1) Public health emergencies detection and identification 
Public health emergency detection and identification is mainly collected from hospital 
clinic recording, disease/symptoms surveillance in the emergency room, laboratory 
diagnosis and death registration. 
Among all the responded hospitals, 37 hospitals reported that they had developed a 
surveillance system for certain diseases, and all hospitals maintain epidemic 
reporting/registration systems, and had an outpatient log or infectious disease report 
card for surveillance.  
Eight clinical syndromes were used in this research to evaluate the hospital’s 
emergency detection and identification capacity; this included the capacity to 
undertake routine microbiological tests, fever patients, death with unknown causes, 
gastroenteritis patients, influenza-like cases, atypical pneumonia and septicemia. 
Forty Three and the 46respondent hospitals reported that they regularly monitored for 
the presence of disease in routine microbiological tests and fever patients. Similarly, 
most hospitals could detect and identify atypical pneumonia and influenza-like cases. 
In addition, nearly 32 respondents revealed that they can monitor septicemia, death 
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with unknown causes, and gastroenteritis patients (Table 21).  
Table 21 Monitoring items in respondent hospitals 
Types of disease/symptom 
Yes 
 
No/Unknown 
Numbers of hospitals Numbers of hospitals 
Routine microbiological tests* 43  3 
Fever patients 46  0 
Influenza-like cases 46  0 
Death with unknown causes 32  14 
Gastroenteritis patients 30  16 
Atypical pneumonia 39  7 
Numbers of emergency room patients 38  8 
Septicaemia 32  14 
* Classification of pathogen detection result 
There were 38 hospitals which had a designated person in charge of identifying 
suspicious abnormal trends and reporting surveillance information to the health 
administration. Checking, analyzing and summarizing monitoring information is 
important for identification and detection of public health emergencies. Among the 
targeted hospitals, 19 hospitals stated that classified and analyzed monitoring 
information was reported at least once per week (Table 22). 
Table 22 Period of analysis of monitoring information in the respondent hospitals 
Period Hospitals 
Everyday  12 
Many times per week 2 
One week 5 
Every two weeks 13 
One month  8 
Aperiodicity 1 
Never 5 
Total 46 
 
Surveillance information was shared their with the local health authority via a 
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network reporting system by 22 of the surveyed hospitals. 
(2) Laboratory diagnosis capacity 
Eight infectious diseases were selected to evaluate hospitals’ laboratory diagnosis 
capacity, based on the groups described by Zhang Hui, et al. (2007): (1) class A 
infectious diseases, according to the Law on Communicable Disease Prevention and 
Control of China (plague and cholera); (2) infectious diseases caused by a pathogen 
which can potentially be used as a bioterrorist weapon (anthrax and brucellosis); (3) 
infectious diseases with cause a significant threat to life and health of citizens (SARS, 
influenza, meningococcal meningitis, Japanese encephalitis B).  
The results were demonstrated in Table 23. 
Table 23 Capacity of laboratory diagnosis among respondents 
Types of infectious 
Yes 
 
No/Unknown 
Numbers of hospitals Numbers of hospitals 
SARS 42  4 
Plague bacillus 20  26 
Cholera 40  6 
Anthrax 3  43 
Influenza 40  6 
Meningococcal meningitis 27  19 
Japanese encephalitis  35  11 
Brucellosis 20  26 
 
The results demonstrated that most (>35) hospitals had the capacity to identify and 
isolate SARS, influenza, and Japanese encephalitis. Approximately half of the 
targeted hospitals could identify and isolate Cholera, Meningococcal meningitis, and 
Brucellosis, while few hospitals had the capacity to identify and isolate Anthrax (3). 
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Of all respondents, only 3 tertiary hospitals could isolate and identify all eight 
diseases. 
This survey did indicate that when faced with an emergency, 35 hospitals (of 46) 
could promptly enlarge the capacity of sample testing. However few (15/46) had 
arrangements in place for the transport of suspected samples capability to another 
location with more extensive capacity.  
Only 24 of the responding hospitals reported that they could request laboratory testing 
and receive results 24 hours per day and seven days per week.  
Finally centralised reporting was mostly delayed. Of all respondents, 26 had a direct 
electronic link to disease reporting network system to CDC or other health 
administrative department. 
Capacity 3: Training and Drills 
Among all the respondents, 44 hospitals reported that they had a staff training 
program, with variable content including the content of the emergency plan (37), 
medical treatment procedures (43), methods of identifying PHE (44), awareness of 
public health emergencies (33), personal protective measures (40), information 
system management (34), disinfection and sterilization (27), and principles of 
quarantine and isolation (26). However, none of respondents reported that their 
training curriculum included all above-mentioned contents (Table 24). 
Table 24 Comparison of capacity 3 (staff training) among different hospitals 
Content of training  Yes  No/Unknown 
121 
 
Numbers of hospitals  Numbers of hospitals 
Content of emergency plan 37  9 
Medical treatment procedures 43  3 
Methods of identifying PHE 44  2 
Awareness of public health emergencies 33  13 
Personal protective measures 40  6 
Information system management  34  12 
disinfection and sterilization 27  19 
principles of quarantine and isolation 26  20 
Of all respondents, 36 hospitals had a designated person who supervised the training 
and drills program; 31 of which was updated regularly, and the effectiveness of 
training and drills was periodically evaluated in only 34 hospitals. 
In addition, not all hospitals (34) conducted drills for staff. Among all listed types of 
drills, 34 hospitals provided drills on nosocomial infection, compared with natural 
disaster (30), and foodborne disease (28), occupational poisoning and mass 
unidentified disease (28); less than half of hospitals (20) had drills program with 
regard to bio/chemical terrorist attacks. 
Table 25 Comparison of capacity 3 (staff drills) among different hospitals 
Type  
Yes No/Unknown 
Numbers of hospital Numbers of hospital 
Infectious disease 34 12 
Mass unidentified disease 28 18 
Foodborne disease 28 18 
Occupational poisoning 28 18 
Nosocomial infection 34 12 
Natural disaster 30 16 
Bio/Chemical/nuclear, etc. terror 20 26 
 
Capacity 4: Stockpiles and infrastructure  
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(1) Special drug stockpile 
A special drug stockpile is defined as storage of certain drugs for treating 30 patients 
with each of 8 infectious diseases for at least 7 days (Zhang hui, Huang Jian-shi, et al. 
2007). In the surveyed hospitals, a majority of respondent hospitals reported that they 
had an adequate stockpile of drugs for influenza (30); more than half of respondents 
had an adequate stockpile of drugs for meningococcal meningitis and Japanese 
encephalitis B (27); and less than half of respondents had an adequate stockpile of 
drugs for plague (20), cholera (18), anthrax (17), and brucellosis (18)Only 10 
hospitals had enough drugs stockpiled for all 8 kinds of infectious diseases. 
The survey results revealed that 24 respondents had evaluated their stockpiles of 
drugs, and 28 had established a relationship with suppliers to provide emergency drug 
supplies. However, only 11 hospitals had signed written contracts with suppliers. 
Most of the surveyed hospitals possessed emergency resource reserves to respond to a 
sudden increase in patients, but less than half of them (23) had corresponding drug 
distribution programs for rational allocation of limited drugs. 
(2) Personal protective equipment  
Of all respondent hospitals, 23 hospitals had biohazard protective suits, 41 had safety 
glasses, 34 had ventilators, 26 had N95 masks, and only 2 hospitals had powered 
air-purifying respirators available for health care personnel and other employees. 
However, only 1 hospital reported that they had all of the above-mentioned types of 
personal protective equipment.  
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For protection against chemical and nuclear terrorism, 17 the current respondents 
stocked chemical protective suits for staff. There were 15 respondents who confirmed 
having radiation detection equipment, while seven of those have not tested the 
equipment within the previous year. 
(3) Facilities 
About 35 hospitals reported that they had identified additional patient care capacity, 
and some hospitals planned to set up temporary facilities if the hospital became 
unusable (e.g., without power or flooded). Strategies to sustain operations that were 
reported included back-up oxygen system (32), alternated power supply system (31) 
and water supplies (21). Many hospitals would establish alternate care areas with beds, 
staffing, and equipment in nonclinical space (32), inpatient unit hallways (24), or 
decommissioned ward space, but only four hospitals had alternative laboratories once 
laboratories were contaminated. 
(4) Emergency funding 
All hospitals had an emergency fund, and the majority of respondents could obtain 
financial support from state or local governments. Thirty four hospitals had in place 
and emergency funding management system. 
Capacity 5 Medical treatment  
All hospitals reported that they had capacity of taking traumatic patients from 
accidents or disasters as well as patients with infectious diseases. However only half 
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of the surveyed hospitals could admit a group of foodborne and occupational 
poisoning patients, and less than one third of hospitals had plans for taking 
nuclear/radioactive accident and bio/chemical terror casualties. 
Almost all hospitals had a plan for admission and treatment of at least one type of 
emergency event listed in the questionnaire, but only six hospitals had plans which 
included all listed types of emergency events (namely infectious disease, mass 
unidentified disease, foodborne disease, occupational poisoning, nosocomial infection, 
serious accident and disaster, bio/chemical/nuclear terror). 
In addition, all hospitals reported that could transfer public health emergency victims 
to other medical agencies for appropriate treatment. Of the surveyed hospitals, 33 
hospitals had specific protocols for patient’s transfer in a public health emergency. 
As for infectious disease treatment, the survey showed that 12 hospitals had medical 
treatment plans for all eight types of infectious diseases, and all hospitals a plan for at 
least one of the infectious diseases. As shown in Table 26, 36 of the surveyed 
hospitals had special medical treatment plans for treating SARS and 40 had plans for 
influenza patients. Additionally 20 had plans for the management of cholera; 18 for 
meningococcal meningitis; 15 for Japanese encephalitis B; and less than 14 hospitals 
for plague, anthrax, and brucellosis. 
Table 26 The medical treatment capacity in respondent hospitals (N=46). 
Types of infectious 
Yes 
 
No/Unknown 
Numbers of hospitals Numbers of hospitals 
SARS 36  10 
Plague bacillus 12  34 
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Cholera 20  26 
Anthrax 13  33 
Influenza 40  6 
Meningococcal meningitis 18  28 
Japanese encephalitis  15  31 
Brucellosis 10  36 
Of all respondents, about 37 hospitals were prepared to respond to the needs of 
vulnerable people (includes women, children, pregnant women and the disabled) in 
the event of public health emergency. 
Availability of empty beds is a fundamental component of hospital’s surge capacity, 
which reflects the hospitals’ capacity to accept new patients, not only during routine 
operations, but also during a mass casualty incident. All responding hospitals could 
add extra beds for general ward, emergency department, and infectious department 
when an emergency plan is initiated. However, no hospitals had evaluated their ability 
to increase beds and equipment for emergencies.  
Capacity 6 Risk communication 
With regards to capacity for risk communication, the majority of hospitals had plans 
for receiving and communicating alerts from the state or local health department. 
Forty two hospitals reported that they had a risk communication system within the 
hospital; while 26 had a system to communicate information to the media, public and 
local governments. The result showed that most of the surveyed hospitals' response 
plans focused on medical treatment, transport of medical staff in a timely manner, and 
providing health services when an emergency event occurred, but paid less attention 
to health education, psychological counselling, and crisis communication. 
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Capacity 7 Emergency command system  
As for the emergency command system capacity, all hospitals had emergency first-aid 
medical teams or an Emergency Department. There were 43 hospitals which had a 
command centre or designated personnel for public health emergency situations. Of 
all respondents, 24 hospitals had established an expert group for responding to 
emergency events, and only 13 hospitals possessed expert panels to advice on public 
health psychological counselling for public victims.  
Capacity 8 Maintaining a fully staffed workforce 
In an event of emergency, most hospitals had a plan for continuity of operations. For 
example, 43 hospitals would recall staff that are on days-off, or employ temporary 
workers (31), or rehire retired employees (30). In addition, some hospitals had a 
mutual aid agreement with other agencies to share health care providers (18) and to 
register volunteers (14) so as to expand the on-site health care workforce (Table 27).  
Table 27 Capacity of expanding workforce 
 
Yes  No/Unknown 
Hospital  Hospital 
Recall staff is on leave 43  3 
Temporary worker 31  15 
Retired employee 30  16 
Share health care 
providers 
18  28 
volunteers 14  32 
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5.3 Overall evaluation of preparedness among different levels of hospital 
Factor Analysis was used to identify common underlying factors which most 
significantly affect hospital preparedness, and to verify the proposed conceptual 
model of hospital preparedness used in this research. Moreover, preparedness capacity 
between hospitals was compared by using Factor Analysis method. 
Factor Analysis is a statistical approach that can be used to analyze interrelationships 
among a large number of observed variables X1, X2…Xn and to explain these variables 
in terms of their common underlying dimensions ( is called common factors) (Connie 
D., Stapleton 1997). The common factors are hypothetical variables which explain 
why a number of variables are correlated with each other----it is because they have 
one or more factors in common (Alan Taylor, 2001).  
It aims to: (1) reduce the number of variables and (2) detecting latent structure in the 
relationships between variables, and to classify variables. Factor analysis allows 
researchers to test theories involving variables which are hard to measure directly, or 
help people to establish that sets of questionnaire items (observed variables) are in 
fact all measuring the same underlying factor and so can be combined to form a more 
reliable measure of that factor (Alan Taylor, 2001). 
In this study, factor analysis was used for finding the common factors which explain 
the correlation among variables. Factor analysis can show a group of variables which 
are highly associated with, and thus are representing, a common factor (Hee-Ju Kim, 
2008). Through this process, the structures, dimensions, or underlying processes of 
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the data are also identified. Figure 16 illustrates how the structures, dimensions, or 
underlying process of data detected by factor analysis may be displayed. 
 
Fig.16  Underlying dimension, process, and structure of the data (Hee-Ju Kim, 2008) 
In this model, S represents an observed variable and the term “Factor” is something 
which is common in the data. The arrows indicate that factors create variables and 
lines indicate that there is a correlation between the variables. This diagram illustrates 
the relationships between factors and observed variables, and how factor analysis can 
show the underlying process, dimensions, and structure of the data (observed 
variables). 
There are four basic steps to carry out factor analyses: (1) generation of the 
correlation matrix to test whether the sample is appropriate for Factor Analysis; (2) 
extraction of initial factors to identify common factors; (3) rotation and interpretation; 
and (4) construction of scales or factor scores (Ramchander, P. 2004). 
S1 
S2 
S3 
S6 
S5 
S4 
Factor 1 
Factor 2 
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In this research, eight capacities (variables) of hospital preparedness were measured, 
and were tested for their correlation. The hypothetical explanation for these 
correlations is that there may be common underlying factors. Therefore, a factor 
analysis model was developed to analyze variables of the hospital preparedness 
evaluation framework in-depth by using SPSS software. The steps are as the 
following: 
(1) Generation of the correlation matrix and testing for appropriateness 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity were used for testing 
whether factor analysis is suitable for the data. KMO tests whether the partial 
correlations among variables are small. High values (close to 1.0) generally indicate a 
factor analysis maybe useful with the data. The value should be greater than 0.5 for a 
satisfactory factor analysis to proceed. 
Bartlett’s ‘test of sphericity’ tests whether the correlation matrix is an identity matrix, 
which would indicate that the factor model is inappropriate. It is used to test the null 
hypothesis that the variables in the population correlation matrix are uncorrelated. The 
observed significance level is 0.0000 which concludes that the strength of the 
relationship among variables is strong (Zhao Qi, 2009). 
Application of these tests to this data demonstrates that Barlett’s test of sphericityis 
highly significant (p ＜0.001), which means factor analysis is feasible. The KMO 
value is 0.815, which is greater than 0.5, indicating that KMO also supports factor 
analysis is appropriate for this data (Table28). 
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Table 28 KMO and Barlett’s test of spercity test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of Sampling 
Adequacy 
-------- 0.815 
Barlett’s Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 505.677 
 df 253 
 Sig. 0.000 
 
(2) Identify common factors (Extraction of initial factor solution) 
The mathematical process used to obtain a factor solution from a correlation matrix is 
such that each successive factor, accounts for as much of the variance of the observed 
variables as possible. The amount of variance accounted for by each factor is shown 
by a quantity called the ‘eigenvalue’, which is equal to the sum of the squared 
loadings for a given factor. In this research it was calculated through SPSS. While this 
initial solution is consistent with the aim of accounting for as much as possible of the 
total variance of the observed variables with as few factors as possible, the initial 
pattern is often adjusted so that each individual variable has substantial loadings on as 
few factors as possible (preferably only one). This adjustment is called rotation to 
simple structure, and seeks to provide a more interpretable outcome.  
Table 29 shows all the factors extractable from the analysis along with their 
eigenvalues, the percent of variance attributable to each factor, and the cumulative 
variance of the factor and of the previous factors. Before extraction, SPSS has 
identified 8 components within the data set. The eigenvalues associated with each 
factor represent the variance explained by that particular component and SPSS also 
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displays the eigenvalue in terms of the percentage of variance explained (for instance, 
factor 1 explains 26.03% of total variance). Four factors were extracted by SPSS from 
all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, accounting for almost 81% of the variance 
which means these four factors could represent most variance. 
As shown in the final part of the Table (labelled Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings), 
after rotation, the eigenvalues of the factors are displayed. Rotation has the effect of 
optimizing the factor structure and one consequence for these data is that the relative 
importance of the four factors is equalized.  
Table 29 Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalue 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loading 
Total 
%of 
variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total 
% of 
variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.43 26.03 26.03 4.43 26.03 26.03 4.43 26.03 26.03 
2 1.48 19.06 45.09 1.48 19.06 45.09 1.54 19.06 45.09 
3 1.37 18.08 63.17 1.37 18.08 63.17 1.37 18.08 63.17 
4 1.28 17.51 80.68 1.28 17.51 80.59 1.28 17.50 80.69 
5 0.81 6.20 86.88       
6 0.73 5.60 92.48       
7 0.67 5.14 97.62       
8 0.57 2.38 100.00       
 
(3) Rotation (Common factor Interpretation) 
The idea of rotation is to reduce the number of factors on which the variables under 
investigation have high loadings (Alan Taylor. 2001). Rotation does not actually 
change anything but makes the interpretation of the analysis easier (Ramchander, P. 
2004).  
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Briefly, this involves identifying the variables with high loadings on a given 
component. Usually, a brief name is assigned to each retained component to describe 
what it appears to measure. If the mathematical factor produced by the analysis 
represents some real-world construct then common themes among highly loaded 
questions can help identify what the construct might be.  
As shown in the following Table 30, after the rotation, there are four factors and 
variables load very highly onto only one factor, ordering variables by loading size. 
Therefore, a clear pattern now emerges, for example, the three variables: early 
detection, laboratory diagnosis and medical treatment load highest on Factor 1. The 
variables that load highly on factor 2 include fully staffed workforce and staff 
training. 
 
Table 30 Rotated Factor Matrix 
Variables 
Common factors 
1 2 3 4 
V1 Early Detection  0.820 -0.070 0.185 0.156 
V2 Laboratory Diagnosis 0.805 0.168 0.040 0.095 
V3 Medical Treatment 0.766 0.127 0.066 0.103 
V4 Fully staffed workforce 0.123 0.759 0.171 0.095 
V5 Staff Training 0.091 0.624 0.151 0.180 
V6 Stockpiles  0.385 0.357 0.666 0.127 
V7 Facilities (Infrastructure) 0.191 0.126 0.696 0.079 
V8 Emergency Plan 0.170 0.157 0.237 0.702 
V9 Risk Communication 0.174 0.171 -0.215 0.701 
V10 Emergency Command System 0.123 0.150 0.369 0.696 
 
The values highlighted are large in magnitude, and from this the interpretation can be 
made as followings: 
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• Factor 1: primarily a measure of Early Detection and Warning, but also increases 
with increasing scores for Laboratory Diagnosis and Medical Treatment, which stands 
for capacity of hospital’s functions of surveillance and warning and medical services 
before and during an emergency event , and it could be labelled “Hospital Service 
Factor”. 
• Factor 2: this factor tends to be associated with variables of Full Staffed workforce 
and Staff Training with large positive loadings, which presents hospital capability of 
providing medical services to the public and casualties during crisis. It can be labelled 
“Human Resources Factor”.  
• Factor 3: primarily a variable of stockpile alone, it includes emergency supplies, e.g. 
drugs, beds, etc. In addition, it contains activities such as building infrastructure to 
ensure critical facilities meet building code for high risks, e.g. floods, earthquake. 
This factor can be labelled “Stockpiles and Infrastructure Factor”. 
• Factor 4: Emergency Plan, Risk Communication and Emergency Command System 
with large loadings, indicating hospital’s response capacity and attention degree. It 
can be identified as “Management, Direction and Coordination (MDC) Factor”. 
(4) Construction of scales (Develop a factor analysis model) 
A factor analysis model can be calculated by the following equation (Zhang Hui, 
2005)： 
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It is mentioned above that the aim of factor analysis is to “explain” correlations 
among observed variables in terms of a relatively small number of factors. Through 
SPSS results here, there are four common factors which could reflect the overall 
hospital preparedness capacity. Therefore, the total score of a hospital can be 
calculated by the following equation (Alan Taylor. 2001): 
 
 
 
 
The quantities of each factor show how much of the total variance of the observed 
variables is accounted for by that factor. The higher of the weight, the more important 
a factor is. 
According to the equation, four common factors can be calculated respectively: 
F1=0.820X1+0.805X2+0.766X3+0.123X4+0.091X5+0.385X6+0.191X7+0.170X8+0.17
4X9+0.123X10 
F2=-0.070X1+0.168X2+0.127X3+0.759X4+0.624X5+0.357X6+0.126X7+0.157X8+0.1
71X9+0.150X10 
Fi= bi1X1+bi2X2+……+binXn (i =1,2,….n) 
Fi= a common factor scores 
b= a constant (loading of rotated matrix) 
 
F=
𝛌𝟏
𝛌𝟏+𝛌𝟐+𝛌𝟑+𝛌𝟒
F1+
𝛌𝟐
𝛌𝟏+𝛌𝟐+𝛌𝟑+𝛌𝟒
F2+
𝛌𝟑
𝛌𝟏+𝛌𝟐+𝛌𝟑+𝛌𝟒
F3+
𝛌𝟒
𝛌𝟏+𝛌𝟐+𝛌𝟑+𝛌𝟒
F4 
F= hospital total score 
λ=Loading of initial eigenvalue 
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F3=0.185X1+0.040X2+0.066X3+0.171X4+0.151X5+0.666X6+0.696X7+0.237X8-0.21
5X9+0.369X10 
F4=0.156X1+0.095X2+0.103X3+0.095X4+0.180X5+0.127X6+0.079X7+0.702X8+0.70
1X9+0.696X10 
Therefore, a factor analysis model for hospital preparedness is developed as the 
following: 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the model, the weights of 4 common factors are 0.518, 0.173, 0.160, and 
0.150 respectively, which reflects that hospital service is the most important factor for 
hospital preparedness capacity, followed by human resources, stockpiles and facilities, 
and MDC (Figure 17). 
F=0.518F1+0.173F2+0.160F3+0.150F4 
F1: Hospital Service Capacity Factor 
F2: Human Resources Factor 
F3: Stockpiles and Facilities Factor 
F4: MDC Factor 
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Fig.17 Distribution of common factor weight 
 
This analysis of the data derived from this survey of hospitals appears to align with 
and validate the conceptual model derived from the literature and reinforced by the 
Delphi study of experts (Chapter 4 Figure 14). The four key factors identified through 
factor analysis may encompass the describe domains identified in the literature 
through simple aggregation as follows; Stockpiles and Facilities (stuff, space), Human 
resources (staff), Hospital Service Capacity (service), MDC (system). 
Comparison of different types of hospitals capacity from 4 common factors 
(1) Comparison between secondary hospitals and tertiary hospitals 
The statistical results revealed that the tertiary hospitals had higher mean scores than 
secondary ones in all four common factors, and that the factor of hospital service and 
Hospital Service 
Capacity Factor, 
0.518 
Human Resources 
Factor, 0.173 
Stockpiles and 
Facilities Factor, 
0.16 
MDC Factor, 
0.15 
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human resources were statistical significant (p＜0.05). (Table 31) 
Table 31 Comparison of four common factors between tertiary and secondary hospitals 
(Mean±SD) 
Factors 
Tertiary hospitals 
(n=21) 
Secondary hospitals 
(n=25) 
t p 
Hospital Service  
2.25±0.67 1.90±1.55 3.172  0.002＊ 
Human Resources 
2.02±0.73 1.26±2.01 0.255 0.037＊ 
Stockpiles and Facilities 
2.08±0.54 1.24±2.89 0.510 0.542 
MDC 
2.04±0.77 1.98±0.67 1.132 0.260 
Overall Capacity 
0.26±0.49 0.14±0.58 4.108  0.000＊ 
＊:P < 0.05 
(2) Comparison between general hospitals and non-general hospitals 
The mean scores in all factors of preparedness were higher in general hospitals than 
those in non-general ones. But only MDC was statistically significant. (p＜0.05). 
(Table 32) 
Table 32 Comparison of four common factors between general and non-general hospitals 
(Mean±SD) 
Factors 
General hospitals 
(n=38) 
Non-general hospitals 
(n=8) 
t p 
Hospital Service 
2.05±1.31 1.75±1.52 1.108 0.508 
Human Resources 
2.58±2.61 0.99±2.12 1.701 0.748 
Stockpiles and Facilities 
1.99±2.27 0.31±2.21 1.841 0.872 
MDC 
2.02±2.23 1.96±0.71 2.012  0.023＊ 
Overall Capacity 
2.26±0.49 1.14±0.58 4.108  0.000＊ 
＊:P < 0.05 
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(3) Comparison between teaching hospitals and non-teaching hospitals 
With regard to comparison between teaching hospitals and non-teaching hospitals, the 
mean scores in all four factors of preparedness were higher in teaching hospitals than 
those in nonteaching ones, and the difference in mean scores of three factors (hospital 
service, human resources, MDC) was statistically significant. (Table 33) 
Table 33 Comparison of four common factors between teaching and non-teaching hospitals 
(Mean±SD) 
Factor 
Teaching hospitals 
(n=19) 
Non-teaching hospitals 
(n=27) 
t p 
Hospital Service 
2.15±0.70 1.81±0.61 2.798  0.006＊ 
Human Resources 
2.12±0.71 1.84±0.66 2.267  0.025＊ 
Stockpiles and Facilities 
2.23±2.27 1.86±0.81 1.919 0.058 
MDC 
2.10±0.60 1.89±0.67 2.007  0.047＊ 
Overall Capacity 
2.26±0.49 1.14±0.58 4.416  0.000＊ 
＊:P < 0.05 
5.4 Discussion 
Emergency preparedness requires planning and other actions that ensure an 
organization, or community responds to an emergency in a coordinated, timely, and 
effective manner. Hospitals may not have the ability to respond to a sudden increase 
in patient care demand during an emergency. As precautions avert perils, hospitals 
should formulate an emergency plan; identify necessary stores, beds, and equipment; 
and educate and train their staff in advance to prevent and treat large outbreaks of 
infectious disease and other mass casualty events.  
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Emergency plan 
An emergency plan is needed before, during, and immediately after the emergency. 
At the time of this survey, virtually all respondents had an emergency plan. Most 
hospital plans focused on infectious diseases, natural disasters, foodborne disease and 
mass unidentified disease, while less attention was paid to preparedness for 
nosocomial infection and occupational poisoning. A similar trend was found with 
respect to including biological, nuclear radiation and other terrorist attacks. This 
might be because China has experienced earthquakes, floods, bird flu, etc., and thus 
most hospitals have strengthened their preparedness for infectious diseases and 
natural disasters. However, nosocomial infections and occupation poisoning events 
are also common in China. For instance, 120 people were infected with hepatitis C 
virus after intravenous injection in 2013, etc. and terrorist incidents are frequent over 
the last two years, e.g. Urumqi attack 2014, Kunming attack 2014, Kashgar attacks 
2013. Hospitals might have to respond to various kinds of incidents, and will be 
required to mobilize all public health emergency resources in a short period of time. 
Therefore, different types of plans are needed in advance, suggesting that all hospitals 
should raise awareness of emergency plans, and formulate emergency plans based on 
analysis of possibility of an incident and also the likely scale of damage. 
Surveillance 
Characteristics of a public health emergency are suddenness and unpredictability, but 
hospitals need the ability to detect infectious disease and other mass disease outbreaks 
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as early as possible. Therefore, hospitals’ capacity for detecting early warning signs in 
a timely and accurate manner is essential. 
This study indicated that most hospitals could monitor suspicious public health 
emergencies via recording of hospital clinic and emergency department attendances, 
symptom monitoring, and death registration. All hospitals above the secondary level 
in China were required to set up a fever clinic for monitoring SARS, influenza-like 
cases, and other infectious disease. Most of the hospitals could regularly train medical 
staff on how to report and identify suspicious public health emergencies and that the 
institutions possessed surveillance systems to monitor various aspects of abnormal 
situations.  
However, only a few hospitals could report and identify all eight types of infectious 
diseases and less than half of the respondents classified and analyzed monitoring 
information regularly and share the surveillance information with the local health 
authority. There were statistically significant differences among various 
classifications of the respondents, which may demonstrate that this capacity was 
affected by the comprehensive strength of hospital. 
Detecting public health emergency related pathogen/etiology can not only confirm 
clinical diagnosis, but also identify newly emerging infectious diseases. This survey 
indicated that many of the hospitals did not report adequate laboratory diagnostic 
capacities. Although hospital laboratory regulations seemed relatively good: the 
majority of respondents had the ability to identify SARS, influenza and Japanese 
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encephalitis, and could enlarge the capacity of examining specimens, only one-third 
of hospital laboratories had programs for dealing with suspicious samples collecting, 
disposal and delivery, this probably is associated with disease incidence. It is also 
worth noting that only four hospitals had alternative laboratory backup. 
Not all the hospitals had a link to Health Alert Network, which means there were still 
some hospitals which couldn't share and collect information through the internet, 
which may cause serious delays in reporting and may potentially impede early 
warning of disease threats. More standardized epidemiologic forms, and around-the 
clock ability to request tests and receives laboratory results are required. 
Staff training and drills 
Emergency events happen suddenly and their incidence rate is relatively low, which 
makes most medical staff inexperienced and unprepared. When an emergency event 
occurs, hospital medical staff is usually the first responders and information providers, 
therefore, education and training are key measures to enhance hospital’s public health 
emergency preparedness capacity. The content of training and drills for public health 
emergencies should include: understanding aspects of public health incidents, medical 
emergency response and rescue, emergency plan, early warning, reporting and so on 
(Xin YT, et al., 2011). 
At the time of this survey, the results indicated that most hospitals realized the 
importance of training and drills for medical staff, and that the majority of respondent 
hospitals reported that different types of training and drill programs were offered to 
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their staff. For training, there were majority of hospitals provided training on content 
of the emergency plan, awareness of public health emergencies, medical treatment, 
infectious disease prevention and control, and information system management; the 
median numbers of hospitals addressed disinfection and sterilization, as well as the 
principles of quarantine and isolation. Most hospitals conducted drills about general 
emergency events, such as natural disaster, infectious disease, etc.; however, more 
than half hospitals indicated that they have not organised disaster exercises within the 
previous 12 months. In addition, not all hospitals evaluated the quality and 
effectiveness of training and drills. Therefore, hospital officials must be encouraged to 
expand education and drills, which should be designed to address events including 
biochemical and nuclear, disinfection and sterilization, and the principles of 
quarantine and isolation. 
Stockpiles and infrastructure 
Preparedness and related management activities are of little use unless resources are 
available to support response activities. The goal of resource management is to 
identify and establish internal and external resources necessary for disaster response 
and recovery. Identifying resource needs, acquiring resources, and storing and 
distributing resources are thus key preparedness dimensions. Therefore, hospitals 
must have programs to ensure appropriate levels of emergency supplies including 
drugs, medical equipment, electricity, water and oxygen, and disinfectants.  
Drug supplies are essential for emergency management and rescue. The survey shows 
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that a small number of hospitals had drug stockpiles for all categories of infectious 
disease in the survey. While a large proportion of hospitals had specific drugs for 
SARS, influenza, a smaller proportion had an adequate stockpile for plague, cholera, 
anthrax and brucellosis. This may reflect the prioritization of infectious disease 
prevention and control strategies in Sichuan based on the type of incidents which are 
more frequent. However, with the increasing trend of globalization, an infectious 
disease occurring in one region is prone to spreading to other regions, hospitals should 
prepare for responding to not only the infectious disease of immediate importance, but 
also those occurring rarely and emerging suddenly. 
Medicine storage will fall short of demand with sudden increases in volume 
associated with mass patients or casualties. Nearly half the hospitals had a plan of 
medication distribution, and a similar number of respondents set up 
emergency-drug-supply system with a pharmaceutical factory or company. The 
diversity of public health emergencies is considerable, it is impossible for hospitals to 
reserve sufficient and the variety of drugs required, therefore, it is suggested that all 
hospitals could set up a catalogue of drugs stockpiles based on local incidents and 
should cooperate with other hospitals and pharmaceutical manufactures to enrich 
drugs categories and maintain medicine supply. 
Protecting the health and safety of medical personnel is a top priority during an 
emergency or disaster. Personal protective equipment is known to be crucial to 
respond effectively to a large-scale infectious disease incident. The safe use of 
personal protective equipment and appropriate allocation of limited personal 
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protective equipment supplies during periods of insufficient resources are important 
components of disaster preparedness for hospitals. In the survey, most hospitals 
allocated the general protective equipment and could provide training of personal 
protective measures for health care workers and other employees. However, few 
hospitals stocked equipment for protecting medical personnel from radioactive 
contamination.  
The ability of adding extra beds reflects the hospital’s capacity to accept patients not 
only during routine operations, but also during an emergency. The study indicated that 
hospitals had the ability to surge ordinary hospital beds in Sichuan province. The 
survey results show that different hospitals could provide different numbers of extra 
beds. Additionally, all responding hospitals could add extra beds in the department of 
infectious disease and isolation ward, which are the important departments of 
accepting mass patients. However, some hospitals admitted that their extra beds might 
not be enough to meet the demands. Meanwhile, about two-thirds had plans for 
establishment of alternate care areas with beds, and equipment in nonclinical spaces. 
It is recommended that hospitals should develop adequate surge capacity by such 
means as opening unused areas, doubling up inpatient rooms, cancelling elective 
admissions and procedures, and using alternate areas for extra critical care space. 
For other facilities, emergency medical installations, back-up oxygen systems, 
alternated power supply systems and waterworks were investigated in the survey. The 
study indicated that many hospitals were operating at or near full. 
145 
 
Medical treatment capacity 
A sudden, large-scale emergency outbreak requires hospitals to have the ability to 
meet increased demand for medical care that exceed expectations. In this survey, 
more than half the respondents showed that their physicians were aware of current 
public health emergency protocols. The survey results indicated that all hospitals had 
capacity for taking mass casualty and infectious disease patients. Most hospitals had 
transfer and treatment procedures for infectious diseases, and could take responsibility 
for rescue service, transport the medical staff in a timely manner, and provide priority 
health services to vulnerable populations.  
Not all hospitals had plans of admission and treatment for all listed emergency events. 
For infectious diseases, there were only a small proportion of hospitals have specific 
medical treatment plans for plague, anthrax and brucellosis. Although 
nuclear/radiation accidents, bio/chemical terror seldom happen in China, with the 
increasing trend of globalization, suggesting that it is necessary to formulate the 
corresponding plans. 
Risk communication 
In a public health crisis or emergency, effective risk communication can help people 
cope, make decisions, and return their lives to normal. Risk communication, is an 
important part of a public health emergency response. Effective communication is 
necessary to ensure complete, transparent and prompt information exchange, and to 
help hospitals make timely responses and reduce serious consequences. Therefore, 
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hospitals need to communicate and cooperate with other local health agencies, 
functioning as a networked public health provider. The survey revealed that if an 
emergency occurred, most hospitals reported that they could communicate within the 
hospital. Yet, only half the respondents share information with media, public and 
local governments. This lack of cross-institutional interaction indicated that the ability 
of hospitals to coordinate with other agencies in preparation for, or in the event of an 
emergency was generally poor, suggesting that communication and coordination 
between hospitals and community agencies should be strengthened. 
Emergency command system 
The goal of a command system is to develop, test, and improve decision-making and 
response capability using an integrated incident command system in the hospital. 
When an emergency occurs, hospitals need to identify and command different sectors 
within hospitals, and manage all resources to respond effectively in a short time. 
In the survey, most hospitals above secondary level had command systems for public 
health emergencies. However, this might be insufficient for responding to public 
health emergencies effectively without specialist guidance, especially when mass 
unidentified disease outbreaks occur. Besides, only a few hospitals possessed an 
expert group which played important roles in making decision. Hospitals at the same 
level could develop expert group together via network system share information, 
which may avoid repetitiveness of establishing expert group independently. 
Fully staffed workforce  
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A fully staffed workforce means people who can perform optimally under stressful 
circumstances. This represents a new role for much of the public health workforce, 
including operations-ready medical staff and volunteers. During an emergency, any 
planned role for reallocation must, rely on the expectation that few staff members will 
move. In order that a sufficient number of frontline staff will remain, therefore, a fully 
staffed workforce is necessary to affect the quality and effectiveness of hospital 
response to emergency events, and that they also may be in a position to intervene 
earlier to diminish the growth rate of the surge.  
The results indicated that most hospitals had an arrangement for maintain sufficient 
staffing levels throughout an emergency, but only a few hospitals had a mutual aid 
agreement with other organizations and the registration of volunteers. Existing (and 
creating new) registers of medical personnel who are willing to volunteer their 
assistance in the event of a disaster surge, will assist they note the difficulties of 
mobilization in scenarios in which transport infrastructure is damaged. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the quantitative findings of this study into the evaluation of 
hospital public health emergency preparedness in Sichuan and the current status of 
preparedness capacity among the surveyed hospitals. Descriptive statistics were used 
to compare the emergency plan, surveillance, training and drills, stockpiles and 
infrastructure, medical treatment capacity, risk communication, emergency command 
system, and fully staffed workforce at different levels of hospitals. The research 
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questions sought to find the main influencing factors of hospital preparedness capacity, 
and also sought to identify gaps among different types and levels of hospitals.  
Through analysing the evaluation framework, four common influencing factors were 
identified which mainly affect hospital preparedness capacity, namely hospital service 
capacity factor, human resources factor, stockpiles and facilities factor, emergency 
awareness factor. Comparison of hospitals preparedness capacity using these four 
factors, revealed that tertiary-grade, teaching and general hospitals performed better 
than secondary-grade, non-teaching and non-general hospitals with statically 
significant.  
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CHAPTER6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters (Chapter 4-5) have discussed the major findings in relation to 
interpretation, and the public health implications of these studies. This chapter aims to 
discuss the key findings of the intensive interview and Delphi study (reported in 
Chapter 4), and the results of survey (Chapter 5) in the context of the literature and to 
apply those findings to public policy strategies. The findings generally support and 
build on concepts from the literature and form a comprehensive insight into the design 
of an evaluation framework for hospital public health emergency preparedness. The 
chapter also identifies the limitations of this research and makes recommendations for 
future research directions. 
The purpose of this study was to develop a comprehensive evaluation framework of 
hospital preparedness capacity for public health emergencies, and to validate it by 
using it to assess the current status of hospital preparedness in Sichuan province. The 
objectives of this study were: 
(1) Define public health emergency preparedness and identify its key elements; 
(2) Develop an assessment framework with a set of indicators; 
(3) Utilize the framework to test its validity and functionality by applying it to assess 
rural hospitals in Sichuan province; 
(4) Examine rural hospitals preparedness capacity in China, and identify the 
contributing factors; 
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6.2Research Context 
Research on hospital public health emergency preparedness is a relatively new area of 
research in China (Hong Chen, 2011). The studies carried in to date China may be 
categorised into 2 categories: 
(1)Theoretical studies 
Much of this discussion explores hospital preparedness and discusses the problems 
based on the authors own work or research experience. For example, Weilin He, et al. 
discussed hospitals’ role and function in public health emergency and describe those 
roles as: rescue and medical treatment, report and release information promptly and 
accurately; Crisis communication and cooperation with other facilities such as 
government agencies, CDC, and other medical institutions. (WeiLin He, et al.2004). 
Xiaomei Jiang, et al. considered that hospitals are more vulnerable than other kinds of 
facilities in PHE, mainly due to their complex combinations of utilities, surgical and 
diagnostic equipment, and hazardous materials, along with ever-changing visitors and 
patients in various conditions of physical and mental health, and therefore, hospitals 
are the important institutions to prevent, control, and deal with PHE. (Xiaomei Jiang, 
et al. 2005) 
This discussion in the literature proposes suggestions for hospital emergency response 
planning, emergency systems and stockpiles. For example Kuiwen Hu, et al. proposed 
that staff awareness of PHE should be intensified and an emergency report system 
should be established and developed (Kuiwen Hu, et al. 2004). XL, Xu reported that 
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the key elements for structuring hospital PHE preparedness system including 
command system of effectiveness and preciseness, reasonable staff structure, 
advanced equipment and sufficient drug stockpiles (XL XU, et al. 2006). Xianrong 
Luo and Youhong Ma, et al. reported that an emergency plan, education and drills, 
emergency management system, emergency stockpiles are critical factors affecting 
hospital preparedness capacity (Xianrong Luo, 2006; YouhongMa,et al. 2008) 
(2) Empirical studies 
Studies into the assessment of hospital PHE preparedness capacity in China mainly 
began between 2006 and 2007 (Yantao Xin, et al. 2011), Hui Zhang (Hui Zhang, 
2007), Dexiang Zhu (Dexiang Zhu, 2006) developed evaluation instruments with 
indicators, and assessed hospital emergency preparedness in Beijing and Guangdong 
province respectively.  
Feng Xu, et al. sought to assess the requirements of local community hospital 
preparedness and capacity development. They developed a two-level indicator system 
including 6 first level indicators, 19 second level indicators (Feng Xu, et al.2010).  
Qi Zhao sought to assess county-level hospital preparedness for PHE, they identified 
emergency plans, warning and monitoring, laboratory diagnosis, information release 
and communication, coordination system, training and drills, on-site rescue, as the 
important factors affecting county-level hospital preparedness capacity building (Qi 
Zhao 2009). 
Xiaozhi Yang (Xiaozhi Yang, et al., 2008), Decheng Liu (Decheng Liu, et al., 2010) 
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sought to develop an evaluation framework and indicator system for military and 
special hospitals. They used a scaling method, “Health care institutions preparedness 
assessment questionnaire” (designed by China Concord Medical Science University), 
to investigate secondary-level hospitals in Guangxi. This questionnaire addressed 
human resources management, beds, emergency stockpiles, emergency plan, and so 
on (Xiaozhi Yang, et al. 2008; Decheng Liu 2010).  
Zhonghua Wang undertook a study to investigate the current status of mental health 
hospital preparedness capacity (Zhonghua Wang 2010).  
Xiao Wang analyzed and identified the key influencing factors for military hospital 
preparedness, including emergency plan, command system, cooperation with local 
government, and training (Xiao Wang 2007). 
These descriptive, theoretical and empirical reports suggest progress in the 
understanding of hospital preparedness. However, there remained deficiencies in that 
conceptual understanding and in the methods available for use in measuring 
preparedness. Most instruments were designed by the researchers themselves and 
their reliability and validity was not tested. Similarly the evaluation indicators are not 
sufficiently comprehensive and there is a lack of consensus on the key elements of 
hospital public health emergency preparedness.  
The evaluation of public health emergency preparedness is complicated by problems 
of definition. There is no definition of adequacy of preparedness and no agreed 
measure of adequacy (Nelson C, et al. 2007). Knudson reported that the terms 
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“disaster management,” “disaster plans,” “emergency management,” “crisis 
management and emergency planning” were often used interchangeably with the term 
“emergency preparedness” (Knudson D, 2005).  Kuntz found similar disparities in 
the usage of these terms in her study of the preparedness of rural health departments 
in Montana (Kuntz S, et al., 2004). 
The challenges facing researchers, policy makers and health leaders are ambiguous 
and uncertain preparedness goals, a lack of agreement about what the measures 
should aim at and how they should be interpreted (Nelson C, et al. 2007; Lurie N, 
Wasserman J, 2006). While efforts have been made to assess progress made by public 
health preparedness programs in general, there is lack of evidence-based performance 
measures of population-based “preparedness”. There is further little consensus on the 
definition of the word itself as it relates to public health (Lurie N, Wasserman J, 2006). 
Adini, et al, emphasized that maintaining emergency preparedness of medical 
organizations is not a static effort, but a dynamic framework (Adini, et al. 2009).   
Throughout the world, comprehensive efforts to develop key indicators, which enable 
the reliable and valid assessment of the status of emergency preparedness, are 
underway (Adini, 2005). However, in the absence of clear definitions and adequate 
performance metrics, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of past investments, 
engage in continuous quality improvement of current efforts or design and target 
future efforts (Nelson, 2007; Stephen S. 2007; P. Joseph, et al. 2012). 
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6.3 A Theoretical Framework for Defining the Concept of PHEP 
This thesis firstly sought to identify how the public health emergency preparedness 
should be defined. It sought to clarify the concept of public health emergency 
preparedness by developing a conceptual framework and identifying its key 
dimensions in order to describe what hospitals do to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from public health emergencies. 
Emergencies happen suddenly and often unpredictably, it is difficult to reveal 
effective performance of hospital preparedness in emergencies. In addition, the 
preparedness required for dealing with emergencies is different from the normal or 
static situation. To identify an outcome measure for responding to incidents, it is 
paramount to identify and define metrics for the various components of that 
preparedness.  
The concept of hospital public health emergency preparedness was defined as a 
consequence of Study 1 as: “the planning and actions that enable hospital to prevent, 
protect against, quickly respond to, and recover from public health emergencies in a 
timely, coordinated and effective way. It involves a coordinated and continuous 
process of planning and implementation that relies on measuring performance.” 
The themes identified in this interpretive review were intricately linked and likely to 
have a combined effect on hospital preparedness capacity. The translated themes and 
subthemes allude to the complex, dynamic linkages in the hospital preparedness 
activities. This thesis considered there is a multi-component approach proposed in the 
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existing literature, which could take into account the interactions and dependencies 
necessarily entailed by an effective health systems’ response to a disaster: “It is not 
simply beds or ventilators, but appropriately trained personnel (staff), comprehensive 
supplies and equipment (stuff), facilities (structure), and infrastructure (space), of 
imperative importance, integrated policies and procedures (systems) to develop 
optimized sustainable health care capacity” (Samantha K. Watson, et al. 2013). Based 
on this approach, the translated themes could be distilled in to a whole, more complete 
interpretation.  
Therefore, compared with other evaluation tools, the framework proposed in this 
research combines features of two existing approaches, the multi-component approach 
for sustainable health organizations, and the model of life cycle of public health 
emergencies (pre-, during, post-incident). The key components of model include: 
“staff”, “stuff”, “service”, “space”, and “service”. 
It proposes various health activities which form a comprehensive preparedness and 
response system. It provides a concise, broadly applicable vision of what a prepared 
hospital looks like and describes public health emergency preparedness activities. For 
instance, the breadth of hospital’s “system” (preparedness, planning, coordination, 
after-action adaptation, and development of incident action plans) can be illustrated 
by the framework. Prior to an incident, the hospital is required to focus on setting up a 
comprehensive plan that encompasses all potential threats so as to organize their 
response to emergencies. During an incident response, the incident command system 
may clarify which operations might be best addressed with public health agency 
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resources and expand emergency planning. After an incident, evaluation of the 
operational responses may identify gaps in operational capabilities and areas to be 
improved. An action plan will be improved, or adapted, which may help optimally 
apply or allocate resources. 
Additionally, there are interactions among all of the subcomponents of the interwoven 
domains to be considered. Critical points of failure exist when subcomponents are not 
synchronized. For example, supply of equipment must include the requisite and 
appropriately trained personnel to run the equipment. Without plans to use alternate 
facilities, the stuff and the staff may find themselves with inadequate resources to 
provide patient care. As volunteers arrive on the scene there may be no process to 
credential, (just-in-time) train, and optimize their skill set to support the event.  
In summary, based on the identified primary themes and sub-themes, we developed a 
model to depict our understanding of public health emergency preparedness (Figure 
14). The model draws heavily from concepts developed in the emergency 
management field. The proposed model ties together the core emergency 
preparedness competencies developed for hospitals. To the best of our knowledge, the 
model addresses these critical components involved in assessing hospital 
preparedness capacity to respond to all-hazards events. 
6.4 An Evaluation Framework for Measuring Hospital PHEP 
An evaluation framework was developed and validated through two-round Delphi 
study to address the research question2:“how hospital public health emergency 
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preparedness could be assessed?” 
As with attempts to identify lists of the key elements of preparedness, the 
development of common preparedness standards will have to rely in large part on 
expert judgment and consultation with thought leaders from health departments and 
organizations (Nelson, 2006). However, the existing reports often provide little detail 
on the criteria or decision making processes used to identify the preparedness 
constructs and measures featured in the reports. Therefore, more efforts are required 
to employ a more systematic approach to elucidate the expert views. 
The Delphi study conducted as part of this research sought to identify those key 
elements for hospital preparedness. Upon completion of the Delphi study, 8 themes 
and 24 sub-themes for a final version of assessment framework were identified on 
consensus. As the Delphi results have already been discussed in Chapter 5 (Qualitative 
study), this section mainly addresses the rationality and utility of the framework. 
6.4.1 Rationale 
Intensive review of the literature shows that the limitation of many of tools reviewed 
is that they do not specify the elements that must be assessed. There have been 
attempts to address this issue and researchers have specifically addressed activities 
required of the preparation of an emergency plan (Burkle FM, 2003), staff (Klein RN, 
et al. 2005), equipment and infrastructure preparation (Rotz LD, et al. 2000), training 
and exercises (Hogan DE, et al. 1999).  
In this research, the Delphi study identified that the framework should include: (1) 
158 
 
emergency plan; (2) surveillance; (3) training and drills; (4) stockpiles; (5) emergency 
command system; (6) fully staffed workforce; (7) onsite rescue and medical treatment; 
(8) crisis communication and cooperation. All of these elements concluded can 
contribute to a higher level of emergency preparedness (Adini, 2009). Therefore, the 
proposed framework can serve as an effective mechanism for a hospital to evaluate its 
readiness and preparedness. It also meets the main rationale of the assessment of 
emergency preparedness: to promote effectiveness and raise professionalism. 
Measurement and analysis of an indicator system is difficult (Hong Chen, 2011). 
Generally, assessments are evaluated and selected on the basis of (a) validity, the 
extent to which they really measure the attributes they seek to measure; (b) reliability, 
the extent to which they provide consistent measures over time and across raters.  
Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007) described validity in terms of three factors: 
authenticity, plausibility and criticality: “Authenticity convinces readers that the 
researcher was indeed part of the culture by using features such as vignettes and in 
vivo codes. Plausibility allows readers to accept the findings by having them “make 
sense” to them. Finally, criticality further convinces readers by causing them to 
re-examine their own assumptions that they had its nature, provides significant 
opportunity to validate the researcher’s understanding of observations and 
implications.”  
“Triangulation using different data sources” is outlined as a strategy for validating 
data and constructs (Creswell, 2005). Triangulation is the use of two or more research 
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methods to investigate the same thing (Fellow & Liu, 2008). As Esterberg (2002) 
stated, “if you have access to interview data, observational data, and historical 
documents, your analysis is likely to be much sounder than if you rely on only one 
source of evidence”. The analysis of various data is likely to be much sounder than 
relying on only one source of evidence (Esterberg, 2002).  
Triangulation was achieved in this study through combination of intensive interviews 
and Delphi study.In this research, an initial draft of an evaluation framework for 
hospital preparedness capacity was proposed based on the literature review and 
intensive interview results. This draft framework, along with key components, was 
further discussed, revised and finalized through a two- round modified Delphi method. 
Validity of assessment is the degree to which it measures what it is supposed to 
measure. There are many different types of validity: (1) face validity is an estimate of 
whether a test appears to measure a certain criterion; (2) Content validity is a 
non-statistical type of validity that involves “the systematic examination of the test 
content to determine whether it covers a representative sample of the behaviour 
domain to be measured”. (3) Construct validity refers to the extent to which 
operationalizations of a construct do actually measure what the theory says they do. 
(4)Empirical validity is assessed by evaluating the extent to which a measure relates 
to other measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the 
concepts being measured (Carmines and Zeller, 1979).  
In this research, the relatively high qualification of panellists and the degree of 
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consensus after two consecutive rounds Delphi contributes to the level of face and 
content validity. Spearman’s rho was calculated and showed that there was a strong 
correlation between two independent variables, indicating the evaluation framework 
has good construct validity. 
In the assessment of the framework’s empirical validity, the results indicated that 
there were statistically significant differences in overall preparedness capacity. These 
were higher in the tertiary hospitals than secondary level ones, which reflect the 
practical capacity of hospitals. This diversity also indicates that the evaluation 
framework is practical as means of assessing hospitals preparedness capacity. 
It is important to determine a questionnaire’s reliability in order to ensure the 
robustness of this research. Cronbach’s α and test-retest reliability were calculated for 
assessing internal and external reliability respectively. Cronbach’s alpha is considered 
as the most common measure of internal consistency in a questionnaire (Sasaki, 1996). 
Test-retest reliability is one of the simplest ways of testing the stability and reliability 
of an instrument over time. It is measured by administering a test twice at two 
different points in time. This type of reliability assumes that there will be no change in 
the quality or construct being measured. In most cases, reliability will be higher when 
little time has passed between tests. In this research, Cronbach’s α and test-retest 
coefficient reached the good level, concluded that the evaluation framework with 
indicator system has good consistency. 
In summary, an evaluation framework will only be valuable if it is tested (P. Joseph 
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Gibson, et al. 2012). This study used the modified Delphi method to identify key 
elements of public health emergency preparedness, and to further develop a 
measurement tool for hospital evaluation. In the light of the results of the literature 
review and Delphi study, an evaluation framework with eight key components was 
developed. We then sought to validate it by testing its rationality via statistical 
methods. These results indicated that the framework produced by the Delphi method 
was appropriate and valid for the research. 
6.4.2 Utility 
The framework describes hospital public health emergency preparedness activities 
comprehensively within the disaster life cycle, and defines the work of hospital’s 
response to ordinary and extraordinary public health emergencies. Therefore, it is 
proposed that the framework could be applied to support the following hospital’s 
critical activities. 
Pre-planning, coordination, quality improvement 
Because it is comprehensive and process oriented, the framework can form the basis 
of a hospital’s development and response planning. The framework’s structure 
supports emergency planning, cooperation, communication with other health and 
non-health organizations before and during incident, and after-action thus optimizing 
recovery strategies, resource coordination and adaption of incident action plans. For 
instance, during a multiagency incident response, the framework may clarify which 
operations might be best addressed with public health agency resources. 
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Health services improvement 
The framework can help identify and bridge gaps in medical treatment plans. It can 
present hospital service capacity (such as epidemiology and laboratory function, 
health care) as a measure that enables the proportion of surge cases that the available 
resources can accommodate to be quantified. Therefore, potential shortfalls of the 
existing capacity could be estimated. 
Training and drills 
The evaluation framework is also useful for explaining public health emergency 
preparedness to new public health staff and to external partners. The prevention and 
protection, response, and recover process groups provide a sensible framework for 
staff that may be not familiar with public health operations. The framework illustrates 
the breadth of preparedness activities and supporting materials, and can then provide 
additional detail for processes of interest. 
Resource prioritization 
By providing a detailed view of public health emergency preparedness, the framework 
may help identify shortcomings or, conversely, opportunities for investments that will 
support further development. This is especially useful when explaining how new 
resources may be optimally managed. For example, a grant application could explain 
how enhancements will improve related processes and strengthen the hospital’s 
overall preparedness may be more successful than applications lacking a systems 
oriented justification. 
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Evaluating how specific scenarios flow through the framework may identify gaps and 
areas for improvement. The framework’s robustness might best be tested by using it 
to describe incidents that vary with respect to threat (biological, chemical), occurrence 
(natural, or intentional), and scope (local, national). PHEP framework are required 
that must allow for the evaluation of public health threats and interventions (P. Joseph 
Gibson, et al. 2012). Although specific processes may change over time, however, we 
believe that the framework structure will remain robust. 
6.5Factors Contributing to Hospital PHEP 
Maintaining the emergency preparedness of hospital is a comprehensive activity. 
(Adini, et al. 2006).Therefore, assessment of the overall hospital preparedness 
capacity should include a large number of various factors.  
Factor analysis is usually used to summarize the information contained in a large 
number of variables into a smaller number of factors. In this research, the purpose of 
factor analysis is to reduce a list of variables under investigation to focus on a smaller 
set of core elements. Through establishing a regression model, there were four 
common factors were identified to represent the overall hospital preparedness 
capacity. 
Factor 1: hospital service capacity factor 
Hospitals play an important role in disaster response, including incident identification, 
early detection, identification, and intervention at the local level. They also contribute 
to ongoing surveillance and reporting during public health emergency outbreaks as 
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well as triage and treatment of victims during and after incident. Furthermore, early 
identification is inseparably related to medical treatment for managing bioterrorist 
events or infectious disease outbreaks. For instance, the ability to test and receive 
laboratory results around-the-clock and early diagnosis can support appropriate 
medical treatment plans for patients in a timely manner.  
In the factor analysis model, early detection, laboratory diagnosis and medical 
treatment were identified as the Hospital Service Capacity factor with the largest 
weight: 0.518, reflecting it is the most impactful factor contributing to the hospital 
preparedness capacity. The result indicates that opportunities for improving the 
hospital capacity to respond to public health emergencies should focus firstly on the 
need for reinforcing surveillance systems and medical treatment capability. 
Factor 2: Human resources factor 
There is a wide degree of consensus regarding the central importance of maintenance 
of sufficient staffing levels throughout an emergency event. Skilled, well-trained 
personnel constitute a critical resource for effective response. Although a regional 
response that calls upon private and public resources is required for a public health 
emergency, hospitals still face the challenge of inadequate staffing levels (Matthew D. 
2010). In the statistical model, used in this research, there were two variables 
comprised factor 2which had high weights, namely fully staffed workforce and staff 
training. Thus a robust workforce is the second most important factor for hospital 
preparedness capacity. To develop a robust workforce in support of public health 
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emergency preparedness, not only requires the conditions that support the recruitment 
and retention of adequate staff, but also ensure efficient training and drills program to 
meet the demand. 
Factor 3: Stockpiles and Facilities Factor 
Stockpiles typically include a very wide range of items, including beds, ventilators, 
and other medical apparatus, pharmaceuticals, and a range of other essential resources. 
Facilities (infrastructure) denote medical spaces, treatment areas, laboratory, air 
filtration, built-in radiation protection, and blast-protected walls, etc. These two 
variables with large positive weight (0.160) were categorized as Stockpiles and 
Facilities and represents hospital supportive resources. Identifying resource needs, 
acquiring resources, and storing and distributing resources are key dimensions for 
preparedness. The factor also includes efforts designed at mobilizing resources to 
continue with operations if key resources are destroyed. For example hospitals must 
prepare for the possibility that an alternate facility will be required. 
Factor 4: Management, direction, and coordination factor (MDC) 
In the factor analysis model, the variables of emergency plan, risk communication and 
emergency command system also has large positive loadings, which reflects hospital’s 
organization and responsibilities as a significant contributor to public health 
emergency preparedness. This was defined as the MDC Factor. This factor included 
the development of a communications plan, different types of emergency plans for all 
potential threats, the establishment of command system, protocols and procedures, 
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responding to security issues and crowd control, regular testing and support, and 
addressing the interoperability of multiple responding departments and personnel. 
This factor of preparedness makes it possible for hospitals to manage both preparatory 
activities and response processes effectively. 
6.6The Current Status of Hospital PHEP in Sichuan Province 
This section discusses the preparedness capacity of hospitals in rural areas of Sichuan 
in relation to the available literature in order to answer the research question three: 
“how does the level of hospital preparedness capacity in rural areas of China?” 
Sichuan is a high risk province which frequently occurred public health emergencies, 
and the types of emergency events are mainly earthquakes, infectious diseases. 
Therefore, based upon the research results and local government reports, although 
hospital medical staff was provided training, the content of training should be 
strengthened. According to the characteristic of Sichuan, the content of training 
should focus on onsite rescue, medical staff and volunteer management, safety 
protection. Drills should be conducted and cooperated with other organizations (e.g. 
fire department, CDC), which may improve cooperation and coordination among 
different organizations for effective response. 
Additionally, shortage of medicine stockpiles was reported by the surveyed hospitals 
as a common issue when emergencies happened. Since Sichuan has a large mobile 
population, weather is hot and humidity, some respiratory infectious diseases and 
food poisoning will be likely to happen. Then, it is possible for medicine storage to 
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not only be sufficient for general emergency events, but also those occurring rarely.  
In the survey, only few numbers hospitals had an expert group. In order to cope with 
emergencies effectively, it is possible for hospitals to develop an expert group which 
would provide technical support.  
According to the “hospital classification system” of the Ministry of Health of People’s 
Republic of China, all hospitals in China are classified into three levels: primary, 
secondary, and tertiary hospitals based on their capabilities in providing medical care, 
education, and conducting medical research. Hospitals are also classified according to 
the types of services they provide: general hospitals and non-general hospitals. 
“General hospital” means a hospital that provides general acute care services, 
including emergency services. “Non-general hospital” means a subclass of hospital 
that is primarily or exclusively engaged in the care and treatment of one of the 
following categories: (1) patients with a cardiac condition; (2) patients with an 
orthopaedic condition; (3) patients receiving a surgical procedure; and (4) any other 
specialized category of services that the secretary of health and human services 
designate as a specialty hospital. Hospitals can be further classified by determining 
whether they are a community hospital or a teaching hospital. Community hospitals 
are local, general hospitals. Teaching or academic hospitals are hospitals that are 
associated with a medical school or nursing school. 
Through comparing different types of hospitals’ preparedness capacity on the four 
common factors identified in this research, the results indicate that tertiary hospitals 
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performed better than secondary level hospitals in the factor hospital service, human 
resources, and stockpiles and facilities. However, it also identified that tertiary 
hospitals may be not always better than the secondary hospitals in all aspects. The 
results showed that general hospitals achieved a higher score than non-general 
hospitals in hospital service, human resources, stockpiles and facilities. It also 
revealed that different types of non-general hospitals may be more prepared in 
identifying lines of authority and responsibility. In comparing teaching and 
non-teaching hospitals, the mean score of teaching hospitals is higher in the aspects of 
hospital service and human resources. 
Moreover different type of hospital setups may affect the adaptation of hospital PHEP 
system. For example, emergency fund is one of key elements for hospital 
preparedness system. Capacity of stockpiles, e.g. equipments, medicine, etc. depend 
on emergency fund. According to the research results, all public hospitals could 
obtain financial support from state and local government. While, for private hospitals, 
emergency funding management system may be different from public hospitals. How 
to raise sufficient fund would be a challenge for private hospitals. Hospitals setup may 
affect other aspects of building a sustainable preparedness system as well, such as 
communication and coordination system with other hospitals. A preparedness network 
at provincial or national level should be established in future.  
In summary, different types of hospitals are performed differently in this study 
because of their functions and missions. This may be larger hospitals received greater 
assistance. It is impossible to require all hospitals have the same capacity. To maintain 
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high level of preparedness for all hospitals, a minimum preparedness requirement, for 
instance, planning and policies, staff and infrastructure, skilled staff, training and 
drills (Adini, 2009), should for basis to be applied to all types of hospitals for 
effective response to public health emergencies.  
The results of the study indicate that the majority of hospitals in the rural area are 
moderately well prepared for a public health emergency event:  
(1) Establishment of emergency command, communication and coordination system, 
while types of emergency plans are limited. 
A few previous studies have investigated specific aspects of hospital emergency 
communication and coordination systems. In 2005, in four regions including Beijing, 
Shandong, Guangxi, and Hainan, 76.1% of hospitals above the secondary level were 
prepared to set up the emergency command centre/office, and 90.3% of hospitals had 
an emergency plan for infectious disease, while only 18.7% had plans for 
bio/chemical terror. With regard to communication, nearly 60% of respondents 
reported a lack of communication and coordination between hospital departments, and 
limited timely forecasting, public communication and effective regulation of public 
health emergency (XingmingLi, et al. 2008).  
Research in Guangzhou revealed that all hospitals above the secondary level had 
established emergency command centre/office and about 92.6% of hospitals had at 
least one emergency plan. However the contents of emergency plans were mainly 
focused on infectious disease outbreaks and natural disaster with less focus on 
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bio/chemical terror. For the capacity of communication and coordination, there were 
85.2% of hospitals which could communicate and coordinate across institutions 
(Xinhua Liu, 2011)  
This research examined rural hospitals in Sichuan province in 2013. The results 
indicated that all targeted hospitals developed an emergency plan, but the numbers for 
biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats were still relatively 
low. Most hospitals had command systems and formed preparedness networks for 
public health emergencies, and they could communicate within hospitals.  
Thus hospitals in different regions of China have made efforts to enhance planning 
and preparedness and to coordinate capability. Additionally, there is a greater 
perception of risk from emergencies due to natural hazards and infectious diseases 
than from human made disasters, which limits the content and scope of emergency 
plans. With a greater emphasis on all-hazards preparedness and less emphasis on 
specific threats, emergency plans which address specific hazards may be a moot issue 
for rural hospitals in China.  
(2) Surveillance systems was developed to support epidemiology and laboratory 
functions, however the laboratory diagnostic capacities and analysis of monitoring 
information remain inadequate. 
In the study, it is concluded that hospitals’ preparedness capacity in epidemiology was 
better that those reported in Beijing, Shandong, Guangxi, and Hainan (2005) and 
Guangdong (2009). This may reflect the fact that in 2005, there were only 55.5% of 
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hospitals that had syndromic surveillance systems for certain diseases. Around 70.0% 
of respondents monitored fever and atypical pneumonia cases and only 38.7% of 
hospitals could classify and analyse monitored information regularly. An estimated 
47.4% of hospitals shared their surveillance information with the local health 
authority and other institutions. 
In 2009, research showed that most hospitals (80%) in Guangdong had developed 
public health emergency detection and identification systems, about85% could 
identify fever patients and atypical pneumonia cases and about 63.1% could 
summarise information; a level higher than that found in 2005.  
Since 2009, all hospitals above secondary level in China are required to monitor fever 
and influenza-like cases (Dexiang Zhu, 2009). This survey indicated that in Sichuan 
most could report surveillance information to health administration. However, the 
period required for analysing and reporting the information is still an issue for the 
effectiveness of surveillance. 
This research also found that the laboratory function was insufficient. Recent articles 
(Hong Chen, 2011; Xingming Li, 2009; Qi Zhao, 2009) suggested that hospitals 
should establish laboratory pathogenic surveillance networks nationwide, which will 
develop, maintain and strengthen an integrated domestic and national network of 
laboratories to respond quickly to public health emergencies. 
(3) Fully staffed workforce was maintained, the content of training and drills should 
be diversified. 
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Fully staffed workforce includes operations-ready workers and volunteers who have 
the skills and capabilities to perform optimally in a public health emergency. There is 
a wide degree of consensus regarding the central importance of maintaining sufficient 
staffing levels throughout a surge scenario's duration (James W, Samantha K, et al. 
2013), and the majority of studies have concentrated on the need to mobilized hospital 
staff in China. XinghuaLiu 2009) and Qi Zhao (2009) reported respectively that most 
health institutions in Guangdong, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Fujian, Yunnan, Gansu, and 
Ningxia provinces had emergency response teams; mainly for infectious disease 
responses. Besides, most hospitals had developed a response plan to maintain 
sufficient human resources during an emergency, e.g. recall off-duty employees 
(Xinghua Liu, 2009; Qi Zhao,). While, some studies are beginning to consider 
education and training as key measures to enhance staff’s ability of public health 
response, it has been proposed that a series of activities of training, drills, and 
exercises should be designed to ensure emergency operations will be carried out 
effectively when disaster strikes (Adini, 2009; Jeannette Sutton, 2006; Hui Zhang, 
2005). The issue with respect to training and drills is usually that the content of 
training varies but broadly includes: (1) understanding aspects of public health 
emergencies; (2) reporting early warning, communication, medical treatment; 
(3)legislation concerning medical emergency response; (4) information management 
(Yantao T Xin, Keyi Y Xu, 2011).  
This research indicates that most hospitals had a preparedness capacity in regard to 
maintaining sufficient staff in the event of a disaster and in developing emergency 
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response team and command systems which could mobilize additional human 
resources. In addition, all hospitals provided various training and drills for hospital 
staff, and the content addressed awareness of public health emergencies, on-site 
rescue and medical treatment, principles of quarantine and isolation, infectious 
disease prevention and control, etc. However, the effectiveness of these training and 
drill programs needs to be periodically evaluated, and the content of these programs 
could be more diversified to give scenarios of varying severity and risk.  
(4) Stockpiles and infrastructures were insufficient to meet the demands 
Hui Zhang reported that most hospitals were short of equipment, such as beds and had 
insufficient for a substantial numbers of patients who may present to hospitals within 
a relatively short period of time (Hui Zhang, 2005). Hong Chen (2012), Fan Liping, 
Zhao qinghua, et al. (2012) showed that although all hospitals had a stockpile of drugs, 
personal protective equipment, beds, ambulances, etc., the quantity and variety 
couldn't meet a sudden increase in demand. 
This research reported that all hospitals possessed emergency resources reserves, 
personal protective equipment, and had the capacity to create “alternate sites”, for 
instance through the use of non-clinical areas (waiting areas, corridors) as treatment 
spaces in the event of a surge. However they still faced many problems. For example, 
not all of them had corresponding drug distribution programs to provide priority to 
vulnerable people. Besides, not all hospitals could prepare for back-up facilities when 
key resources are destroyed. This may be affected by economic level and the 
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classification of the hospital. The need for hospitals and health systems to develop and 
maintain an emergency stockpile is widely acknowledged but may be severely 
undermined by economic pressure (Avery et al. 2008).Therefore, to strengthen 
hospital’s ability to provide public health emergency, the local government should 
take measures to tighten policy guidance and to increase input into rural hospitals’ 
emergency preparedness capacity construction. 
6.7 Using the Framework for Driving Improvement in PHEP 
Although there are efforts to improve the preparedness of hospitals in China, there are 
still tremendous gaps between these efforts and the preparedness status of rural 
hospitals, as evidenced by the findings in this research. Thus, several 
recommendations are offered. 
First, there must be a standardized method to consistently measure preparedness 
across all hospitals. The framework represented a valid and well considered 
measurement tool and should be considered as a consistent standard.  
Second, professional organizations should utilize the findings from this research to 
create a broader forum for discussion about the critical issues of disaster preparedness 
facing rural acute care hospitals in China. There also must be more sharing of best 
practices.  
Third, hospital officials must explore feasible alternatives for surge capacity in the 
event of a disaster. Community and public health forums should be conducted to 
involve all entities, not just hospitals. 
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Fourth, healthcare officials must be encouraged to access available government 
funding for preparedness in areas of vulnerability, such as surge capacity and staffing. 
Grants and other funding streams also should be pursued. 
Fifth, rural hospitals managers should build and maintain local and state partnerships 
in an effort to access crucial resources in the event of a disaster, particularly as related 
to surge capacity and staffing. 
Finally, hospital officials must be encouraged to expand education and drills. 
Education and drills are needed, particularly in the area of surge capacity. 
This study served to quantify the levels of preparedness for rural hospitals in China. 
Further research is necessary to build on these finding. The frameworks should be 
further validated across various provinces and in other jurisdictions outside of China. 
It should also be tested against more long term objective measures of hospital 
performance in disasters. 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter presented a discussion on major qualitative and quantitative findings, 
with particular reference to the findings in Chapters 4 and 5.  
To start with, this chapter discussed the concept of hospital PHEP. This included a 
synthesis of the themes of PHEP based on the peer-reviewed publications, and the 
development of a proposed conceptual framework, which helps to understand the 
profound relationship among activities of PHEP.  
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Moreover, the Delphi method penetrated into identifying the key indicators for 
developing an evaluation framework, and validated the framework’s rationality and 
usage. Through a two-round Delphi, an agreed framework was finalized, along with 8 
first level indicators and 24 second indicators. The framework concisely yet 
comprehensively captures the emergency preparedness activities of hospitals. It 
describes the processes within 3 time periods which can help hospital’s workers 
recognize how their daily work fits within emergency preparedness.  It can reflect 
the flexibility and complexity of PHEP, and its level of specificity is also useful in 
planning, training, system development, etc. activities.  
Eight elements of preparedness were examined across respondent rural hospitals. The 
results showed that there was a substantial improvement compared with previous 
studies, however, there remained gaps in rural hospital preparedness for public health 
emergencies.  
Hospitals at all levels should enhance their management of disasters including 
updating and revising of emergency plans, strengthening communication and 
cooperation with other local agencies, enhancing the capacity of abnormity 
monitoring and laboratory diagnostic capability for infectious diseases; improving the 
treatment program for various PHE scenarios and strengthening psychological 
intervention and risk communication capabilities. 
Finally, healthcare authorities should institute a formal preparedness assessment tool 
incorporating the questions describe in the present study that would allow them to 
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identify deficiencies.  
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CHAPTER7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Introduction 
This research sought to develop a framework to help validate hospital preparedness 
for public health emergencies. The proposed framework was based on concepts 
reported in the published literature but consolidated through a Delphi study of 
stakeholder perceptions and validated by using the framework to measure the 
resilience of hospitals in rural areas of Sichuan Province in China. 
The research background, questions and objectives were introduced in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 presented an extensive literature review to lay a solid theoretical foundation. 
The aims, objective and research methodologies targeted at the research questions 
were detailed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 reported the outcome of the Delphi study of key 
expert opinions. Chapter 5 reported the outcomes of the use of the proposed resilience 
framework to measure the level of preparedness. Chapter 6 discussed all the 
implications of the findings for theory and practice. 
This final chapter of the thesis seeks to apply the findings of this research towards 
health service development via a set of recommendations aimed at improving the 
quality of hospital PHEP. Further, this Chapter addresses the research limitations and 
identifies the directions for future research.  
7.2 Contribution 
The evaluation framework proposed in this study provides hospitals with a practical 
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tool that facilitates the understanding of PHEP activities and supports 
decision-making for hospital PHEP investment. The ultimate aim is building the 
sustainability of hospital in disasters. Because a deep analysis of hospital PHEP 
activities is useful information for the decision-making process, it is believed that the 
evaluation framework developed by this research can help guide hospital policy 
makers in moving towards sustainability. Through the evaluation conducted here, this 
research has identified consensus on what health services need to do during a public 
health emergency and how those services may be better prepared to do those things. 
Additionally, this research provides a comprehensive understanding and description of 
hospital PHEP, and confirms the key dimensions of PHEP which could be used to 
develop new research surveys or improve the current tools. The framework proposed 
in this research has been organized around key dimensions of preparedness activities. 
Based on the results, it suggests that the development of broadly applicable PHEP 
metrics is quite feasible. These discussions are intended to serve as a foundation for 
the development of comprehensive assessment strategies for hospitals. 
The studies of hospital PHEP are relatively rare in China, especially in rural areas. 
This study examined the current status of hospital PHEP in rural Sichuan province by 
using the proposed framework, and examining the contributing factors. They may 
help in constructing plans and strategies to enhance hospital PHEP capacity in the 
future. 
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7.3 Limitations 
Our study has a number of limitations: 
Firstly, the experts were self-selected and not necessarily representative. However 
their knowledge and skills in this field which was the reason behind their selection 
means that they are best placed to contribute to a deep understanding of the factors 
influencing preparedness. 
Secondly, the sample size of46 hospitals are relatively limited. The small sample size 
precludes a statistical analysis of before and after data, and may not fully represent the 
PHEP of all hospitals, thus limiting the generalizability of the results. However, the 
data points enumerated in the questionnaire and the format of the questionnaire will 
provide a good foundation for future research, and also will help hospitals examine 
their current level of preparedness. Because there were some hospitals which didn’t 
respond or complete the survey, and some hospitals had to be excluded for 
ineligibility for hospital classification, then to some extent, the survey may not 
represent the broad range of hospitals. 
Thirdly, selection bias also may have occurred. For example, those respondents who 
did not complete the questionnaire may have been less interested and less prepared 
than hospitals willing to take time to discuss preparedness issues.  
Fourthly, there may be respondent reporting bias as a self-report method was used, in 
which the Emergency Department Director may have presented a favourable image of 
his or her facility. The results are limited by the respondents’ knowledge about 
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specific topic areas. There also may be a tendency to over exaggerate the true PHEP 
capacity, therefore, the hospitals may have been even less prepared than reported 
here. 
Fifthly, the study was conducted over almost 12 months, during which time there may 
be some changes on PHEP of the surveyed hospitals. Many of participating hospitals 
were in the process of receiving government financial support to purchase 
decontamination trailers, supplies, and personal protective equipment during the 
period of study. Therefore, it is possible that our results would differ accordingly if 
the study were performed again. 
Finally, only quantitative data were collected to measure PHEP capacity of hospitals. 
Most questions are designed with a “yes” “no” or “unknown” answer which may 
restrict the collected data to these three categories. Thus the degree of compliance is 
not measured in this format. 
7.4 Future Research Directions 
This study served to quantify the levels of preparedness for rural hospitals in China. 
Further research is necessary to build on the findings of this study.  
 The framework should be further validated across various provinces and in other 
jurisdictions outside of China.  
 It should also be tested against more long term objective measures of hospital 
performance in public health emergencies.  
 Finally, the aim of research is to guide preparedness and response, thus focus 
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should also be placed on the development of practical guidelines and tools that 
may facilitate improvement. 
In future, hospital PHEP research in China should make efforts to (1) establish a 
universally accepted standard of prepared PHEP which is accepted by policy makers 
and stakeholders, particularly those charges with evaluating the capacity of the public 
health and safety systems (Zhao Qi, 2009; Fan Liping, 2012;), (2) endorse a 
theoretical structure for further studies, (3) integrate research of different disciplines 
into a more in-depth understanding of the concepts. Therefore, researchers should 
give more attention to basic concepts, principles and methods, their application to 
public health incidents and disasters, and the key function systems required to develop 
emergency resilience of hospitals. 
7.5 Conclusion 
To date, a major obstacle to the development of hospital PHEP capacity is the absence 
of consensus regarding the clarity of understanding and definition of key terms. Work 
is needed to generate robust conceptual and analytical frameworks, along with 
innovations in data collection and methodological approaches. 
The purpose of this doctoral study was to develop an agreed evaluation framework for 
hospital PHEP, and to test its validity and utility by using it to assess the current status 
of hospital PHEP in rural areas of Sichuan province. This framework’s integration 
into the model of the disaster life cycle and incorporation of multiple approaches for 
sustainable health organizations may facilitate robust response to public health 
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emergencies. 
There are five basic domains (Structure, Staff, Stuff, Space, and Service) which were 
proposed for constructing the sustainable PHEP framework. This framework 
identifies response processes required to address an incident that threatens to 
overwhelm the routine capabilities of a hospital.  
The qualitative results revealed that the processes should contain 8 functional areasor 
capabilities related public health, namely, emergency plan, disaster surveillance, 
training and drills, stockpiles, emergency command system, onsite rescue and medical 
treatment, fully staffed workforce, and crisis communication and cooperation.  
The framework also revealed the interactions among these functions or capabilities, 
and suggesting a need for greater attention to these dynamic linkages. Therefore, the 
framework in comparison with others in the literature is more explicit in capturing 
how hospitals prepare for and responds to public health emergencies. Combining 
comprehensiveness with specificity is especially useful in defining PHEP. It also 
provides a framework for pre-planning, coordination, quality improvement, training 
and drills and resource prioritization. 
The uses of the framework 
The tool has been positively evaluated for identifying the activities that are required at 
each stage of the Prevention Preparedness Response and Recovery cycle.  
Prevention and preparedness are generally considered profitable strategies since they 
result in capacity building, safe land use planning, emergency planning and (as 
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needed) safe retrofitting of existing facilities. Promoting proactive prevention and 
preparedness may be one of the most valuable benefits of the use of the framework. 
 
Fig.18 The uses of the tool 
Fig.18 summarizes the potential uses of the tool. Training in the methodology and 
logic behind the tool stimulates preventive action and post-incident thinking. As 
mentioned in the chapter 6 (the utility of the framework), the framework can then 
result in sustainable and safe pre-planning, in safety planning of facilities and in 
capacity building. After the incident, “lessons learned” from evaluations of large-scale 
incidents may be translated into remedial actions within the structureof this 
framework. 
First, a general disaster reduction strategy may be followed, e.g. by enhancing the 
ability of natural systems to neutralize potential natural threats.  
Secondly, preparedness should also encompass training of field team members, back 
office experts and country representatives. A highly relevant comment from those 
Pre-incident During incident Post-incident 
The framework use for: 
﹒Pre-planning 
﹒Training 
The framework used by: 
﹒Hospitals manager 
﹒Policy maker 
The framework reports 
﹒Analysis 
﹒Database 
Impact prevention, 
awareness, disaster 
resistance 
Local impact reduction: 
-Short term 
-Long term 
Reduction lessons 
Experience learning 
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exposed to the tool as part of this research was that experience with the tool may 
stimulate national authorities to reconsider their disaster preparedness and response 
legislation, and also stimulate collaboration between environmental experts and 
disaster managers. 
The concept to operational capability 
A coherent conceptual and analytical framework would be an important step toward 
creating a defined research space to enhance the development of evidence and to 
inform policy and practice. It can easily cross-walk the policies and procedures that 
differ across regions and assist in prioritizing resources for critical services. 
This research assessed the capability of rural hospitals in Sichuan, and explored the 
issue of PHEP among rural hospitals. While disasters can occur in both urban and 
rural areas, a recent study found that (Zhao Qi, 2009), in China, the rural hospitals 
was ill-prepared for a large scale disasters because of limited resources and capacity, 
and therefore, they are more vulnerable to public health emergencies. In the survey, 
eight elements of preparedness, in addition to overall preparedness, were examined 
across hospitals of Sichuan province. The four factors were identified that contributed 
strongly to hospital PHEP. It is anticipated that improving these factors will lead to 
high level of preparedness. 
The results indicated that rural hospitals have a need for collaborative planning for 
different types of emergencies and for the equipment and supplies required to meet 
surge needs. 
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Hospital PHEP capacity can be quantified, in terms of the severity, acuity, duration, 
magnitude or volume, and nature of the event. It then may be possible to measure the 
speed and adequacy of the potential response. Besides, once the sub-issues within the 
domains are defined and validated during planning, we can move seamlessly into the 
operational phase through the use of an integrating hub. 
In conclusion, growing evidence suggests that hospital PHEP has substantially 
improved in recent years, but more improvement is needed. Future events and 
disasters, such as terrorist attacks and emerging infectious diseases, will require 
hospitals and other health care providers to prepare well to respond. Additionally, to 
enhance hospital preparation for dealing with public health emergencies, governments 
should increase investment in the construction of infrastructure to create and sustain 
appropriate hospital PHEP capacity.  
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QUEENSLAND OF 
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SICHUAN UNVIERSITY 
QUESTIONS FOR INTENSIVE INTERVIEW 
The structure questions for intensive interview are as follows: 
1. What are the ingredients or constituents or elements of hospital public health 
emergency response preparedness 
2. Please give us your opinions about the particular environments and challenges of 
major hospitals in rural areas of China regarding to the hospital preparedness for 
public health? (e.g., hospital culture and social beliefs, policy and plans for disaster 
management, management mechanism, management procedures, costs of preparation, 
governance frameworks, socio-economic frameworks)  
3. Please give us your opinions, comment or modification recommendations on the 
content in regard to suitability of the measurable items (with regard to the special 
situation in China) and the readability of the survey instrument. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE FIRST ROUND OF DLEPHI 
STUDY 
Dear participants: 
First of all, thank you so much for your consideration as an expert of our reference 
group in Delphi study. 
The main function of the reference group in this study is to give your opinions on 
each potential item in the questionnaire which is used for establishing an evaluation 
framework of hospital public health emergency preparedness in China. The reference 
group aims to make it more useable and more adapted to the Chinese situation. We 
have already sent you our detailed research background and the questionnaire (seen in 
the attachment). 
All the domains and items in this questionnaire were derived from the related 
literatures with the recent decade. It is supposed to be filled by key emergency 
hospital staffs in China to give their assessments on the importance of items from 
hospital perspective. 
This is the first round of Delphi study, please rate each item in the questionnaire, and 
feel free to give comments or modifications to the indicator system.  
Instructions 
(1) Please assess each item by given a score: very important=4, important=3, 
moderately important=2, of little importance=1, of no importance=0. Tick “√” on 
the corresponding blank space.  
(2) Please give us your opinions, comments or medication recommendations on the 
content in regard to suitability of the measurable items. 
(3) Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions. 
 
  
QUESTIONNAIREFOR THE FIRST ROUND OF DELPHI STUDY 
Evaluation of hospital PHE preparedness in city and county of China 
Indicator system 
Importance 
unimportance 
Little 
important 
Moderately 
important 
important 
Very 
important 
1 Emergency plan      
1.1 Type of emergency plan      
1.2 The plan are accessible to all 
medical staff 
     
1..3 Details of the plan      
1.4 The period of evaluating and 
revising the emergency plan 
     
Modification and Comments 
2  Surveillance and warning       
2.1 Disease surveillance      
2.1.1 Monitoring network      
2.1.2 Type of surveillance event      
2.1.3 analysis and management of 
information 
     
2.2 Laboratory diagnosis capacity      
2.2.1 Working procedure and policy 
of laboratory 
     
2.2.2 Varieties of etiology can be 
isolated and identified 
     
2.2.3 The structure of laboratory staff      
2.2.4 technical plant      
Modification and Comments 
3 Training and drills      
3.1 Emergency training      
3.1.1 Type of training      
3.1.2Evaluate the effectiveness of 
training 
     
3.2 Drills      
3.2.1 Type of drills      
3.2.2 Drills cooperation with multiple 
agencies 
     
3.2.3 Evaluate the effectiveness of 
drills 
     
Modification and comments 
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4 Stockpiles      
4.1Stockpiles of emergency 
supplies 
     
4.2 Management of emergency 
supplies 
     
Modification and comments 
5 Emergency command system      
5.1Emergency command centre      
5.2Emergency relevant system      
5.3 Emergency committee or group      
Modification and Comments 
6 On-site rescue and medical 
treatment 
     
6.1 on-site rescue      
6.1.1 Capacity of emergency rescue      
6.1.2 Specific procedures for 
transfer of seriously patient in 
emergency 
     
6.1.3 Equipment for on-site rescue      
6.2 Medical treatment      
6.2.1 Expert group for emergency 
medical treatment 
     
6.2.2 Treatment strategies for 
different disease 
     
6.2.3 Equipment for 
decontamination, isolation and 
protection to infectious diseases and 
chemical contamination 
     
6.2.4 Equipment for medical 
treatment 
     
Modification and Comments 
7 Crisis communication and 
cooperation 
     
7.1 Crisis communication and 
cooperation within hospitals 
     
7.2 Crisis communication and 
cooperation with other facilities 
     
7.2.1 with other health facilities      
7.2.2 With government offices for 
emergency 
     
7.2.4 With media and public      
Modification and Comments 
8 Fully staffed workforce      
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8.1 The staff structure of critical 
department 
     
8.1.1 Setting of command 
center/expert group and its staff 
structure 
     
8.1.2 Setting of critical departments 
and their staff structure 
     
8.2 Capacity of critical staff      
8.2.1 Knowledge of key staff      
8.2.2 Skills of kef staff      
Modification and comments 
9 Evaluation and adaption      
9.1 Evaluation of hospital 
capacity 
     
9.2 Experience learning      
Modification and comments 
10 Funding      
10.1 Emergency funding 
collection 
     
10.2 Emergency funding 
management 
     
Modification and Comments 
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PERSONAL INFROMATION OF EXPERT 
 
Dear hospital key personnel/ health care professionals: 
Please provide your name and contact details, we need some of your personal 
information and evaluation criteria for the purpose of assessing the results in this 
project. Please note that all the information which may cause individually identifiable 
will be treated confidentially. Any identifiable information will not be available to 
anyone except for the research team. Individual responses to questions will be 
non-individual identifiable in the results of this project.  
1. Key personnel information  
Name： Gender： Highest qualification： 
Hospital Name： 
Working department： Working Position： Working Role： 
Phone Number： Email address： 
 
2. Experience in your working area (please tick “√” in the corresponding space of 
the form. You can choose more than one answers） 
Unfamiliar Less familiar Familiar More familiar Very familiar 
     
 
3. Key personnel evaluation criteria (please tick “√” in the corresponding space of 
the form. You can choose more than one answers） 
Evaluation 
criteria 
To what extent do you rely on these criteria to give your evaluations 
Never  Little  Somewhat  Much  A great deal  
Experience      
Theory       
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Literature      
Instinct      
 
Thanks again for your consideration and valuable advice！                  
Date：    month/         year 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF DLEPHI 
STUDY 
Dear participants: 
First of all, thank for providing precious suggestions in the first round of Delphi study. 
After calculating the results of the first round, there are 8 first level indicators, 22 
second level indicators, and 37 indicators were identified. In this round, please 
re-evaluate the listed items, thank you very much! 
Research Background 
We are trying to establish an evaluation framework for hospital PHEP. The reference 
group aims to make it more usable and more adapted to the Chinese situation. All the 
domains and items in this questionnaire derived from the related literatures within the 
recent decade. It is supposed to be filled by key emergency hospital staffs in China to 
give their assessments on the importance of items from hospital perspective. 
This is the second round of Delphi study, please rate each item in the questionnaire, 
and feel free to give comments or modifications to the indicator system.  
Instructions 
(1) Please assess each item by given a score: very important=4, important=3, 
moderately important=2, of little importance=1, of no importance=0. Tick “√” on 
the corresponding blank space.  
(2) Please give us your opinions, comments or medication recommendations on the 
content in regard to suitability of the measurable items. 
(3) Please feel free to contact us if you have any questions. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF DLEPHI STUDY 
Indicator system 
Importance 
Of no 
importance 
Of little 
importance 
Moderately 
importance 
important 
Very 
important 
1  Emergency Plan      
1.1  Type of emergency plan      
1.2  The accessible of plan to all 
staff 
     
1.3 Evaluation and updating of 
emergency plan 
     
Moderation and comments： 
2 Surveillance and warning      
2.1  Disease surveillance      
2.1.1  Monitoring system      
2.1.2  Type of surveillance event      
2.1.3  Analysis of information      
2.1.4  Report of information      
2.2  Laboratory diagnosis 
capacity 
     
2.2.1  Working procedure and 
policy of laboratory 
     
2.2.2  Varieties of etiology can be 
isolated and identified 
     
2.2.4  Technical equipment      
Moderation and comments： 
3  Training and drills      
3.1  Emergency training      
3.1.1 Content of emergency training      
3.1.2 Evaluation of effectiveness of 
training 
     
3.1.3 Coverage of staff training      
3.2 Emergency drills      
3.2.1 Content of drills       
3.2.2 Evaluation and adaption of 
drills 
     
Moderation and comments： 
4 Stockpiles      
4.1  Emergency funds      
4.1.1  Emergency funds budget      
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4.1.2  Emergency funds 
management 
     
4.2 Emergency materials      
4.2.1 Stockpile of emergency 
materials 
     
4.2.2 Management of emergency 
materials 
     
4.3 Emergency drugs      
4.3.1 Supplies system of emergency 
drugs  
     
4.3.2 Distribution system of 
emergency drugs 
     
Moderation and comments： 
5  Emergency command system      
5.1  Emergency command centre      
5.2  Emergency relevant system      
5.3  Emergency committee or 
group 
     
Moderation and comments： 
6  On-site rescue and medical 
treatment 
     
6.1  on-site rescue          
6.1.1  Capacity of emergency 
rescue 
     
6.1.2  Emergency training rescue      
6.1.2  Equipment for on-site 
rescue 
     
6.1.3 System of transfer patients      
6.2  Medical treatment      
6.2.1  Treatment strategies for 
different disease 
     
6.2.2  Equipment for medical 
treatment 
     
6.2.3 Treatment plans for different 
emergencies  
     
6.2.4 Beds of emergency 
department 
     
6.2.5 temporary beds      
6.2.6 Beds of ICU      
6.2.7 Beds of isolation ward      
6.3 infectious disease treatment      
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6.3.1 Scale of department of 
infectious disease 
     
6.3.2  Quarantine measures      
6.3.3  Protective equipment          
Moderation and comments：  
7 Crisis communication and 
cooperation 
     
7.1  Crisis communication and 
cooperation within hospitals 
     
7.2  Crisis communication and 
cooperation within hospitals 
     
7.2.1  with other health facilities      
7.2.2  With government offices for 
emergency 
     
7.2.3  With media and public      
Moderation and comments： 
8  Public emergency education      
8.1  Public emergency education 
department 
     
8.2  Public emergency education 
plan 
     
8.2  Way of education      
Moderation and comments ： 
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第一轮专家咨询问卷 
 
尊敬的专家： 
您好！首先感谢您在百忙之中抽出时间参与我们的专家咨询！ 
 
研究背景 
我们目前正在构建 “四川省医院突发公共卫生事件应对能力评估体系”。随着全球各类灾害
及突发事件的频繁发生，医院应急医疗管理的重点已经由灾后的恢复重建逐渐转变为包括灾
前防范及准备、灾难过程中及时响应、灾后恢复改善的全过程、系统化管理。因此，近年来
发达国家开始逐步重视“医院灾难应对能力”这一理念。“医院灾难应对能力”是指医院对灾难
及突发事件的吸收能力、缓冲能力及应对、恢复能力。增强医院灾难应对能力有助于我们迅
速化解一般突发事件的影响，在严重的灾难后也能够有效地应对，尽快地恢复。目前，我国
缺乏全面、综合、系统的医院突发公共卫生事件应对能力评估体系，而建立有效的评价工具，
是提高医院灾难应对能力，最终提升社区整体抗灾能力的有效途径和必要条件。 
本次专家咨询法的目的是通过专家达成共识的方法，确立及完善医院灾难应对能力评估体系，
从而帮助我们确定评估指标及权重，优化评估重点，建立适用于我国各级医院的评估体系。
本研究共包括两轮专家咨询法，您正在参加的是第一轮，请您对指标体系的各指标给出相应
评价。这些指标源自十年来国际相关领域的文献综述。 
 
填表说明 
得知您是这方面的专家，希望借助您的丰富经验对指标体系中的一、二、三级指标的重要性
给予相应的评价，并提出宝贵的建议。 
具体评价方法如下： 
[1] 请对各指标的重要性进行评价，在每个问题后对应的选项中打“√”，其中“不重要”，表
示在评价医院灾难应对能力时，该指标不起任何作用；“极重要”，表示在评价医院灾难
应对能力时，该指标是必须具备的。例如，如果您认为“应急制度”极重要，则在对应的
第五个空格中打“√”。 
[2] 如果您觉得所提供的指标存在不合理或遗漏，请在相应的空白处提出您的宝贵意见。 
[3] 如果您对本次专家咨询存在任何疑问之处，请与我们联系。 
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二级以上医院应对突发公共卫生事件能力评估专家咨询表 
指标体系 
重要性 
不重要 一般 重要 很重要 极重要 
1.1 应急预案      
1.1 应急预案种类和内容      
1.2 应急预案的普及      
1.3应急预案更新      
修改建议： 
2监测与预警      
2.1 疾病监测      
2.1.1 监测制度      
2.1.2 监测事件的种类（如不明原
因肺炎） 
     
2.1.3 监测信息的汇总与报告      
2.2 实验室检测能力      
2.2.1 实验室工作制度      
2.2.2 实验室检测致病源种类      
2.2.3 实验室人员结构      
2.2.4 实验室技术设备      
修改建议： 
3应急培训与演练      
3.1 应急培训      
3.1.1 应急培训种类      
3.1.2 应急培训效果的考核      
3.2 应急演练      
3.2.1 T 应急演练种类      
3.2.2 应急演练资料备查      
3.2.3 应急演练评估      
修改建议： 
4后勤保障      
4.1 应急资金管理      
4.1.1 应急资金预算      
4.1.2 应急资金管理      
4.2 应急物资      
4.2.1 应急物资储备      
4.2.2 应急物资管理      
5应急机构      
5.1应急指挥部门设置      
5.2 应急相关科室设置      
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5.3 应急专家组      
修改建议：      
6现场救援和医疗救治      
6.1 现场救援          
6.1.1 紧急救援能力      
6.1.2现场救援设备      
6.2 医疗救治      
6.2.1不同种类疾病救治方案      
6.2.2医疗救治设备      
6.2.3 传染病与生化污染消毒、隔
离及防护设施 
         
修改建议：       
7信息沟通与合作      
7.1 院内与其他科室信息沟通与
合作 
     
7.2 院外信息沟通与合作      
7.2.1 与其他卫生机构      
7.2.2 与政府相关管理机构      
7.2.3 与媒体及大众      
修改建议： 
8 应急人员      
8.1 应急人员结构      
8.2应急人员能力      
8.2扩大应急人员能力      
9 评估与改进      
9.1应急能力评估方案      
9.2 经验总结      
修改建议： 
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第二轮专家咨询问卷 
 
尊敬的专家： 
您好！首先感谢您参与我们的第一轮专家咨询并提出了宝贵的意见。经对第一轮所有专家的
意见进行统计汇总，共筛选出8个一级指标，22个二级指标，37个三级指标，希望您能再次
对以下指标的重要性给予评价，我们将非常感谢！ 
 
研究背景 
我们目前正在构建 “四川省医院突发公共卫生事件应对能力评估体系”。 “医院灾难应对能
力”是指医院对灾难及突发事件的吸收能力、缓冲能力及应对、恢复能力。增强医院灾难应
对能力有助于我们迅速化解一般突发事件的影响，在严重的灾难后也能够有效地应对，尽快
地恢复。目前，我国缺乏全面、综合、系统的医院突发公共卫生事件应对能力评估体系，而
建立有效的评价工具，是提高医院灾难应对能力，最终提升社区整体抗灾能力的有效途径和
必要条件。 
本次专家咨询法的目的是通过专家达成共识的方法，确立及完善医院灾难应对能力评估体系，
从而帮助我们确定评估指标，优化评估重点，建立适用于我国各级医院的评估体系。本研究
共包括两轮专家咨询法，您正在参加的是第二轮，请您对指标体系的各指标给出相应评价。
这些指标源自十年来国际相关领域的文献综述。 
 
填表说明 
得知您是这方面的专家，希望借助您的丰富经验对指标体系中的一、二、三级指标的重要性
给予相应的评价，并提出宝贵的建议。 
具体评价方法如下： 
[4] 请对各指标的重要性进行评价，在每个问题后对应的选项中打“√”，其中“不重要”，表
示在评价医院灾难应对能力时，该指标不起任何作用；“极重要”，表示在评价医院灾难
应对能力时，该指标是必须具备的。例如，如果您认为“应急制度”极重要，则在对应的
第五个空格中打“√”。 
[5] 如果您觉得所提供的指标存在不合理或遗漏，请在相应的空白处提出您的宝贵意见。 
[6] 如果您对本次专家咨询存在任何疑问之处，请与我们联系。 
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二级以上医院应对突发公共卫生事件能力评估专家咨询表 
指标体系 
重要性 
不重要 一般 重要 很重要 极重要 
1应急预案      
1.1 应急预案种类      
1.2 应急预案的普及      
1.3应急预案评估与更新      
修改建议： 
2监测与预警      
2.1 疾病监测      
2.1.1 监测制度      
2.1.2 常规监测事件的种类（如不
明原因的死亡人数、急性哮喘发作
人数、发热人数等） 
     
2.1.3 监测信息的汇总      
2.1.4 监测信息的报告      
2.2 实验室检测能力      
2.2.1 实验室工作制度      
2.2.2 实验室分离、检测致病源种
类的能力 
     
2.2.3 实验室人员结构      
2.2.4 实验室技术设备（例如空气
室或头罩） 
     
修改建议： 
3应急培训与演练      
3.1 应急培训      
3.1.1 应急培训内容      
3.1.2 应急培训效果的考核      
3.1.3 接受培训人员的覆盖面      
3.2 应急演练      
3.2.1 应急演练内容      
3.2.2应急演练评估与改进      
修改建议： 
4后勤保障      
4.1 应急资金管理      
4.1.1 应急资金预算      
4.1.2 应急资金管理      
4.2 应急物资      
4.2.1 应急物资储备      
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4.2.2 应急物资管理      
4.3 应急药品储备      
4.3.1 药品保障机制      
4.3.2 药品分配制度      
修改建议： 
5应急指挥协调机制      
5.1应急指挥部门人员      
5.2 应急相关科室设置      
5.3 应急专家组      
修改建议： 
6现场救援和医疗救治      
6.1 现场救援          
6.1.1 急救应急预案      
6.1.2 急救培训      
6.1.3 现场救援设备（急救车辆、
通讯设备） 
     
6.1.4重症病人转诊和途中监护      
6.2 医疗救治能力      
6.2.1不同种类疾病救治方案      
6.2.2医疗救治设备      
6.2.3 不同突发公共卫生事件所致
疾病的院内治疗方案 
     
6.2.4 急诊科床位      
6.2.5 临时应急可加床位      
6.2.6 ICU床位      
6.2.7 隔离病房床位      
修改建议：  
7信息沟通与合作      
7.1 院内与其他科室信息沟通与
合作 
     
7.2 院外信息沟通与合作      
7.2.1 与其他卫生机构      
7.2.2 与政府相关管理机构      
7.2.3 与媒体及大众      
7.3 培训医务人员识别和报告突
发事件 
     
修改建议： 
8 应急人员      
8.1 应急人员结构      
8.2应急人员能力      
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专家个人信息 
尊敬的专家： 
您好！ 
为了方便和及时对专家咨询结果进行评价，我们需要了解您相关的个人信息以及您对本
次咨询问卷作出的判断依据，请分别填写以下表格 
1 专家个人信息 
姓名： 性别： 学历： 
单位： 职称： 职务： 
电话： 电子信箱： 
 
2您对突发公共卫生事件应对工作的熟悉程度（请在相应空格中打“√”，可多选） 
不熟悉 了解一点 熟悉 比较熟悉 很熟悉 
     
 
3 您对本次调查的判断依据（请在相应空格中打“√”，可多选） 
判断依据 
依赖程度 
没有 少部 部分 大部分 几乎全部 
工作经验      
理论      
参考文献      
直觉      
 
再次感谢您的参与以及宝贵意见！！！ 
日期：年/         月 
 
8.2扩大应急人员能力      
修改建议： 
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THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE SURVEY 
The Questionnaire for Investigating Hospital PHEP in Sichuan 
Province 
Instructions 
1. Survey Objective: To examine the current status PHEP of hospitals above 
secondary level, and provide suggestions for the future research and making 
policy. 
2. Public health emergencies in this research are defined as: events that occur 
unexpectedly and can cause or potentially cause mass destruction to the public’s 
health. 
3. Each hospital is required to designate a department director to be responsible for 
coordinating the completion of the questionnaire.  
4. Most questions in the questionnaire are mainly in two types: (1) Choice questions 
(including some multiple choice questions). (2) Fill-in questions: please fill in the 
relevant content on the underline. 
5. When you finish the questionnaire, please return it by email. Email address: 
sunny.tree.t@gmail.com 
6. Please free to contact us if you have any questions. 
 
Thank you for your time and patience! 
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Part 1 Basic Information 
1.1 Name of hospital: ___ 
1.2 Address: ___ 
1.3 Hospital grade: ___ 
1.4 Number of staff in total, and: ___ 
 
Staff 
category 
Total 
Education Background Positional Title Major 
Phd Master Undergraduate Other Senior Medium Junior Other Clinical Other 
Doctor            
Nurse            
Medical and 
technical 
           
 
1.5 Dose this hospital have infectious disease ward?  □ Yes □No □Unknown 
1.6 Dose this hospital have accepted and cured SARA patients?□ Yes □No □Unknown 
1.7 Is this hospital a teaching hospital or not?□ Yes □No □Unknown 
1.8 Does this hospital have fever clinic? □ Yes □No □Unknown 
Part 2 Emergency Plan 
2.1 Type and updating of emergency plan 
2.1.1 Does this hospital have the following emergency plan? (If all are chose “No”, 
jump to 3.1) 
Type 
Whether has emergency plan 
Yes No 
Infectious disease □ □ 
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Mass unidentified 
diseases 
□ □ 
Foodborne disease □ □ 
 
Occupational 
poisoning 
□ □ 
Nosocomial 
infection 
□ □ 
 
Natural disasters □ □ 
Bio/Chemical terror □ □ 
Other： □ □ 
 
2.1.2 Have the hospital ever evaluated or adapted the emergency plan/files/handbook? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
2.2 Accessible of emergency plan 
2.2.1 Have the hospital offered training or publicity regarding to the content emergency plan 
which mentioned above? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
2.2.2 Are these emergency plans accessible to all the medical staff? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
2.2.3 By what means that medical staffs can get to know these plans? 
□Printed files □Hospital website □Training  □Conference □Other 
Part 3 Surveillance and Warning 
3.1 Disease surveillance 
3.1.1 Has this hospital developed early warning system for pubic emergencies?  
□ Yes □No □Unknown（If choose “No” or “Unknown”, please jump to the question 3.2） 
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3.1.2 Does this hospital have infectious disease report or register system? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.1.3 Does this hospital have outpatient log or infectious disease report card? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.1.4 Types of monitoring items 
Type of disease/symptom Yes No 
Routine microbiological test □ □ 
Numbers of fever patients □ □ 
Influenza-like cases □ □ 
Numbers of unexplained pneumonia □ □ 
Numbers of gastroenteritis patients □ □ 
Numbers of septicemia／infectious shock □ □ 
Numbers of unexplained death toll □ □ 
Numbers of emergency room patients □ □ 
Other □ □ 
3.1.5 Analysis of surveillance information 
3.1.5.1 Does this hospital have worker that in charge of public emergencies report? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.1.5.2 How often does the hospital summarize the monitoring information? 
□everyday □many times per week□one week□every two weeks□one month  
□Other□Unknown 
3.1.5.3 Does the hospital share surveillance information with other medical organizations? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2 Capability of Laboratory 
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3.2.1 Dose laboratory have critical operation specification or manage system? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2.2 Is there technical staff is on duty in laboratory everyday (include weekends)? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2.3 Types of etiology 
3.2.3.1Could laboratory test the following etiology? 
Types Whether could test or not 
Whether has relevant training 
for testing 
SARS Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
Plague bacillus Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
Cholera Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
Anthrax Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
Influenza Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
Meningococcal meningitis Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
Japanese encephalitis  Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
Brucellosis Yes□ No□ Yes□ No□ 
3.2.3.2Does laboratory provide necessary proactive equipments to workers?  
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2.3.3 Can the hospital enlarge the capacity of sample disposal when faced with an emergency? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2.3.4 Does the hospital have the alternated laboratory? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2.3.5 Does the hospital have the protocol of transportation of suspected samples to other medical 
organizations? 
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□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2.3.6 Does the laboratory have the capacity of testing and receiving the samples around the 
clock? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
3.2.3.7 Does the hospital have a direct electronic link to disease reporting network system? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
 
Part 4 Training and Drills 
4.1 Emergency training 
4.1.1 During 2012～2013, did the hospital provide any following trainings?（if all answers 
are ”No”, jump to 4.2） 
Content of training  
Yes No 
Content of emergency plan □ □ 
Medical treatment procedures □ □ 
Methods of identifying PHE □ □ 
Awareness of public health emergencies □ □ 
Personal protective measures □ □ 
Information system management  □ □ 
disinfection and sterilization □ □ 
principles of quarantine and isolation □ □ 
4.1.2 Does this hospital evaluate the effectiveness of training periodically? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
4.1.3 Does the hospital have the designated person in charge of training work? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
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4.2 Emergency drills 
4.2.1 Does this hospital have some relevant drills? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
4.2.2 During 2011～2012, does the hospital have the following drills? 
Type of emergency plan 
Yes No 
Infectious disease □ □ 
Mass unidentified disease □ □ 
Foodborne disease □ □ 
Occupational poisoning □ □ 
Nosocomial infection □ □ 
Natural disaster □ □ 
Bio/Chemical terror □ □ 
Other： □ □ 
4.2.3 Does this hospital evaluate the effectiveness of drills periodically? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
Part5 Stockpile 
5.1 Emergency funds 
5.1.1 Dose this hospital have emergency fund stockpile plan? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.1.2 Does this hospital have funds emergency management system?  
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.1.3 Does this hospital have emergency funds?  
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
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5.1.4 Where is the emergency fund mainly from? 
□financial fund for special purposes □local health department □hospital self-collected 
5.1.5 Does the emergency fund meet emergency work needs? 
□No □Basically □Yes 
5.2 Emergency material management 
5.2.1 Dose this hospital have worker in charge of emergency material management? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.2.2 Does this hospital have plan for emergency material stockpile?  
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.2.3 Does this hospital draw up regulation for emergency materials management? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.3 Emergency drugs stockpile 
5.3.1 Dose this hospital have a certain sum of drugs? (“a certain sum “means could cure 30 people 
for 7days?) 
Types Yes No/Unknown 
SARS □ □ 
Plague bacillus □ □ 
Cholera □ □ 
Anthrax □ □ 
Influenza □ □ 
Meningococcal meningitis □ □ 
Japanese encephalitis  □ □ 
Brucellosis □ □ 
5.3.2 Does the hospital have sum certain of antibiotics? 
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□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.3.3 If the drugs are limited when emergency occurs, does hospital have a proper drug 
distribution?  
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.3.4 Does the hospital a drug-supply system with drug suppliers? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.3.5 Does the hospital have the following back-up medical installations? 
Type Yes No/Unknown 
Back-up oxygen system □ □ 
Alternated power supply system □ □ 
Alternated water works □ □ 
Back-up heating and ventilating system □ □ 
Other  □ □ 
5.3.6 Does the hospital have alternated care areas to enlarge the capacity of receiving patients? 
□nonclinical space□inpatient unit hallways□decommissioned ward space 
5.4 Personal protective equipment 
5.4.1 Does the hospital have the following protective equipments for medical staff? 
 Yes No 
High efficiency particulate masks □ □ 
HEPA filter □ □ 
Protective eyewear □ □ 
Isolation gown □ □ 
Biological protective gown □ □ 
Chemical protective gown □ □ 
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Protective gloves □ □ 
Other  
5.4.2 Does the hospital have Bio/Chemical gown for medical staff? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
5.4.3 Did the hospital ever assess the function of protective equipments before? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
Part 6 Emergency Command System 
6.1 Emergency commend system setting 
6.1.1 Does this hospital set up emergency office or relevant department is responsible for 
emergency cooperation and coordination? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
6.1.2 Is there a hospital’s manager responsible for emergency management? Position ____ 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
6.1.3 Does hospital’s manager direct and inspect the emergency work? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
6.1.4 Does the hospital have experts groups? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
6.1.5 If have,□country level____(numbers of experts)□ provincial level____□ municipal 
level____□county level____  
6.1.6 Does the hospital provide advices on public health emergency psychological counseling, 
medical intervention, health guidance, etc. for medical staff and victims? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
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Part 7 On-site rescue and medical treatment 
7.1 On-site rescue 
7.1.1 Numbers of ambulances ______ 
7.1.2Number of staff in emergency medical first-aid teams (or Emergency Department):______ 
7.1.3 Will the hospital transfer patients to other hospital if they can’t get the relevant medical 
treatments in this hospital? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
7.1.4 Does the hospital have relevant plan for transferring patients? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
7.2 Medical Treatment 
7.2.1 Hospital beds in total：____, the numbers of extra bed could be added____; 
ICU beds____, the numbers of extra bed could be added____ 
Emergency Department beds____, the numbers of extra bed could be added____ 
Isolation ward beds____ , the numbers of extra bed could be added____ 
Did the hospital ever evaluate the ability of increasing beds and equipments for emergencies? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
7.2.2 Does the hospital have the relevant medical treatment plans forpatients from the following 
emergency event? 
Type of emergency plan 
Yes No 
Infectious disease □ □ 
Mass unidentified disease □ □ 
Foodborne disease □ □ 
Occupational poisoning □ □ 
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Nosocomial infection □ □ 
Serious accidents and disasters (traumatic 
patients) □ □ 
Bio/Chemical terror □ □ 
Other： □ □ 
 
7.2.3 Does the hospital have the relevant medical treatment plans forpatients from the following 
infectious diseases? 
Types Yes No/Unknown 
SARS □ □ 
Plague bacillus □ □ 
Cholera □ □ 
Anthrax □ □ 
Influenza □ □ 
Meningococcal meningitis □ □ 
Japanese encephalitis  □ □ 
Brucellosis □ □ 
7.2.4 By which mean the hospital will maintain the sufficient numbers of staff during an 
emergency event? 
Types Yes No/Unknown 
Recall staff is on leave □ □ 
Temporary workers □ □ 
Retired employee □ □ 
Share health care providers □ □ 
Volunteers □ □ 
7.2.5 Can hospital provide priority in medical treatment for children, pregnancy, and old people? 
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□ Yes □No □Unknown 
Part 8 Crisis communication  
8.1 Has this hospital set up system for crisis communication and cooperation within hospital 
otherdepartment? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
8.2 Does this hospital have a system for communicate with other health facilities, government 
offices or media? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown 
8.3 Does the hospital have other emergency departments or organizations’ contact way? 
□ Yes □No □Unknown
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突发公共卫生事件医院应对能力调查表 
填表说明 
1、调查目的：了解某省各级医院突发公共卫生事件应急能力现状，为确定将来医疗机构突
发公共卫生事件应急工作措施、培训和重点项目提供科学依据。 
2、调查范围：各级医院 
3、调查中规定的突发公共卫生事件是指突然发生，造成或者可能造成社会公众健康严重损
害的重大传染病疫情、群体性不明原因疾病、重大食物和职业中毒以及其他严重影响公众健
康的事件。 
4、各级医院要有专人负责此项工作，组织协调相关科室专业人员填写具体内容。填写内容
要真实，不遗漏问题，各项内容要有存档材料备查。调查表单位领导审定、签名后，加盖单
位公章上报。 
5、请直接在该调查表电子文档中填写 
6、填写方式：调查表中有两种类型的问题：（1）选择题：除非有黑体字注明“此题可多选”
外，其它选择题均为单选题（即选择一个答案），请在每个问题后符合医院情况的选项（□）
/后“√”；（2）填空题：请在每个问题后的下划线处填写相关数据/内容。 
7、注意调查表中某些问题的逻辑跳转。 
8、请务必在规定时间内完成调查。调查表完成后通过电子邮件回复。 Email：
sunny.tree.t@gmail.com. 
9、填写过程中如有任何疑问，请与调研组联系。 
 
感谢您对调查工作的协助和支持！ 
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一、 医院基本情况 
1.1 医院名称：__________ 
1.2 医院地址：___________ 
1.3 医院等级（如三甲、二乙等）：_________ 
1.4 全院职工总数：________人，其中： 
 
人员类别 合计 
学历 职称 专业 
博士 硕士 本科 专科 其他 高级 中级 初级 其他 临床 其他 
1.4.1 医生             
1.4.2护理人
员 
            
1.4.3医技人
员 
            
1.5 贵院有无传染病病区：□有□无□不知道 
1.6 贵院是否收治过 SARS 病例：□是□否□不知道 
1.7 是否为教学医院：□是□否□不知道 
1.8 有无发热门诊：□有□否□不知道 
 
二、应急预案 
2.1 应急预案种类与更新 
2.1.1 贵院是否制定以下应急处理预案？（如果全部选择“否”，则跳至 4.1 题） 
种类 
是否制定该应急预案 
是 否/不知道 
传染病疫情 □ □ 
新发传染病/群体
性不明原因疾病 
□ □ 
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食源性疾病爆发 □ □ 
 
职业中毒 □ □ 
医源性感染爆发 □ □ 
 
灾害事故 □ □ 
生物/化学恐怖 □ □ 
其它（请注明）： □ □ 
2.1.2 贵院是否对制定后的应急预案/手册/文件进行过评估或者修订？ 
□是□否□不知道 
2.1.3 如是，多少时间评估修订一次？____半年_______ 
2.2 应急预案的普及 
2.2.1 贵院是否针对以上应急处理预案进行宣传或培训？□是□否□不知道 
2.2.2 如果有医疗救治预案，在突发公共卫生事件发生前临床医生是否知晓这些最新方案？
□是□否□不知道 
2.2.3 贵院工作人员可通过哪些途径获得应急处理预案？（此题可多选） 
□印刷资料□医院内部网站□培训□会议□其它（请注明）： 
三、监测与预警 
3.1 疾病监测 
3.1.1 贵院是否建立了突发公共卫生事件预警系统?□是□否□不知道（回答“否”或“不知
道”请跳转 3.2） 
3.1.2 贵院是否有传染病登记/报告制度？□是□否□不知道 
3.1.3 贵院是否有门诊日志及传染病报告登记簿或报告卡？□是□否□不知道 
3.1.4 监测事件的种类 
贵院是否对以下情况进行监测？ 是 否/不知道 
微生物检测报告 □ □ 
急诊入院人数 □ □ 
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发热人数 □ □ 
流感样病例数 □ □ 
不明原因死亡人数 □ □ 
胃肠炎病人数 □ □ 
败血症／感染性休克人数 □ □ 
3.1.5 监测信息分析与处理 
3.1.5.1 贵院是否有人员负责传染病等突发公共卫生事件报告工作？□是□否□不知道 
3.1.5.2 能否即使将监测的异常信息上报上级主管卫生行政机构？□是□否□不知道 
3.1.5.2 医院监测系统进行信息汇总的时间间隔是： 
□每天□一周数次□每周□每两周□每月□其他□不知道 
3.1.5.3 贵院是否能与当地卫生部门/其它机构共享异常病例所提供的信息？ 
□是□否□不知道 
3.2 实验室检测能力 
3.2.1 贵院实验室是否有严格的操作规程和管理制度？□是□否□不知道 
3.2.2 贵院实验室是否每天（包括周末）24 小时都有技术人员值班？□是□否 
3.2.3 检测致病源种类 
3.2.3.1 贵院实验室能否检测出以下致病源？ 
病原生物种类 目前是否开展检测 是否曾接受培训 
霍乱弧菌 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
SARS 冠状病毒 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
鼠疫 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
炭疽热 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
流行性感冒 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
流行性脑脊膜炎 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
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乙型脑炎病毒 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
布鲁氏菌 是□否/不知道□ 是□否/不知道□ 
3.2.3.2 实验室是否为工作人员提供必要的防护用品？□是□否□不知道 
3.2.3.3  如果紧急需求量显著增加，贵院的实验室是否具备能迅速扩大处理和检测标本的能
力？□是□否□不知道 
3.2.3.4 一旦贵院的实验室被污染，是否有备用的实验室可供使用？□是□否□不知道 
3.2.3.5 是否可以将可疑标本安全的进行院外运送？□是□否□不知道 
3.2.3.6 实验室检测结果能否保证第一时间识别突发事件？□是□否□不知道 
3.2.3.7 贵院是否能通过网络直报系统与当地卫生部门/其它机构共享提供的信息？□是□否
□不知道 
 
四、应急培训与演练 
4.1 应急培训 
4.1.1 2012～2013 年贵院工作人员是否参加以下内容的培训？（注：如果医院工作人员没有
参加过任何培训，则跳至 4.2 题。） 
突发公共卫生事件 是 否/不知道 
突发事件预案相关内容 □ □ 
医疗救治措施 □ □ 
传染病的预防与控制 □ □ 
突发公共卫生事件背景知识 □ □ 
个人防护方法 □ □ 
检疫隔离规则 □ □ 
信息系统管理 □ □ 
消毒进化原则 □ □ 
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4.1.2 贵院是否对培训效果进行定期考核评估？□是□否□不知道 
4.1.3 是否有专人负责与突发公共卫生事件有关的培训□是□否□不知道 
4.2 应急演练 
4.2.1 贵院是否开展或参加过相关应急演练？□是□否（“否”，请跳至 5.1） 
4.2.2 2011～2012 年贵院是否开展或参加以下应急演练？ 
突发公共卫生事件 是 否/不知道 
传染病（如 SARS 和禽流感等） □ □ 
新发传染病/群体性不明原因疾病 □ □ 
食源性疾病爆发 □ □ 
职业中毒 □ □ 
医源性感染爆发 □ □ 
灾害事故 □ □ 
生物/化学恐怖 □ □ 
4.2.3 贵院是否对演练效果进行考核评估?□是□否□不知道 
五、后勤保障 
5.1 应急资金管理 
5.1.1 贵院是否制定应急资金储备计划？□是□否□不知道 
5.1.2 贵院是否制定应急资金管理制度？□是□否□不知道 
5.1.3 贵院是否设有应急资金？ 
□有，□无 
5.1.4 贵院的应急资金来源（此题可多选）： 
□市财政专项拨款□当地卫生行政部门拨款□医院自筹 
5.1.5 贵院的应急资金是否可以满足工作需要？□不可以□基本能够□能够 
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5.2 应急物资管理 
5.2.1 贵院是否有专人负责应急物资储备管理？□是□否□不知道 
5.2.2 贵院是否制定应急物质储备计划？□是□否□不知道 
5.2.3 贵院是否制定应急物资管理制度？□是□否□不知道 
5.3 应急药品储备 
5.3.1 贵院是否进行过药品储备评估□是□否□不知道，以及是否储备有治疗一定数量（“一
定数量”是指储备有治疗某种传染病或中毒情况 30 人 7 天的药品量）的药品？ 
种类 是 否/不知道 
霍乱弧菌 □ □ 
SARS 冠状病毒 □ □ 
鼠疫 □ □ 
炭疽热 □ □ 
流行性感冒 □ □ 
流行性脑脊膜炎 □ □ 
乙型脑炎病毒 □ □ 
布鲁氏菌 □ □ 
5.3.2 贵院是否储备有一定数量的抗生药品？ 
□是□否□不知道 
5.3.3 在应对突发事件时，如果药品供给有限，贵院是否有相应的药品分配方案？ 
□是□否□不知道 
5.3.4 贵院是否与某些药品供应商建立了应急药物供给系统？ 
□是□否□不知道 
5.3.5 贵院是否应急资源储备？□是□否□不知道（否或不知道请调至第六部分） 
5.3.6 包括下列哪些资源？ 
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种类 是 否/不知道 
供电系统 □ □ 
供水系统 □ □ 
供氧系统 □ □ 
供暖和通风 □ □ 
其他 □ □ 
5.3.7 在发生紧急情况时，当院内空间紧缺，贵院是否可以通过一下方式扩大接收病人能力？ 
□住院部走廊□废弃的病房□其他非临床区域 
5.4 个人防护用品 
5.4.1 贵院是否有下列防护设备以供工作人员和医务人员使用？ 
种类 是 否/不知道 
高效微粒子口罩（N95） □ □ 
高效微粒空气过滤器 □ □ 
动力空气进化口罩 □ □ 
防护镜 □ □ 
呼吸机 □ □ 
其他 □ □ 
5.4.2 贵院是否有生物化学防护服供工作人员使用？□是□否□不知道 
5.4.3 贵院是否对个人防护设备进行过功能检测？□是□否□不知道 
六、应急机构与人员 
6.1 应急指挥部门设置与人员构成 
6.1.1 贵院是否成立应急处理办公室（或相当的职能部门）负责本院应急协调或处理工作？
□是（跳至 6.1.3 题）□否 
6.1.2 贵院是否有领导分管应急工作？□是，________（注明分管领导的行政职务）□否 
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6.1.3 贵院领导是否定期现场检查指导医院应急工作？□是□否 
6.1.4 贵院有无专家进入各级应急专家委员会/组？□有□无（则跳至 6.1 题） 
6.1.5 如有（此题可多选）：□国家级：___人□省级：___人□市级：____人□县级：__人 
6.1.6 贵院是否向受害者以及家属提供心理服务、保健指导、隔离措施信息、医疗干预？ 
□是□否□不知道 
 
七、现场救援和医疗救治 
7.1 现场救援 
7.1.1 贵院有救护转运车：______辆 
7.1.2 医疗急救队人数：_____人（如果没有成立明确的医疗急救队，以医院急诊科人数为计） 
7.1.3 如果突发事件中的受害者不能在贵院得到治疗，是否将其转到相应医院进行救治？ 
□是□否□不知道 
7.1.4 如是，是否有转移病人的具体方案？ 
□是□否□不知道 
7.2 医疗救治 
7.2.1 医院病床数： 
医院病床总数：_____张，负压病房：____间, 应急时可增加普通床位_____张 
急诊科病床数：___张，应急时可增加床位数：____张； 
传染科病床数：___张，应急时可增加床位数：____张； 
重症监护病床数：____张，应急时可增加床位数：_____张。 
贵院是否对大量急诊病人或者病人数量急剧增加时，医院增加床位和相应的设备进行评估？ 
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□是□否□不知道 
 
7.2.2 贵院是否有接收和治疗以下突发事件中受害者的具体方案／治疗手册? 
突发公共卫生事件 是 否/不知道 
传染病（如 SARS 和禽流感等） □ □ 
新发传染病/群体性不明原因疾病 □ □ 
食源性疾病爆发 □ □ 
职业中毒 □ □ 
医源性感染爆发 □ □ 
灾害事故(烧伤、外伤) □ □ 
生物/化学恐怖 □ □ 
 
7.2.3 贵院是否有接收和治疗以下传染病中受害者的具体方案／治疗手册? 
类型 是/否 否/不知道 
霍乱弧菌 □ □ 
SARS 冠状病毒 □ □ 
鼠疫 □ □ 
炭疽热 □ □ 
流行性感冒 □ □ 
流行性脑脊膜炎 □ □ 
乙型脑炎病毒 □ □ 
布鲁氏菌 □ □ 
7.2.4 突发事件发生时，贵院是否采取以下措施来解决人力资源不足 
方式 是 否/不知道 
召回正在休息工作人员 □ □ 
聘请本院退休职工 □ □ 
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征用其他医院或者中心工作人员 □ □ 
使用临时雇员 □ □ 
使用志愿者 □ □ 
其他 □ □ 
7.2.5 发生突发事件时，贵院是否能够优先为儿童、孕妇、老人以及残疾等弱势群体提供服
务？□是□否□不知道 
八、危机沟通与合作 
8.1 贵院是否建立院内各部门应急沟通协调工作制度？□是□否 
8.2 贵院是否主动与其他应急相关部门（如新闻媒体、疾控等）进行沟通协调？□是□否 
8.3 贵院是否有其他应急相关部门的联系方式？□有□无 
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